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Abstract 
This thesis looks at conceptual combination, in particular it investigates how 
noun noun compounds are interpreted. Several themes run throughout the work. 
Real compounds (e.g. coat hanger, crab apple) are compared to novel ones (e.g. 
banjo cactus, zip violin). Also, compounds are examined in each of the possible 
permutations of artefacts (A) (e.g. coat, banjo) and natural kinds (N) (e.g. crab, 
cactus), (AA, AN, NA and NN). 
Experiments 1 - 4 examine noncompositionality in noun noun compounds. 
Possible sources of noncompositionality are investigated using both feature 
listing and feature rating tasks. Although some differences were found, results 
were similar between different types of compound, evidence of 
noncompositionality being found in each. The results also confirm that most of 
the meaning of a noun noun compound is derived from the second constituent 
(noun2). 
Experiments 5 and 6 look at two different types of compound interpretation - slot 
filling and property mapping. In experiment 5, slot filling is found to be the 
preferred interpretation type overall, but property mapping is more common in 
compounds composed of two natural kinds (NN). Experiment 6 examines 
possible factors influencing the choice between slot filling and property mapping 
interpretations. It was found that constituent similarity plays an important role, 
and also that this interacts with whether or not the constituents have important 
properties which clash. 
Experiment 7 looks at compound identification. Results suggest that the first 
constituent (nounl) may be critical in such tasks. Experiment 8 compares the 
importance of nounl and noun2 in determining the type of interpretation given to 
a compound. Neither position is found to be more influential than the other, 
although relational information does seem to be associated with specific nouns in 
each position. 
Throughout the thesis findings are related to current theories of conceptual 
combination, such as prototype models, the concept specialisation model and 
theories of compound interpretation by analogy. 
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Chapter one: Introduction and Literature Review 
What Is A Concept ? 
A seemingly appropriate issue to address before discussing details of research, is 
that of what counts as a concept. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, this is not an 
easy question to answer. There are two identifiable and distinct forms of 
circularity related to this issue, the first is straight-forward and problematic, the 
second is less simple, but perhaps more helpful. 
(i) We ask the question, "What is a concept ?", as a prelude to the study of 
concepts, since it makes sense to have some idea of what we are meant to be 
investigating before we begin. But, inevitably, a principle reason for wanting to 
study concepts is that we don't yet know the answer to this very question, and we 
are trying to find it out. So, in some sense there is no possible, logical starting 
point for such a programme of investigation. 
(ii) In asking, "What is a concept ?" we are formulating a conceptual question in 
a sense beyond the trivial - it could be rephrased, "What is the concept "concept" 
?" We presuppose some answer, moreover we are implicitly making a judgement 
as to what kind of thing we are prepared to accept as an answer. That is to say, 
the appreciation of what the question itself may entail gives us some indication 
of what a concept is. Undeniably such inferences are nebulous and inadequate, 
but they at least provide a starting point. 
From such an insight, we can derive an initial understanding of concepts - they 
are a cognitive tool for information processing. Rosch (1978) describes two 
"general and basic principles" with respect to the role of categories. 
"The first has to do with the function of category systems and asserts 
that the task of category systems is to provide maximum information 
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with the least cognitive effort; the second has to do with the structure 
of the information so provided, and asserts that the perceived world 
comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary or 
unpredictable attributes. Thus maximum information with least 
cognitive effort is achieved i f categories map the perceived world 
structure as closely as possible." (Rosch, 1978 p312). 
From these two principles, Rosch infers more information about the likely nature 
of categories. Firstly, that some levels of hierarchy wi l l , in general, be more 
useful than others, since they better mirror the perceived world, secondly that, 
since some aspects of our experience are more frequent or more pertinent than 
others, there should be some representation of these variations in frequency 
within categories, via some form of prototypicality. 
Similarly, a form of introspection led Wittgenstein (1953) to the conclusion that 
concepts are not bounded, at least not in a simple way, 
"Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so on. 
What is common to them all ? - Don't say "There MUST be something 
common or they would not be called 'games" but LOOK AND SEE 
whether there is anything common to all. -For i f you look at them you 
wil l see not something that is common to ALL, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't 
think, but look !" (Wittgenstein, 1953, p31) 
Wittgenstein goes on to use the expression "family resemblances" to characterise 
these similarities. So theoretical analysis of how and why we use concepts has 
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informed us to some extent of the kind of things we are looking at. However, 
set of guidelines as to what processes are looked at in experimental work is also 
required. The following is from Medin and Smith, (1984). 
"The following four functions (after Rey, 1984) seem particularly 
important: 
1. SIMPLE CATEGORIZATION: the means by which people decide 
whether or not something belongs to a simple class (e.g. deciding that 
a particular object is an instance of the concept BOY). 
2. COMPLEX CATEGORIZATION: the means by which people 
decide whether or not something belongs to a complex class (e.g. 
deciding that a particular object is an instance of the concept RICH 
BOY). 
3. LINGUISTIC MEANING: that part of the meaning of a term that 
explains relations of synonymy, antinomy, and semantic implication 
(e.g. that part of the meaning of "boy" that explains why it is roughly 
synonymous to "lad" and implies being male and young). 
4. COMPONENTS OF COGNITIVE STATES: the critical 
components of beliefs, preferences, and other cognitive states; in this 
role, concepts are what provide a cognitive explanation of complex 
thought and behavior (e.g. the roles played by the concepts RICH, 
BOYS and SPOILED in someone's belief that rich boys are spoiled)." 
(Medin and Smith, 1984, p i 14), 
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In considering what linguistic entities are counted as concepts a comment from 
the same paper, but attributed to Miller (G.A. Miller, 1982, personal 
communication), is also worth noting,"... those interested in categorization think 
that concept is spelled "N.O.U.N"" (Medin and Smith, 1984, p. 122). Although 
this comment ignores some work (e.g. Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976), and is 
less true now than when first published, it is still a broad truth. It is probably the 
case that nouns are seen as "safe" examples of concepts, and so are used by 
researchers most commonly. This thesis also investigates noun concepts. It 
should be recognised though, that this weight of attention is hard to justify on 
theoretical grounds, and may lead to an unbalanced representation of concepts, 
with those concepts related to actions or events, for example, being largely 
ignored by cognitive psychology. 
Theories Of Concepts 
In the study of concepts, as with many areas of cognitive psychology, it is very 
difficult to divorce the findings of research from the theoretical framework of the 
researcher concerned. This is in part due to the range of techniques used in 
obtaining data. I shall therefore discuss these three aspects of the literature as an 
integrated whole, as their interdependence demands. In doing so I adhere to the 
conventional technique for such a discussion, and subdivide the topic into types 
of theories. 
Unfortunately there appears to be no consensus as to the best way to carry out 
such a division. There is a so called classical view, which is taken as a starting 
point, and with which other theories are contrasted. This classical view assumes 
that concepts are defined by lists of features. Other theories reflect the 
probabilistic nature of categorisation. Amongst classifications, these theories 
have been lumped together as "prototype" theories (Costello & Keane 1992), 
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divided into "defining- and characteristic-attribute theories" and "characteristic-
attribute theories" (Eysenck & Keane, 1990) or into "probabilistic" and 
"exemplar" theories (Medin & Smith, 1984). I shall first describe the classical 
view, and then the prototype and exemplar views, both of which are probabilistic 
in nature. 
There is another dimension along which a useful division of theories can be 
imposed, particularly relevant to recent work - this is the extent to which general 
world knowledge is held to inform categorical judgements. More traditional 
views have tended to assume that the intension of a concept is finite, i f perhaps 
probabilistically based. General knowledge, or "theory" based views claim that 
our extensive theories of the world at large have a major influence. However, the 
evidence on which such theories are founded comes largely from studies of 
conceptual combination, so I propose to deal with theory-based views when I 
discuss the specific issues of complex concepts. In the present discussion, I shall 
divide the theories into two main sections, classical and probabilistic, with the 
latter section being further sub-divided into prototype and exemplar views. 
The Classical View 
The central claim of the classical view is that an item X, is a member of concept 
Y i f it complies with certain, defined rules. In other words, the intension of a 
concept is a list of attributes, and that category membership is an "all-or-nothing" 
affair. As wil l be immediately apparent, this view entails that concepts should 
behave in a straight-forward, simple fashion, but this is not in fact found to be 
the case. As seen from the work of Wittgenstein cited above, concepts, e.g. 
games, are not characterised by a set of necessary and sufficient features, but are 
better described as being comprised of items which bear a family resemblance, 
one to another (Wittgenstein, 1953, or Rosch & Mervis, 1975 for an 
12 
experimental account). This is a severe failing, perhaps the most severe, of the 
classical view. Related to this problem are others. There is, for example, no room 
in such a theory for unclear cases of category membership. Yet the psychological 
reality is that there is often considerable doubt as to whether or not a particular 
item belongs in a category: Is a rug furniture? It is even the case that a single 
subject wi l l give different answers on different occasions (McCloskey & 
Glucksberg, 1978). 
Another major stumbling block is evidence of a typicality range within concepts. 
According to the classical view an item cannot be a more or less typical member 
of a class - it is simply a member or not. This is in stark contrast to the actual 
state of affairs, in which even the concepts most likely to conform to such a 
principle (e.g. "odd numbers") show typicality effects (Armstrong et al, 1983). 
The classical view cannot stand up to the weight of evidence against it. It is still 
often referred to in the literature though. This is in part because of its intuitive 
appeal - it is perhaps the view most similar to the folk psychological theories that 
people have of concepts. The issue of how people believe concepts behave can 
be important. This possibility also accounts for the fact that it is the view from 
which later theories are derived, arising from the evidence mounted against it. 
Finally, it is not yet clear that the classical view has no role to play. It may be 
significant as a process of categorisation when other techniques are inhibited, or 
with respect to specific kinds of concept. 
Probabilistic Views : prototypes and exemplars 
A fundamentally different alternative to the classical view is required i f the 
phenomena recorded from studies of concepts are to be explained. The 
probabilistic view rejects the notion that any criteria can be laid down as 
13 
absolutely determining category membership. Rather, membership of a category 
is determined by the similarity between the item in question, and a representation 
of the concept. This representation may take the form of a prototype, or of 
previously encountered category members. These two cases are the prototype 
and exemplar views respectively. In both cases the representation conveys 
typicality, that is, information of a probabilistic nature. 
Prototype View 
This view contends that a concept is represented by some prototypical entity. 
The major proponent for this view of concepts has been Rosch, who with other 
researchers in the 1970's, found much evidence in favour of prototypes. 
Rosch (1978) cites research using a range of psychological variables, all of 
which implies the importance of prototypes :-
Speed of Processing : Reaction Time : people have faster categorisation 
responses for items rated as more typical members of the category concerned 
than for less typical members. Rosch et al (1976) demonstrated this even with 
artificial categories devised in an experiment which controlled factors such as 
frequency. 
Speed of Learning : Rosch et al (1976) found that prototypicality of stimuli 
predicted speed of learning artificial categories. Anglin (1976) and Rosch (1973) 
found evidence that children learn good examples of categories before less 
typical ones. 
Order and probability of item output : Battig and Montague (1969) asked 
subjects to list the members of various superordinate categories. The order in 
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which they are listed correlates with prototypicality. Rosch et al (1976) found 
that both order and frequency of output correlated well with rated typicality of 
artificial categories. 
Priming : The typicality of items in a category determines how strongly the 
category name wil l prime that item. This has been shown across several category 
types (Rosch, 1975b&c; Rosch et al, 1976b). 
Logic of Natural Language use of Category Terms : Various aspects of natural 
language use suggest that categories are structured by typicality. For example, 
the acceptability of hedges, such as "virtually", or "technically" correlates with 
typicality (Lakoff, 1972; Rosch, 1975a). 
This body of evidence, however should not be seen as pointing to a particular 
model. In the words of Rosch (1978, p318), "To speak of a prototype at all is 
simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are 
judgements of degree of prototypicality." Prototypicality should be seen as a 
constraint, which a model of categorisation should satisfy, rather than a theory in 
its own right. These arguments for prototypicality are not to be confused with the 
suggestion that a concept is defined by similarity to, for example, an average 
template image, they might equally well support, for example, propositional or 
structural representations (Rosch, 1978). Clearly, the notion of prototypicality 
does away with many of the problems associated with the classical view. There 
is no need to search for sufficient and necessary characteristics, and there is a 
built in assumption that some features are more salient or important than others. 
There is also the important difference of probabilistic rather than definite class 
inclusion, since the category boundaries are not strict, but fuzzy. 
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Two principle criticisms are levelled at the prototype approach. The first 
concerns the validity of inferring a prototypicality structure of representation 
from evidence of apparent prototypicality effects in the output, or treatment of 
information. The second relates to the loss of useful information involved in the 
formation of a prototype. The first of these arguments was made by Armstrong, 
Gleitman and Gleitman (1983), who demonstrated just the same prototypicality 
effects in operation when dealing with concepts specifically chosen for their 
obvious non-probabilistic nature. That is, concepts like "odd number" which 
have a clear "all or nothing" definition do exhibit typicality effects. Armstrong et 
al argue that i f concepts we know to be non-prototypical exhibit typicality 
effects, we are not entitled to infer prototypicality of structure for any other 
concepts from this sort of evidence. This argument might constitute a real 
problem for proponents of a prototype theory. However, there is still work that 
needs to be done to clarify the status of the claim that "non-prototypical concepts 
show typicality effects". On closer examination, all Armstrong et al have shown 
is that categories which can be classically defined, can also show typicality 
effects. It is possible that, even though subjects are aware that there are definite 
criteria for judging "oddness" of numbers, they do not normally represent the 
concept in such terms. In other words, the assumption that classically defined 
concepts are necessarily classically represented is itself unfounded. 
It seems that subjects employ a probabilistic judgement heuristic to this situation. 
Whether this is seen as implying that such procedures mask the structure of all 
concepts in a veil of typicality effects, remains to be seen. An alternative 
explanation can be sought by reference to a possible two tier representation. This 
might envisage an explicit, classically defined category "odd numbers", in 
parallel with an implicit probabilistic representation or identification procedure, 
which would manifest itself via a graded value of oddness of numbers. There 
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appears to be scope for empirical investigation of this possibility. It is likely that, 
i f there is such a two tier system responsible for these effects, then each 
component could be individually inhibited. I f for example the typicality effects 
are the result of a probabilistic identification mechanism, this might be bypassed 
by explicitly supplying information which is absolutely diagnostic of category 
membership (for example, subjects may be encouraged to attend only to the 
final digit of numbers, and use this to judge whether the number is odd or even). 
The second major criticism is that the suggestion of a prototype inevitably 
condenses the information to a large extent. This is considered unsatisfactory, 
since there appear to be items of relational information concerning the internal 
structure of categories to which we have access, but which wouldn't have been 
stored in a prototype. The best example of this concerns complex concepts 
derived from simple concepts. The information contained in such complexes 
could not be derived form simple prototypes (Osherson and Smith, 1981). This 
problem is addressed in more detail in the discussion of complex concepts 
below. 
Exemplar View 
The exemplar view asserts that a concept, rather than being represented by an 
abstraction of its elements (as in the prototype view), is simply represented by 
the instances of the concept themselves. It retains the probabilistic nature of the 
prototype view by determining categorisation on the basis of similarity to 
existing category members. The two major arguments in favour of this view are 
firstly that some useful (and apparently used) information, (e.g. about the range 
of elements within a concept) is discarded by prototype formation, and secondly 
that such a system is unjustified unless it can be shown to be necessary. 
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There are however, inevitable problems with the idea that it is simpler to allow 
the instances of concepts to represent themselves than to construct a 
representation that is abstracted from the instances. It would require that 
apparently simple superordinate categories have a huge definition, e.g. consider 
the representation of "things" under this system. This is surely perverting 
principles of cognitive economy. It is also founded on the assumption that 
abstracting features from an element somehow excludes the specific attributes of 
that element from being accessed. Obviously such an outcome would be 
intolerable, but it is not clear that it is a necessary implication of prototype 
systems, in the generous sense of Rosen (1978), who writes, "For natural-
language categories, to speak of a single entity that is the prototype is either a 
gross misunderstanding of the empirical data or a covert theory of mental 
representation." (Rosch, 1978, p318). Finally, proposing such an exemplar view 
is rather confusing theoretically. I f it is the extensional exemplars themselves 
which define concepts, then it is not a psychological model. On the other hand, i f 
it is the case that our mental representations of exemplars define our concepts, 
then the theory is rather empty in that it still requires that some suitable model be 
found for representing the exemplars themselves. 
Assessment Of The Available Theories 
In the words of Medin and Smith, in a review of this area, "The present state of 
affairs is less than satisfying." (Smith and Medin, 1984, p i 19). They also 
identified a number of questions which the extant literature failed to address 
satisfactorily. Two of these questions in particular have received considerable 
amount of attention in the intervening years. These are the questions of concept 
combination, and concept coherence. Although some models of conceptual 
representation have been specifically designed to address both questions, and 
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nearly all make some reference to both, this thesis concentrates on the topic of 
concept combination. 
Are all Types of Concepts the Same? 
Complicating the central question of what type of representation concepts might 
have, is the issue of whether or not different types of concepts might have 
different forms of representation. It is possible that there are in fact important 
differences between ontological categories of concepts. The most common 
distinction drawn is between artefacts (such as tools, clothes, furniture etc.) and 
natural kinds (such as plants, animals, chemicals etc.). Other categories such as 
emotions (Wierzbicka, 1994), speech sounds (Barsalou, 1992) and nominal kinds 
(Keil, 1989) could also be considered distinct, but since the natural kind / 
artefact distinction is most well researched, I concentrate on those categories 
here. 
Philosophical Evidence 
The origins for supposing such a distinction are in philosophy, principally from 
Kripke (1972a) and Putnam (1975). Putnam noted that for natural kinds such as 
lemon and water, it is not possible to specify a list of criteria which absolutely 
rules any item in or out of that category. This led him to the conclusion that 
concepts are not formed on the basis of features, but in the belief that there is 
some underlying essence. The role of surface features (such as colour, taste and 
texture) in categorisation is as indicators to what the underlying essence of an 
item may be. Quite what might constitute such an essence did not concern 
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Putnam, although he suggests such notions as chromosomal and subatomic 
structure may be the right sort of thing.1 
Putnam later generalised this essentialist theory beyond natural kind concepts. 
"It follows that "pencil" is not synonymous with a loose description. 
When we use the word "pencil", we intend to refer to whatever has the 
same nature as the normal examples of the local pencils in the actual 
world" (Putnam, 1975, p. 162). 
As an illustration, Putnam describes a thought experiment in which microscopic 
examination of pencils reveals that they are in fact not manmade, but are 
biological organisms. The critical point is that upon this discovery we are likely 
to still claim that what we previously believed to be pencils are still pencils, and 
that we have simply changed our belief about what attributes a pencil has. In 
doing so we are revealing our belief that pencils have an underlying essence.2 
However, Schwartz (1978) points out that when confronted with single items 
which contradict our beliefs, we behave differently with respect to artefacts and 
natural kinds. I f we discover that our pet cat is actually robotic, we alter our 
beliefs about that individual to exclude it from the category "cats". The case of 
artefacts is different. It is possible (though highly improbable) that a pencil could 
be formed by a bolt of lightening happening to fuse various elements in an 
1 Stressing that essences are a matter of belief rather than metaphysical fact, Medin and Ortony 
have used the term "psychological essentialism" for a version of this theory (Medin and Ortony, 
1989). 
2 As thought experiments go, this one does rather tax the imagination. However, an informal but 
large scale experiment' can be interpreted similarly. An edition of the television programme 
Panorama (April 1st, 1957) chronicled the harvest of spaghetti from the large bushes on which it 
was said to grow. That this counterfactual biological origin for an artefact was widely accepted at 
the time (Dimbleby, 1975) illustrates people's readiness to accept such findings as plausible. 
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appropriate structure. Although this would certainly not be manmade, we would 
still believe it to be a pencil. It appears that there is therefore a basis for a 
theoretical distinction between artefacts and natural kinds. 
Cognitive Psychological Evidence 
Empirical evidence on these questions is mixed. Malt (1992) found (in 
agreement with Schwartz's thought experiment) that intended function was 
neither necessary nor sufficient for membership of artefact categories. In a later 
study Malt (1994) looked at the case of water being defined by the chemical 
formula H 2 0 , with ambiguous results in several different studies. In one study, 
subjects were asked to judge the acceptability of sentences about substances 
known as "water" but not composed entirely of H2O, such as puddle water, or 
mineral water. Sentences were like (i) "puddle water is a type of H 2 0 " , and (ii) 
"puddle water is mostly but not entirely H2O". Sentence (i) contradicts the 
essentialist view, since puddle water is not itself H2O, but some kind of mixture, 
whereas sentence (ii) is consistent with essentialism. Since subjects found both 
statements about various kinds of water acceptable, Malt concluded that we can 
use both an essentialist sense and a nonessentialist sense of water. Similarly 
mixed findings were obtained by Braisby et al (1996). They empirically tested 
people's judgements about natural kind concepts as influenced by new 
"discoveries" which might be counter to supposed essential characteristics. 
Responses were found to vary in their consistency with essentialism, depending 
upon the type of discovery presented.3 
In contrast, Barton and Komatsu (1989) found that for most of their subjects both 
artefacts and natural kinds have some essential characteristics. Subjects were 
3 Braisby et al reject essentialism on this evidence, on the grounds that essentialism itself entails an 
invariance under changes of context. 
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asked questions of the form "Would a pencil still be a pencil i f it were like a 
pencil in all ways except that....?" where the continuation of the question referred 
to a change in either chromosomal/molecular structure, function, or a physical 
feature. For artefacts, only the appropriate function was necessary, and for 
natural kinds only the chromosomal/molecular structure was necessary. 
The relevant cognitive psychological evidence is therefore balanced, with 
various researchers claiming that essentialism holds for both artefacts and 
natural kinds, or just natural kinds, or neither. The behaviour of subjects seems 
quite dependent upon the specifics of the task. 
Other Evidence 
Other studies have also produced evidence that artefact and natural kind 
concepts are significantly different in their mental representation, Wierzbicka 
(1994) points out that natural kinds are organised hierarchically (e.g. creature -
bird - sparrow) whereas artefacts are not. That superordinate natural kinds are 
count nouns (e.g. 3 birds, 3 plants), while superordinate artefacts are not (*3 
furnitures, *3 clothings) is indicative of such a difference. 
There are also several accounts of neurological injury resulting in cognitive 
deficits relating specifically to one category, while leaving the other intact. 
Caramazza et al (1994) catalogue a number of such cases. 
Overall, there seems good evidence for supposing that there are important and 
interesting differences between artefacts and natural kinds. Whether or not this 
consists of a fundamental difference in essentialist terms is a moot point, but 
there would appear to be ample evidence to suggest that artefact and natural kind 
concepts wi l l behave differently in some circumstances. 
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Models Of Conceptual Combination 
The Significance Of Complex Concepts 
People are very good at combining concepts. Not only do we readily understand 
complex concepts that we may have heard before, but there is often little 
difficulty in understanding entirely novel combinations. However, as a topic of 
research, it is first necessary to decide what qualifies as a complex concept. This 
entails all the problems referred to earlier relating to simple concepts, and more. 
For example, concepts can be linguistically combined in more or less explicit 
ways, e.g. the form "pets which are also fish" may differ from "pet fish". The 
literature appears to be in general accord with the notion that any non-idiomatic 
phrase comprised of two or more lexical units describes a complex concept.4 
There are also inevitable problems with mixing grammatically different word 
types. The more difficult cases, such as verbs, tend not to have been addressed, 
but work has been carried out on adjective-noun, adverb-adjective-noun, and 
noun-noun combinations. Apart from the need to understand complex concepts 
for their own sake, there are related areas of language use which may be 
understood by the same process. For example, simile and metaphor both seem to 
require some complexing of two concepts to derive both their literal and non-
literal meanings. There is also the promise of understanding something of the 
nature of simple concepts, from looking at their complexes. 
How Theories Relate To Complex Concepts 
The various theories of conceptual combination discussed below each make 
there own predictions about the relationship between a complex concept and its 
component parts. In discussing these, a number of important findings on the 
4 Although such a definition is useful, it is worth bearing in mind that it may ultimately be of little 
use, since how we define terms such as "concept" and "lexical unit" remains unclear. 
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behaviour of complex concepts, often in contradiction to the proposed models, 
wil l be introduced. 
Intensions And Extensions 
The relationship between a complex concept and its constituents has often been 
expressed in terms of set theory, which is a useful way of representing such 
combinations. Before looking at theories of concept combination, it is therefore 
important to appreciate the relationship between the intension and the extension 
in terms of the intersection and union of sets. Set theoretic descriptions of 
concept combination under different models of concepts are therefore given 
here. 
Classical View 
Classically, the union of the intensions ( A j u B j ) of two categories corresponds 
with the intersection of the extensions (AgOBg), as shown in f ig 1.1. That is, 
things which have all the characteristics of A and all the characteristics of B are 
members of both A and B. 
Fig 1.1: The Relationship between the Union of the Intension and Extension in 
the Classical View 
Intension Extension 
Prototype View 
The prototype view provides a less straight-forward relationship, the nature of 
which is determined by the criteria relating intension to extension used in a 
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particular prototype model. Assuming class-inclusion to be determined by a 
function of similarity between intension (i.e., the prototype) and the item being 
categorised exceeding some threshold, we can predict a relationship of the form 
shown in f ig 1.1, that is, identical to the classical view. However, it may be that 
the threshold is variable, perhaps decreasing when more features are specified, 
this would introduce a psychologically realistic unpredictability into the 
situation, allowing inclusion of some items in A e n B e , but not in A j u B j . 
Exemplar View 
The correspondence in the exemplar view is more straight forward, since there is 
no logical difference between the extension and intension. The union of the 
intensions ( A j u B j ) therefore corresponds with the union of the extensions 
(AgUBg), as shown in fig 1.2. 
Fig 1.2 : The Relationship between the Union of the Intension and Extension in 
the Exemplar View 
Intension Extension 
Theories of Concept Combination 
Having seen how views of concepts differ with respect to concept combination in 
terms of set theory, I now examine how these differences relate to empirical 
situations. 
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Classical View 
This tradition predicts that the extensional complex of two concepts will be the 
conjunction of the sets of members of the two concepts. An example to illustrate 
this is as follows: the combined concept "orphan girl" contains all those 
individuals who are both girls and orphans. For this example, the theory works 
well, but this is the exception rather than the rule. One could think of countless 
examples where such an prediction fails, consider "mechanical engineer", "chair 
leg" or "coffee cup". The theory therefore demands very little by way of 
refutation. It is however useful in what it illustrates. It becomes very clear that 
different combinations behave as different grammatical forms. This is an 
observation to which subsequent theories ought perhaps pay more attention than 
they do, as wi l l be discussed below. 
The Probabilistic Views : Prototypes and Exemplars 
In order that the probabilistic nature of human conceptualisation can be 
accurately modelled, researchers have employed fuzzy set theory, in which each 
item belongs to a set with a certain probability, a formulation of the prototype 
view of concepts.. Fuzzy sets, just like well defined ones, can be combined. 
Since fuzzy sets contain information relating to the typicality of a member to the 
set, it is possible to convey this information to the combined concept too. The 
precise description of the process is open to debate, but the min rule (Zadeh, 
1965, 1982) is the most commonly adopted principle. This rule considers the 
probabilities of a particular item being a member of the individual constituent 
concepts. It takes the lowest of these to be the probability of that item being a 
member of the complex concept. There are alternatives to this, e.g. taking the 
product of the individual probabilities to be the probability of membership of the 
complex (Costello & Keane, 1992). However it wi l l be seen that by any such 
process, the probability of being a member of a complex cannot exceed that of 
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being a member of any simple constituent, i.e. The 'min' rule is the most 
generous formulation possible. 
This prediction has caused the prototype view perhaps its biggest problems. 
Osherson & Smith (1981), demonstrated that in some instances an item is a far 
more typical member of the complex than of either constituent. E.g. the guppy is 
a relatively atypical example of a pet, and it is not a very typical fish either, but it 
is highly typical of the concept pet fish. Thus the guppy phenomenon proves 
very awkward for this framework. The exemplar view is not subject to the same 
problem. Under the exemplar view, typicality is not inherited from constituent 
concepts, but simply results from similarity to other concept exemplars. In this 
case, the exemplar view would correctly predict that a guppy is a typical pet fish. 
However, the exemplar view also has severe problems specifically related to 
concept combination. For example, its lack of abstraction inhibits creative 
potential in combining concepts. 
Recent Models of Conceptual Combination 
There are severe problems with the approaches described above. Not least being 
the failure to address the issues in specific detailed terms. It has become clear 
that to predict the nature of a complex concept from its simple constituents one 
requires more than a manipulation of the extensions. The next generation of 
models have therefore begun to describe what may be happening in terms of the 
intensions of concepts. 
Concept Specialisation Model 
The first such theory to appear has become known as the Concept Specialisation 
Model (Cohen and Murphy, 1984; Murphy 1988). Importantly, this deals not in 
extensions, but in intensions. In doing so, some of the problems discussed above 
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are avoided. In making this switch of focus, different ways of combining 
concepts arise. It is no longer necessary to be confined to the rules of set theory, 
and the mechanical combinations that they imply. Intensions are meanings, and 
as such they have complex relations with one another. Combining intensions 
implies a whole new range of diverse structural relations. 
According to this model, we combine concepts by finding some mediating 
relation between them. Clearly, this could be any of innumerable relations, and it 
could be more salient to one of the constituent concepts than the other. In 
adjective noun combinations for example, the mediating relation is often quite 
straightforward, and is indicated pretty well by the adjective. For a combination 
like blue chair, colour is the obvious mediating relation. For noun noun 
compounds things are often more complicated. For a combination like house 
boat, an appropriate mediating relation is found in function, thus it is a boat 
functioning as a house. 
Finding such mediating relations might be a question of comparing concept 
intensions, but in other cases we may need to refer to things beyond the 
constituent concepts themselves. The other novel aspect of this model therefore 
is the inclusion of world knowledge. Prior experience and our own theories about 
the world therefore influence the way we combine concepts. As with the switch 
to manipulating intensions, this facility to allow general knowledge to influence 
proceedings provides a rich source of possibilities, and phenomena not 
previously explained can now be accounted for. Using world knowledge we can 
make predictions about what sort of novel characteristics we might expect a 
combined concept to exhibit. For example, an apartment dog (mediating 
relation = lives in) will probably be relatively small and placid compared to 
other dogs. However, these gains in power attained by using intensional relations 
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and world knowledge come at a price. That is that the model is much under 
defined. There is no explicitly defined mechanism for how one mediating 
relation is preferred to any other. Without spelling out how we make such a 
selection the model fails to explain the mechanism upon which it is founded. As 
such, although it succeeds in accounting for the range of phenomena reported of 
concept combination, there is no way that it could be used in a predictive 
capacity. The description of the mechanism is simply too imprecise to be thought 
of as a satisfactory model of concept combination. 
Setting aside these drawbacks, the theories upon which the model is based point 
the way for more limited but also more explicit models. It is no coincidence that 
two of the more successful models, although markedly different in their detail, 
exhibit a similar general approach. The two models referred to are the Selective 
Modification Model, of Smith, Osherson, Rips & Keane, (1988), and a 
Composite Prototype Model, of Hampton, (1987). Their differences are many 
and great, and will be evident in a more detailed look at each, but for now I shall 
highlight their significant similarities. Both models take the intension of a 
concept to be the critical focus of modification, breaking from the more 
straightforward and traditional approach which attended primarily to the 
extension. There is also a similarity in the extent to which both models are 
spelled out in detail. They are both "working" models, based on fairly 
straightforward, intuitive procedures, and their success in dealing with certain 
cases is demonstrable. The predictive scope in each case is strictly limited, but 
this concentration on specific aspects of conceptual combination may serve to 
isolate and characterise relatively distinct processes. At some future date perhaps 
such procedures may find their way into a more general framework. 
Hampton's Composite Prototype Model. (1987) 
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Hampton has proposed a model of combining prototype concepts, by taking the 
union of the sets of features of the constituents as the basis of the new concept. A 
number of constraints of attribute inheritance are imposed on this process :-
i) The mean level of importance of an attribute across both parent concepts must 
be above a threshold level for inheritance. 
ii) I f an attribute is perceived as 'necessary' for either constituent, then it must be 
inherited. 
i i i ) I f an attribute is perceived as 'necessarily impossible' for either constituent, 
then it cannot be inherited. 
The experimental work on which Hampton grounds these assumptions uses 
complex concepts of the form, "Games that are also sports". This model has 
proved surprisingly successful at deriving the character of these compounds. 
There are however several findings which lead to elaboration of the basic model. 
There is often an imbalance in the contribution of each constituent to the 
complex, and there are also so called 'emergent properties1. Firstly, to consider 
the imbalance between constituent concepts. This dominance effect was 
predicted by Hampton (1988), and is thought to be a product simply of a relative 
imbalance of the 'size' of categories used (i.e., how many attributes each has). 
Further to this phenomenon is that of noncommutativity, i.e. :- "X that are also 
Y" is different from "Y that are also X". Hampton ascribes this to a 
predominance of concern with distinguishing the named set from its natural 
contrast set, i.e. distinguishing items in "X that are also Y" from those in "X that 
are not Y". There are however two other factors which may have influenced this 
outcome. Firstly, the constituents of all Hampton's pairs were concerned with 
similar domains, e.g. tools/weapons, sports/games. This may well concentrate 
attention on the contrast set. Secondly, the form of combination itself is 
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somewhat unusual in such studies, and implies a different grammatical 
relationship to the more commonly used "XY" form. Indeed, this distinction 
between the two forms of presentation may be significant in other ways too. It is 
quite possible that the success Hampton has had in taking the union of sets as the 
critical starting point is related to his chosen form of presentation of complex 
concepts. Intuitively the form "X that are also Y" appears to indicate that to 
derive the category concerned one must take the extensional intersection of the 
two sets, whereas the form "XY" may imply many more involved relationships. 
This point does not devalue the findings, but does suggest that they may well 
relate to only a specific type of concept combination, since other combination 
types are effectively ruled out by the use of a such a precise form of presentation. 
Returning to the presence of emergent features, a phenomenon that Hampton 
refers to as noncompositionality. There are features given as belonging to the 
combined concept, which are not accountable by reference to either of the 
constituents. Hampton actually acknowledges the possibility of an 
underrepresentation of noncompositionality in his data, again due to the form of 
presentation of combinations. Given that this effect may be even more extensive 
than demonstrated in this study, a full explanation of this phenomenon is even 
more important. Hampton identifies two processes as possibly contributing to 
this noncompositionality. The first is extensional feedback, this operates by the 
meaning of a concept being derived as described in the model above, and 
subsequent identification of the concept's extension. This extension is likely to 
have some attributes that are not specified in its derived intension, these may 
then be added (fedback) to the intension, to produce a more complete picture. 
The second process is one of inference in order to maintain coherence of the 
concept. Hampton cites the example that pet fish are probably smaller than 
average pets or average fish. This could derive from extensional feedback, but it 
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is also the case that we could infer that for a fish to be a pet it must be able to 
live in a small body of water, and therefore be small itself. It is evident that this 
process doesn't require any experience of the extension of the concept to operate, 
and that conversely, extensional feedback does. 
Another possible influence which might be added to these two is that of 
conventional or idiomatic effects. Some combinations are likely to have 
particular properties associated with them for cultural or linguistic reasons. For 
example, certain characteristics are commonly associated with car salesmen or 
traffic wardens whether or not these agree with our own experiences. 
Consideration of such possibilities is likely to be required i f the 
noncompositionality of all complex concepts is to be explained. But these two 
processes are now initially defined, and worthy of further investigation. 
The Selective Modification Model of Smith et al f1988) 
In contrast to that of Hampton, Smith et al's model concerns complex concepts 
formed by the combination of adjectives and nouns, the primary example being 
red apple. The process of 'selective modification' used follows quite readily from 
the prototype structure which forms the basis of their model. The model assumes 
that a concept is prototypically defined by values attributed to possible options in 
a number of 'dimensions'. E.g. for apple, the dimensions might include colour, 
shape, and texture, the possible options for colour being red, green, brown etc. 
The values (referred to as Votes') attributed to these features act as defaults, so i f 
most apples are thought to be red, then 'red' wil l have more votes than any other 
option in the dimension of colour. There is also a 'diagnosticity' value for each 
dimension in the representation, giving an indication of how pertinent that 
dimension is in general to the concept. This is used in determining whether or 
not some object is a member of the category. The typicality of any item to a 
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category is determined by its 'similarity' to the prototype. This notion of 
similarity is adapted from Tversky's (1977) contrast rule. It amounts to 
subtracting the number of votes weighted on different features from the number 
weighted on the same features, each element having been modified in 
accordance with its diagnosticity. The modification of a noun by an adjective is 
therefore represented as modification of the prototype by the following two 
processes. First, the adjective causes a shift of votes from the alternatives in its 
own 'dimension' to itself, and second, the diagnosticity of the dimension 
concerned rises. This means that a red fruit is now definitely red as oppose to 
any other colour, and that the dimension of colour is more important to red fruit 
than it is to fruit in general. 
To test this model Smith et al obtained subject's feature listings of several fruit 
and vegetable concepts (e.g. apple, potato). From these listings they derived the 
information such as attributes and diagnosticity needed to characterise these 
concepts and their superordinates (fruit and vegetable) in their model. The model 
was then used to produce modified representations of these superordinates by 
combining them with several adjectives, producing representations for such 
combinations as red fruit. Having produced these representations it is possible 
to predict how typical any particular instance (e.g. apple) ought to be of a 
particular combined category (e.g. red fruit). In general, these predictions 
correlate well with subjects'judgements of the same questions. 
Smith et al also proposed that the model could be extended to include adverb-
adjective-noun complexes, like very red apple. The process is fairly 
straightforward, consisting of multiplication of the votes for the specified 
adjective by a scalar in an appropriate range, i.e. (in a simplified form): 
'very' = multiply votes by scalar k, where k > 1 
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'slightly' = multiply votes by scalar k, where 0 < k < 1 
'not (or non-)' = multiply votes by scalar k, where k < 0. 
Even this was extended still further, to include complexes of the form, very 
slightly red apple. However, the performance level of the model was reduced by 
the addition of each of these stages, and some of the adverbs ('very'), were 
considerably better modelled than others ('slightly'). 
On the whole, the model has been relatively successful, but only in a very limited 
field of operation. There are many essential aspects of 'literal' natural language 
that this model expressly fails to capture. Perhaps the most important to address 
is the extended influence of adjectives. Those used in the testing of the model are 
about as focused in their influence as possible, e.g., 'red' and 'smooth' are quite 
well defined5. There are many examples in which this is not the case, Smith et al 
consider 'shrivelled', but what of an 'old' apple, or a 'cooked' potato? Smith et al 
also provide a catalogue (from Clark, R, 1970) of 'non-standard' adjectives, 
which the model seems wholly inadequate to cope with, comprising; "negaters 
(e.g. 'fake'), enlargers (e.g. 'possible'), fictionalizers (e.g. 'mythical'), 
defictionalizers (e.g. 'simulated'), and neutralizers (e.g. 'alleged')". In a similar 
fashion to Hampton's model, the model is best viewed as an attempt to 
characterise the nature of one process of combining concepts. It is strictly limited 
in its application, due to the influence of other, as yet unclear, processes, but the 
model is useful as a working description of one part of conceptual combination. 
Correlated Attributes and Emergent Features 
apparently straightforward adjectives such as red can actually be quite ambiguous. For example, 
in the following cases, the adjective red implies several different modifications, none of which has 
the effect of asserting that the reference is coloured red: red pen, red cone cell, red army, red 
flag (socialist anthem), red indian, red sea, red tape. Some of these are certainly idiomatic, but 
others are legitimate, productive meanings. 
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The two models described above are concerned with different parts of language, 
and treat them in different ways. I have suggested that, in terms of their 
methodological approach, they have some similarities, but there are also some 
areas of theory which they share. Both recognise the problematic phenomenon of 
information being present in the complex representation, which does not appear 
in the constituents. Both models limit the evidence of this with their choice of 
materials, or format of presentation, as the authors themselves acknowledge. 
Smith et al are concerned with the mechanics of how an adjective might modify 
a schematic representation, and so assume that some adjective could operate on 
several dimensions of the representation. They suppose their model to be 
adaptable to cope with this phenomenon, but other research (e.g. Medin & 
Shoben, 1988) implies that even apparently "one-dimensional" adjectives can 
affect other attributes. For example, metal spoons tend to be small, wooden 
spoons tend to be large. Also, the correlation of attributes is something quite 
specific to the concept concerned, e.g. white and grey are more similar than grey 
and black with respect to hair, but the reverse is true with respect to clouds 
(Medin & Shoben, 1988). 
Shoben (1991) identifies three processes that may lead to the correlation of 
attributes: 
i) Inherent correlation : e.g. changing the material of construction 
from lead to aluminium will make the object lighter. 
ii) People's beliefs : e.g. something made in Japan may be thought to 
be of better quality than something from the Philippines. 
iii) World knowledge : e.g. size of a tropical fish is associated with a 
whole range of behavioural, physical and biological properties. 
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In terms of psychological significance it may be more pertinent to consider a 
simpler binary division of types of attribute correlation, between necessary and 
non-necessary correlations. Recall that in Hampton's model, whether an attribute 
was considered necessary or not for a constituent concept could be critical in 
determining the attributes of the combination. As such necessity of attribute 
correlation is likely to be equally important. Our beliefs about the necessity or 
otherwise of the correlation of attributes will be largely determined by 
experience. For example, i f we witness any counter example to the correlation, 
then it can be assumed to be non-necessary. Conversely, if we witness what we 
believe to be a large and representative sample of the population, without 
coming across a counter example, we assume the correlation to be necessary. 
There are also other reasons for assuming a correlation to be necessary or not, 
pertaining to our theoretical beliefs. I f we believe that one attribute necessarily 
causes the other, or i f we believe that some other factor is the necessary 
originator of both attributes we assume the correlation to be necessary. Given 
this binary division between two forms of correlation (necessary, and non-
necessary), it is possible to see a relationship between correlated attributes and 
emergent features. The process of extensional feedback is identified with non-
necessary correlations, while maintenance of coherence inferences are more akin 
to necessary correlations. So, by this analysis of the situation the problem in 
Smith et al's model, of accounting for correlated attributes, and the problem of 
noncompositionality in Hampton's model are closely related. 
36 
Noun Noiin Compounds 
In recent years, the case of noun noun compounds as a special type of conceptual 
combination has received increasing attention. Smith et al and Hampton focused 
on particular types of conceptual combination, as described above, in which the 
relation of one concept to the other was quite restricted. Adjectives tend to 
operate along quite well defined dimensions of meaning, and Hampton used 
syntax to specify the combination type. (In fact, as discussed above, in both cases 
the combinations did have influences beyond what superficially appeared to be 
their limits.) 
Noun noun compounds by contrast clearly encode a high degree ambiguity, 
which obviously creates extra problems. This inherent ambiguity has been 
addressed in different ways by different researchers. The basic problem is, given 
a highly ambiguous compound, how do we settle on one (or even two or three) of 
the possible interpretations as being the most likely intended meaning. Certainly 
context has a very important role to play, an assumption which has not really 
been questioned. Undoubtedly, given a context in which some item is highly 
salient, a compound will be interpreted accordingly (e.g. Gerrig and Murphy 
1992). Often compounds are coined to refer to such specific items. Downing 
(1975) gives an example in which a colleague refers to a particular student as 
"the bike girl", because she was seen to leave her bike in the vestibule. These 
uses are often referred to as deictic compounds. Little research has been carried 
out on such compounds, but clearly context is sometimes strong enough to 
enable coinages to be made and understood regardless of other influences. Most 
research however has been conducted on compounds in little or no obvious 
context. 
37 
Several aspects of noun noun compounds have been the subject of research in 
recent years, and are discussed below. Specifically they concern the relationship 
between lexicalised and novel compounds and the respective influence of each 
constituent in determining the compound relation, and the distinction between 
predicating and nonpredicating compound types. 
Lexicalised and Novel Compounds 
Some compounds are lexicalised and so are familiar to us and have 
conventionally accepted meanings, such as "phone box" or "computer disk". 
Others are novel and newly coined, like "frog ladder" or "robin snake". How 
these two types of compound contrast with respect to factors like 
compositionality and cognitive accessibility is important in understanding how 
we combine concepts generally. However, as well as theoretical comparisons 
between the two being of interest, it is possible that the relationship between 
lexicalised and novel compounds is active in the very way we use compounds, as 
in the theory that novel compounds are interpreted by analogy to their lexicalised 
counterparts. Theories of analogy are discussed below. Because the empirical 
research is closely related, included in this is a discussion of the relative 
influence the two positions of a compound have in determining what relation the 
constituents bear to each other. This is followed by a comparison of the nature of 
lexicalised and novel compounds. 
Analogical Models 
Ryder (1992) looked at the possibility that novel compounds are interpreted by 
analogy to more familiar compounds. She suggests that when we encounter a 
novel compound we compare it to linguistic templates to which known 
compounds adhere. The novel compound is then interpreted accordingly. The 
linguistic templates, and so the analogy, can be at a range of abstraction, from 
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the most abstract (taking noun2 as the head) to the most concrete (sharing a 
common head noun and semantically similar modifier). In support of her theory, 
she demonstrates that when asked to paraphrase novel compounds, subjects 
usually interpret them in accordance with analogous lexicalised compounds. 
The theory certainly has appeal from several perspectives. It seems to be 
coherent with phenomena from other linguistic domains. Labov (1972) reports 
that language change in general can occur by analogical processes. Also, there 
are several contemporary coinages which would seem to rely upon analogy to 
derive their meaning. Trolley rage is a supermarket equivalent of road rage, 
while a net potato is a technologically enhanced couch potato.6 
Ryder succeeds in experimentally demonstrating that interpretations of novel 
compounds are in accordance with those of lexicalised compounds. However, as 
she acknowledges, her results are also explicable without recourse to analogy, 
but relying solely upon semantic script/schema type information, such as those of 
Smith et al (1988) or Murphy (1984) described above. 
"For example, since wine generally is packaged in bottles, and since 
bottles participate in a schema that has a critical slot for what the 
bottle contains, it is not surprising that wine bottle should have the 
meaning 'a bottle that contains wine.'" (Ryder, 1992, p97). 
By the same token, a novel combination of liquid + bottle (e.g. rain bottle, juice 
bottle) will likely have an analogous meaning, though we may derive it from our 
knowledge of liquids and bottles rather than direct analogy to familiar 
interestingly perhaps, these are not direct analogies, e.g. road rage occurs travelling on roads, 
and trolley rage occurs in supermarket aisles. It seems that the rhetorical appeal of referring to 
trolley rage outweighs the need for a direct analogy. 
39 
compounds. Essentially the problem is that i f there is a likely schematic relation 
between the two concepts, then there will probably be several lexicalised 
instantiations of analogous combinations. Separating the two factors is difficult. 
Van Jaarsveld et al (1994) devised a new methodology to try to circumvent this 
problem, and test Ryder's model directly. They reasoned that if novel compounds 
are interpreted by analogy to lexicalised compounds, then the size of the set of 
lexicalised analogues will have an effect on the time it takes to arrive at an 
interpretation. The more possible analogues, the greater the search space, and the 
more time it should take. They also make the assumption that this difference will 
be exaggerated i f the compound is less interpretable. This is because highly 
interpretable compounds are easily interpreted because a suitable analogue is 
easily found, at which point the search for analogue can be terminated. Low 
interpretable compounds require a full search of all analogues. 
They asked subjects to judge whether compounds were lexicalised or novel, and 
measured the response time to see i f any such interaction did occur. The results 
show that there is no interaction between the two factors, so they concluded that 
novel compounds are not interpreted by analogy. However, their reasoning is 
founded on several questionable assumptions. First, that the search is serial. If, as 
Ryder argues, analogy is characteristic of much linguistic interpretation, then it 
would seem likely that an efficient mechanism has arisen to cope with it. A serial 
search of possible analogues is grossly inefficient. For example if one encounters 
a novel compound like fire pencil there is little point in exhaustively searching 
through the numerous (20 or so, by Ryder's count) lexicalised compounds with 
fire as the modifier which are to do with combating fires (e.g. fire station, fire 
engine, fire hydrant etc.). It would be more realistic to propose that we can take 
this set of compounds as a whole, and accept or reject the linguistic template as 
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appropriate all in one go. Also questionable is Van Jaarsveld et al's account of 
interpretability - that compounds are more interpretable i f a suitable analogue is 
found at the start of a search. This would mean that a more appropriate analogue 
might exist, but is not encountered because the search has already been 
terminated upon finding the first tolerable match. It makes more sense to 
suppose that all searches are approximately equally extensive, and that 
interpretability is a product of how good the analogy is, rather than how many 
items were searched through. 
Other researchers have used different techniques, and found evidence that 
analogy generally can be a significant influence, at least when there are only 
short time periods between presentation of the analogue and the novel 
compound. Shoben (1993) found that subjects' interpretations of novel 
compounds could be influenced by prior exposure to a context supporting one 
particular interpretation of a similar compound (same noun2, similar nounl). 
Subjects who read a passage which supported one interpretation (for example 
about a child who contracted a cat rash from contact with a pet) were more 
likely than control subjects to use that same relation to interpret a similar 
compound shortly afterwards (for example, to interpret horse rash as a rash 
caused by contact with a horse than as a rash located on a horse). Shoben 
interprets these results as a kind of semantic priming, and though it doesn't relate 
directly to Ryder's model, such a phenomenon could be the basis of compound 
interpretation by analogy. 
Further evidence comes from Gerrig and Murphy (1992), who investigated the 
effect of context on compound interpretation. In the first of their experiments, 
they presented subjects with a context in four different conditions. They found 
that subjects' later comprehension of novel compounds was improved i f the 
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context supported a particular relation between the two constituents of the 
compound (explicit condition), or i f a compound consisted of one of the 
constituents (the noun2) and a concept similar to the other constituent (nounl) 
(implicit condition). When no relation was supported by the context (control 
condition), subjects' comprehension time was slower. Their second experiment 
was similar, but this time there was a rather longer time interval (of around 5 -
10 minutes) between the presentation of the context and the test compound. In 
this study, it was found that the results of their experiment 1 were approximately 
replicated. It therefore seems that interpretation by analogy could occur over at 
least slightly longer time intervals. In their final study, Gerrig and Murphy used a 
similar design containing just explicit and neutral contexts and a novel 
compound. In this study test sentences contained compounds which were 
possible analogues for the compound in the context, but which didn't have any 
lexical overlap with the primed compound. Subjects were required to state how 
easy the test compound was to comprehend, and to paraphrase it. On both these 
measures, the explicit condition showed improved comprehension compared to 
the neutral condition. This is further evidence of some analogy based 
interpretation, even when neither constituent concept is directly primed. This 
would correspond to the more abstract levels of Ryder's linguistic templates. 
The question of whether or not we do use analogy to familiar compounds is still 
an open one then. Shoben (1993) and Gerrig and Murphy (1992) have shown 
that, at least in the short term, interpretation by analogy to primed compounds or 
relations can occur. Van Jaarsveld et al (1994) have some evidence that a 
particular model of analogical interpretation derived from Ryder (1992) fails to 
hold up under experiment. Ryder's own empirical work (1992) was supportive of 
her more general model, although other schema type approaches would have 
made similar predictions. 
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Another relevant issue which arises from the various strands of this research is 
the degree of influence which each of the constituent nouns has over the 
interpretation of a compound. Both Van Jaarsveld et al and Shoben used 
compound pairs with a common noun2 and similar nounl. Gerrig and Murphy 
also predominantly used such compounds, but also found that they could get 
similar effects when both constituents were only similar. 
In more recent research Gagne and Shoben (1995, unpublished manuscript) 
measured the time it took subjects to judge the meaningfulness of compounds to 
compare the influence of nounl and noun2. They presented subjects with 
meaningful compounds, along with non-meaningful fillers. The experimental 
compounds were composed such that the relation between the constituents was 
either a frequent or an infrequent relation with respect to each of the constituents 
in other meaningful compounds. So compounds had relations that were High-
High, High-Low and Low-High frequencies for nounl-noun2 (it was not possible 
to construct enough meaningful Low-Low compounds to include this condition, 
but that comparison is not critical to the experiment). The compounds appeared 
on a screen and subjects had to indicate whether they were meaningful or not. It 
was found that High-High and High-Low compounds were responded to equally 
quickly, but that Low-High compounds took longer. Gagne and Shoben interpret 
this as indicating that the relational information associated with nounl (whether 
it is analogical or schematic) is of primary importance in interpreting 
compounds, and that such information associated with noun2 is less important. 
Ryder (1992) uses the notion of cue reliability (from Bates and MacWhinney, 
1987) to address the same sort of issue. Cue reliability, in this context, is the 
proportion of cases in which a constituent noun (the cue) occurs in a compound 
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with a particular relation. From surveying lexicalised compounds in a dictionary, 
Ryder concludes that various constituent nouns exhibit more or less the full 
range of cue reliability. Some, such as box in the noun2 position are almost 
absolutely reliable (an X box is a box used for storing Xs). Others such as matt in 
the noun2 position are somewhat reliable, having just a few possible relations, 
while others still, such as board in the noun2 position are very unreliable (e.g. 
surf board, chalk board, head board etc.) 
The issue of what contribution each constituent makes to the relation expressed 
in a compound is clearly an important one. At present, from the research 
discussed above it is not possible to say i f either position in a compound is 
generally more influential than the other. 
Comparing Lexicalised and Novel Compounds 
A number of important issues arise from a comparison of lexicalised and novel 
compounds. The most striking aspect of research into such comparisons is 
therefore its scarcity. Some authors, as described above, have looked at the 
possibility of novel compounds being interpreted by analogy to real compounds 
(e.g. Ryder, 1992; Van Jaarsveld et al, 1994), while others have looked at novel 
compounds only (e.g. Wisniewski and Gentner, 1991; Shoben, 1991). Studies 
involving a comparison of lexicalised and novel compounds are conspicuous by 
their absence. One related area which has received some attention is the study of 
idioms. Jackendoff (1995) highlights the similarity between understanding 
idioms, and understanding compounds, and claims that the same mental 
mechanisms are likely to underlie both processes. Certainly it is the case that 
several of the key questions relating to idioms are also directly relevant to 
compounds, and so the two are looked at together below, with particular 
reference to compositionaltty, flexibility, storage and access. 
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Compositionalitv 
That idioms are noncompositional is often taken as a part of their definition. 
Swinney and Cutler (1979, p522) define idioms as "a string of two or more 
words for which meaning is not derived from the meaning of the individual 
words comprising the string". This definition would therefore classify many 
lexicalised compounds as idioms. Jackendoff (1995) points out that absolute 
noncompositionality is extremely rare even in idioms, and the overlap between 
idioms and lexicalised compounds is therefore all the greater. The difference in 
compositionality that exists between idioms and literal language seems similar to 
that that exists between lexicalised and novel compounds. 
Flexibility 
The degree and type of flexibility of idioms is a matter of current research (e.g. 
Gibbs, 1995). Some types of modification are acceptable (innumerable cats were 
let out of unnumbered bags), while others are not (*the bucket was kicked by 
him). This observation may also provide an insight into the way that novel 
compounds are coined and understood. It has been noted that novel compounds 
are interpreted in ways analogous to related lexicalised compounds, and it has 
been suggested that the processes of novel compound generation/interpretation 
are themselves analogical (e.g. Ryder, 1992). The idea that idioms (and so 
perhaps lexicalised compounds too) are flexible leads to the possibility that an 
explanation for this analogical data can be given in terms of modification of 
lexicalised compounds. That is, the modification of a lexicalised compound 
would create an analogous novel compound, e.g. the familiar compound road 
rage has a more recent counterpart in trolley rage, a supermarket equivalent 
apparently derived from it. Whether this derivation is best viewed as a process of 
analogy or modification is not clear. 
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Storage and Access 
Issues of storage and access of lexicalised compounds and idioms are closely 
related. Both questions are particularly critical to our understanding of idioms. 
Are idioms single lexical units like simple words, or do they consist of syntactic 
structures like other phrases? Similar questions are also valid for lexicalised 
compounds. Several models have been produced to try to describe how idioms 
are stored and accessed, and quite a lot of data is now available describing the 
time course of activation of literal and idiomatic word meanings (Titone and 
Connine, 1994). In summary, it seems that literal meanings are initially accessed, 
but as the idiom nears completion the idiomatic meaning becomes activated and 
the literal meaning deactivated (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988). Although such 
studies have not been carried out with compounds, it is worth speculating that 
they may obtain similar results. 
Predicating and Non-predicating Compounds 
Some authors divide compounds into predicating and non-predicating (e.g. 
Gagne and Shoben, 1995). They define the two types of compound thus 
"Predicating combinations are combinations of the form XY and can be 
paraphrased as a Y that is X. Red apple is an example of a predicating 
combination. Nonpredicating combinations also have the form XY, but cannot 
be so paraphrased; thus mountain stream is not a stream that is mountain." 
(Gagne and Shoben, 1995, p4). 
Other authors have used an alternative dichotomy of property mapping and slot 
filling (e.g. Wisniewski and Gentner, 1992). Slot filling compounds are so 
called because the meaning on the compound can be attained by using the 
modifier to f i l l an appropriate slot' in the representation of the head noun. The 
slot is a relation in a model something like the Selective Modification Model 
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(Smith et al, 1988) discussed above. Gagne and Shoben's example of mountain 
stream would be a slot filling compound according to this classification, 
mountain filling the "location" slot of stream. Property mapping compounds are 
those in which a single property from the modifier is mapped across to the head, 
e.g. elephant shrew, tortoiseshell cat. 
On the surface, non-predicating and slot filling compounds seem the same, while 
predicating and property mapping compounds seem to differ. However, more 
fundamentally it may be the case that the two classifications actually refer to the 
same sets of compounds. Before discussing such issues, it is necessary to explore 
a little further what these various labels refer to. Most investigations into 
compounds concern non-predicating or slot filling compounds. The two names 
for this class of compound suggest the two kinds of theory generally used to 
describe them. The term non-predicating suggests that some predicative element 
of the compound is omitted, and interpretation involves the discovery of that 
relation. Slot filling implies a schema model, in which interpretation is a process 
of fitting the nounl into the correct slot in the noun2's schema. Examples of each 
are discussed below. 
Levi (1978) describes a model whereby such compounds are interpreted by the 
listener / reader discovering the recoverably deletable predicate (RDP) which 
the person coining the compound has omitted from the compound's surface form. 
Among others, Levi (1978), and following her Shoben (1991), have drawn up 
lists of the kinds of relations they feel it is possible for non-predicating 
compounds to express, fig 1.3. 
47 
Fig 1,3 : Types ofNonpredicating Relation (Shoben 1991)? 
A. N causes Adj H . N uses Adj 
F L U V I R U S GAS STOVE 
B. Adj causes N I . N located Adj 
H E A T R A S H U R B A N RIOTS 
C. N has Adj J. N for Adj 
PICTURE B O O K NOSE DROPS 
D . Adj has N K. N about Adj 
L E M O N PEEL T A X L A W 
E. N makes Adj F . N derived from Adj 
H O N E Y B E E O I L M O N E Y 
F. N made of Adj r. Adj located N 
SUGAR C U B E M U R D E R T O W N 
G. Adj is N H'. N used by Adj 
S E R V A N T G I R L FINGER T O Y 
As Ryder (1992) points out however, to claim that such lists give a full and 
explicit account of the possibilities would be misleading. For example, Levi 
herself points out that the relation Y in X (corresponding to category I , N 
located Adj, in fig 1.3 above) is so broad as to cover a multitude of different 
meanings, fig 1.4. 
Shoben (1991) devised an experiment to test the theory that the type of 
relationship was critical to the ease of interpretation of a non-predicating 
compound. He theorised that some relations are inherently more complicated 
than others. For example, it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that causal relations 
between constituent concepts (e.g. flu virus, heat rash) are more complicated 
than possessives (e.g. picture book, lemon peel). However, when he tested this 
by measuring comprehension time he found no such difference between relation 
7This table preserves Shoben's terminology of Adj for the nounl, and N for noun2. 
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types. What he did notice was that some compounds within each type took 
longer 
Fig 1.4 : Possible Meanings of IN, from Levi (1978) 
Meaning Examples 
inhabit 
grow in 
desert rat, field mouse, city folk 
water lilies, mountain laurel, desert 
blossoms 
logical impossibility, communist 
tenet, ideological truth 
spring showers, autumnal rains, night 
flight 
urban parks, city libraries, 
phonological pattern 
marital adjustments, urban riots, 
academic transfers 
according to 
during 
found in 
occur in 
to comprehend than the others. These longer comprehension times seemed to be 
for those compounds which were difficult to straightforwardly paraphrase. For 
example cactus plant can be quite readily paraphrased as a plant which is a 
cactus, and was quickly comprehended. Conversely, finger lake does not 
paraphrase easily (*a lake which is a finger), and took longer to comprehend. 
Similarly paper money and sugar cube are easily paraphrased and were quickly 
comprehended, but mountain range does not paraphrase readily, and was slow 
to comprehend. Shoben interprets this in terms of the ease of filling slots in a 
conceptual schema. Paraphrasing is, in a way, making explicit the slot of the 
head into which the modifier must be fitted. I f the paraphrase is clumsy, perhaps 
this indicates that the modifier is a relatively i l l f i t for that slot. This is however a 
rather speculative idea, and Shoben's judgements of ease of paraphrasing are 
quite subjective. 
Downing (1977) takes an alternative approach, which focuses on the link 
between the semantics of the constituents and their relationship within the 
compound. She used several kinds of task with her subjects. First there was a 
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naming task in which subjects named novel objects indicated in illustrations e.g. 
fig 1.5 
Fig 1.5 : An example illustration from Downing (1977) 
feci 
t 
In other tasks subjects paraphrased lexicalised and novel compounds, or selected 
appropriate paraphrases from a list. From these data, Downing concluded that 
several types of relationship within a compound were constrained by the 
semantic class of the compound constituents, f ig 1.6. 
Fig 1.6 : Predominant Relationships by Semantic Type, from Downing (1977) 
Semantic Type relationship example 
Humans: occupational, sexual, and police demonstrators, women 
racial identity officers, Negro woman 
Animals: appearance, habitat giraffe bird, Salt Creek 
coyotes 
Plants: appearance, habitat trumpet plant, Texas roadside 
flowers 
Natural objects: composition, origin, granite outcroppings, cow 
location hair, Montana beach 
Synthetic objects: purpose banana fork 
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Downing interpreted this in terms of classificatory relevance varying with 
semantic category, that is relations chosen are those with particular significance 
to the concepts concerned. This is important from a linguistic point of view in 
that it rejects the idea that there are grammatical constraints on the relation 
between constituents. Grammatically, the possible interpretations are limitless, 
but the semantics of compound interpretation bring other pragmatic constraints 
to bear. In this respect it is surprising that Shoben should have chosen to follow 
Levi in making finite lists of possible relationships. Downing's insight that the 
limiting factors are semantic/pragmatic rather than grammatical might be 
expected to be embraced by the psychological tradition. 
In spite of her rejection of a pre-defined list of predicating relationships, 
Downing apparently accepts that this general kind of slot filling relation is the 
only possible one. In fact, it has only relatively recently been demonstrated that it 
is quite common for us to interpret noun noun compounds with an altogether 
different type of relationship existing between the constituent concepts. 
Wisniewski and Gentner (1992) asked subjects to paraphrase novel compounds. 
In these paraphrases they noticed several types of interpretation. As well as the 
previously recorded and much debated X relation Y interpretations, which they 
called slot filling, there were others which they termed property mapping and 
structure mapping. In property mapping, instead of the modifier filling a slot in 
the representation of the head (e.g. book box, in which book fills the slot 
contains in the representation of box), a single property of the modifier is 
mapped across and applied to the head. For example, a robin snake was 
described as a red snake. Structure mapping occurs when a relation between the 
properties of the modifier is mapped across to the head. For example, a pony 
chair was said to be a small chair. In this case, it cannot be thought of as simply 
mapping across size, because ponies are generally bigger than chairs, not 
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smaller. Rather it is seen as mapping across the size relationship between ponies 
and their superordinate category, horses, onto pony chairs and their superordinate 
category, chairs. So pony chairs are small in relation to other chairs just as 
ponies are small in relation to other horses. 
Although Wisniewski and Gentner do manipulate the variable of constituent 
semantic class (i.e. they generate compounds from artefact and natural kind 
concepts in each possible configuration), they do not report data according to this 
dimension. They also offer little by way of quantitative analysis of their data, 
simply reporting that approximately 30% of paraphrases imply a property 
mapping interpretation. In a more recent paper Wisniewski (1996) describes a 
similar paraphrasing experiment, in which he also manipulates the similarity of 
constituent nouns to each other. In this study he found that property mapping was 
much more likely when constituent nouns were similar. He interprets this in 
terms of structural alignment. That is, when two concepts are similar, it is easy to 
align their representations and so compare them. Property mapping is likely to 
occur at the point at which the two concepts differ. Again, although he included 
concepts of various ontological categories in his study, he does not report any 
analysis based on this variable. 
Summary 
Throughout this survey of the literature, a range of issues have cropped up. 
Research into conceptual combination, and into noun noun compounds in 
particular is quite recent, and so much of the research discussed above has raised 
more questions than it has answered. Noncompositionality is problematic for 
models of conceptual combination, although extensional feedback and 
maintenance of coherence inferences may prove to account for most emergent 
features. Experiments 1 - 4 of this thesis look at the phenomenon of 
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noncompositionality, and try to identify possible sources of emergent features. 
Slot filling and property mapping are two important types of compound 
interpretation. Factors which may effect these are examined in experiments 5 and 
6. Experiment 7 examines concept identification. The role played by each 
constituent position in determining the relationship between constituents is 
unclear, but important to understand i f a ful l account of compounds is to be 
reached. This is the subject of experiment 8. 
Also important to the psychology of concepts generally are possible differences 
between artefact and natural kind concepts, a topic which has not been properly 
addressed with respect to compounds. This is a theme throughout the 
experiments described in this thesis. The relationship between lexicalised and 
novel compounds is another potentially important area which has been 
neglected. Comparisons between these two types of compound also run 
throughout the experiments in this thesis. 
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Chapter two: Noncompositionality 
Experiment 1: Measuring Noncompositionality 
Introduction 
This experiment is designed to investigate "extensional feedback" (EF), and 
"maintenance of coherence inferences" (MCI) which Hampton identified as 
probable sources of noncompositionality (Hampton, 1987). It also seems 
plausible to suggest that some sort of "conventional wisdom", a kind of idiomatic 
effect, is responsible for some noncompositional meaning. Many of the features 
we associate with familiar concepts are true by convention rather than by 
personal experience or personal opinion. So a gold mine' may be thought of as a 
source of inevitable wealth and happiness, or 'traffic warden' as cruel and 
vindictive. These are items of received wisdom which we associate with the 
concepts concerned, whether they agree with our own personal experience or 
not. 
In this experiment, two different categories of concept were looked at. 
Real Compounds 
e.g. brick wall, car alarm. 
These are familiar compounds with well known meanings. This would allow all 
three effects (EF, MCI and 'conventional wisdom') to influence the eventual 
form of the compound, and so would be predicted to have the highest level of 
noncompositionality. 
Novel Compounds 
e.g. parsnip tree, chair mouse. 
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These compounds are completely novel, and so have no real reference, but 
subjects could be asked to imagine what such things would be like i f they did 
actually exist. In this case extensional feedback and conventional wisdom ought 
to be inhibited, leaving maintenance of coherence inferences as the only source 
of noncompositionality. 
So a comparison of real and novel compounds should give some indication of the 
amount of noncompositionality due to extensional feedback and conventional 
wisdom. The remaining source of noncompositionality is maintenance of 
coherence inferences. In order to isolate this effect, subjects must somehow be 
inhibited from making inferences about the nature of the compounds. The theory 
of psychological essentialism (see Medin and Ortony, 1989) is utilised here in an 
attempt to do this. This theory ignores the question of whether or not extensional 
categories genuinely have essences, and merely states that people behave as 
though concepts have essences. The question of whether or not this essentialism 
is also a real world phenomenon is a topic of current debate. For example, it has 
been claimed that real categories do have essences, but that only experts in the 
relevant fields have any knowledge of these. This debate however is not 
immediately crucial for the purposes of this investigation. What is important is 
that there appear to be distinct types of concept, some of which have fairly 
accessible essences, and others for which the essence is rather more elusive. 
Two quite distinct types of category stand out; artefacts and natural kinds. 
There are theoretical distinctions between these types, but little experimental 
work has been carried out. Artefacts are "man-made" items, and as such their 
essence is relatively clear. The essence of an artefact is usually its intended 
function, or some combination of this with its actual use. In the case of an 
artefact, to say what it is "essentially", is to say what it is "to all intents and 
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purposes". This much is fairly clear, that people in general have access to what 
they believe to be the essences of artefacts. 
Natural kinds, however, comprise the opposite end of the spectrum. The reasons 
for this again are moot. It seems likely that, when contrasted with artefacts, the 
evolutionary/geological/meteorological reasons for the category formation are 
without intent. Or i f we appeal to religion for an explanation, we must at least 
accept that the divine plan is unclear to us. 
This distinction between artefacts and natural kinds is utilised here in an attempt 
to isolate maintenance coherence inferences. By using an artefact in the nounl 
position (as a modifier) and a natural kind in the noun2 position (as a head 
noun), the subject wi l l be faced with a head noun which has an inaccessible core 
meaning. The difficulty of knowing what the essentials of the head noun are 
should inhibit the subject from modifying it. In this case, no elaborative 
inferences about the nature of the compound can really be made. Three types of 
compound are therefore compared, real artefact artefact (rAA), novel artefact 
artefact (nAA) and novel artefact natural kind (nAN) compounds. It is predicted 
that these wil l show decreasing levels of noncompositionality in that order. 
Noncompositionality can be measured by comparing how descriptive a number 
of features are of the compound and how descriptive those same features are of 
the nouns which constitute that compound. This means obtaining a list of 
features some of which should provide a good range of applicability to the three 
parts of each compound (nounl, noun2 and the compound itself). These features 
are then rated as to how descriptive they are of each of these three parts. 
Noncompositionality is be measured by calculating how much difference there is 
between the ratings with respect to the compound and the ratings with respect to 
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the constituents. Only the magnitude of these differences is relevant to 
noncompositionality. Although the direction of difference is of descriptive 
interest with respect to the meanings of the features, noncompositionality could 
be manifest in both positive and negative differences - features might be present 
in the compound but absent from the constituents, or vice versa. For this reason 
absolute differences are needed to capture the overall noncompositionality 
without such directional differences being able to cancel out one another. Thus, 
the bigger the difference, the greater the noncompositionality. Measuring 
noncompositionality in this way means that it is possible to see how much 
meaning of the compound is common to each of its constituents independently. 
In keeping with the idea that the noun2 should act as the head noun, it is 
predicted that this should have most meaning in common with the compound. 
To recapitulate briefly, the motivation behind this experiment is to try to find 
evidence of different levels of noncompositionality between different types of 
noun noun compound. It is predicted that real artefact artefact compounds (r. AA) 
will have most noncompositionality, followed by novel artefact artefact (n.AA) 
compounds and novel artefact natural kind compounds (n.AN). This is measured 
by finding the absolute difference between ratings for features with respect to the 
compound, and ratings for the same features with respect to its constituent parts. 
It is also predicted that this difference wil l be greater for nounl than for noun2. 
Method 
This experiment contained two stages; feature generation, in which subjects are 
asked to list the features of concepts, and feature rating, in which features are 
rated for their descriptiveness of concepts. 
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Stage 1 - Feature Generation 
The purpose of this stage was to produce feature listings to be used in stage two, 
the feature rating stage. 
Subjects 
Twenty-four unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying the University of Durham first year psychology course, 
aged 1 8 - 3 0 years. There was an approximately equal number of males and 
females. 
Design 
This stage used a repeated measures design. Each subject saw items from each of 
six different item categories. Details are given in the Questionnaire Design 
section below. A replicate set of questionnaires was administered to a second 
group of subjects. 
Materials 
Questionnaires were designed to elicit from the subjects a range of features 
associated with twenty-four noun noun compounds in each of the three 
experimental conditions (r.AA, n.AA and n.AN), and with their constituents 
(nounl artefacts, noun2 artefacts and noun2 natural kinds). The selection of 
materials and design of questionnaire were as follows. 
Real Artefact-Artefact Category : Twenty-four noun noun phrases were selected. 
Each of the forty-eight constituents was an artefact, and each phrase had a real 
reference, e.g. seat belt. The mean frequencies of these words were 29.87 for 
nounl, and 30.38 for noun2 (Kucera and Francis, 1967). 
58 
Novel Artefact-Artefact Category : This category was generated directly from the 
real artefact-artefact category, by swapping the noun2s with one another, to 
produce novel combinations. In order that the relative word frequencies of nounl 
and noun2 were controlled for, the frequencies of each noun were used to 
determine which novel compounds were formed. Any frequency imbalance 
between nounl and noun2 was maintained by ordering the real artefact-artefact 
compounds with noun2s in ascending frequency, and then swapping over 
positions 1 & 2, 3 & 4, etc. In three cases this resulted in the new complex 
referring to a real object, i.e. shower shelf, refuse bin, and library curtain. In 
these instances the noun2s were swapped again (with their next closest 
neighbours) in order that there should be no real world referent of each 
compound. 
e.g. carpet shampoo -> carpet hook 
coat hook -> coat shampoo 
Novel Natural kind - Artefact Category : A list of twenty-four single natural kind 
nouns was also compiled, e.g. horse. These were ordered for frequency to match 
the noun2s of the n.AA category, and then substituted for them to produce n.AN 
compounds. This maintained any frequency relationship between nounl and 
noun2. 
e.g. coat hook coat frog. 
These three categories, r.AA, n.AA and n.AN, along with their constituents, were 
used as the materials in the investigation. The ordering of the materials was 
randomised so that they were no longer ordered by frequency, and then twelve 
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different sets of materials were compiled. Each set contained twelve items, two 
each of each category, that is two each of :-
Artefacts (nounl s), artefacts (noun2s), natural kinds (noun2s), real artefact-
artefact combinations, novel artefact-artefact combinations, novel artefact-
natural kind combinations. The order of occurrence of these in each set was also 
randomised. A list of items used in this experiment is given in the appendix, 
table A l . l . 
Questionnaires : Each questionnaire comprised a front instruction page (see 
below), followed by 6 test pages. Each test page presented two of the materials 
as shown above, each material item being followed by some blank lines on 
which its attributes were to be listed. The entire set of 12 questionnaires was 
replicated with another set of subjects. 
Procedure 
Subjects were given the questionnaires and the following "instructions to 
subjects" (also printed on the questionnaire) were read out to them. 
"On the following pages are twelve different phrases, each made up of either one 
or two words. Each phrase names a type of object, and after each is a number of 
dotted lines. I want you to imagine that you have to describe or define the object 
to someone unfamiliar with it. Do this by listing on the dotted lines the 
properties or attributes that you consider important to this object, and which 
could be used to decide whether or not something is this kind of object. You may 
use a few short phrases i f it helps. 
Some of the objects might not actually exist in the real world. I f this is the case, 
then try and imagine what the object might be like in some imaginary world, and 
list its attributes as though it did actually exist. Try to list as many attributes as 
possible. Aim for ten, but more i f you like. Take two or three minutes over each 
object. When you've listed all you can for one object, please go back over your 
lists and rate each attribute according to the following scale (just write the 
letter); 
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N = necessarily true for all possible examples 
A = a very important part of the definition 
B = a fairly important part of the definition 
C = typically true, but not defining" 
Stage 2 : Feature Rating 
The features listed in stage 1 of the study were used as features that subjects 
were asked to rate in this stage. 
Subjects 
Forty-eight unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying the University of Durham first year psychology course, 
aged 1 8 - 3 0 years. There was an approximately equal number of males and 
females. 
Materials 
Questionnaires : The twelve material sets used in stage 1 were now split into 
twenty-four sets, each containing six items, one from each category. Under each 
item were listed those features that had been produced for that item in stage 1. In 
the cases of the heading being a single word, then all the features listed for the 
compounds in which that word was a constituent were also listed. Similarly, i f 
the heading itself was a compound, then all the features listed under either of its 
constituents, or other compounds of which they are constituent parts, were also 
included. These twenty-four material sets were compiled into questionnaires. As 
in stage one, an instruction page was followed by six test pages. The instructions 
to subjects were as follows. 
"At the top of each of the following pages is a different phrase, which is 
underlined, each is made up of either one or two words. Each phrase names a 
type of object, and below each is a number of possible attributes. I want you to 
rate these attributes as to how characteristic they are of the named object. In 
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doing this, you should decide i f the attribute describes this object, and i f it could 
be used to decide whether or not something is this kind of object. 
Some of the objects might not actually exist in the real world. I f this is the case, 
then try and imagine what the object might be like in some imaginary world, and 
list its attributes as though it did actually exist. 
Please rate each attribute according to the following scale (just write the letter on 
the space provided to the left of each attribute); 
N = necessarily true for all possible examples 
A = a very important part of the definition 
B = a fairly important part of the definition 
C = typically true, but not defining 
D = not usually true 
I = impossible for any example 
(The scale is printed at the bottom of each page for easy reference.)" 
Each test page was headed by one material item, which was followed by a list of 
possible features, each with a space provided for a rating. The entire set of 
questionnaires was again replicated for a second subject group. 
Design and Procedure 
Items data were analysed using a 3 (Compound Type) x 2 (Constituent Position) 
x 2 (Subject Group) factorial design, with repeated measures on the last two 
factors. Compound Type was either real artefact-artefact, novel artefact-artefact, 
or novel artefact-natural kind. Constituent Position was either nounl or noun2. 
Results 
Calculation of Results 
The ratings given were first converted to numeric form. In an attempt to reflect 
the non-linear relationship between the ratings, the conversion included an 
extension of the extremes, i.e. 
N = 5 A = 3 B = 2 C = l D = 0 I =-2 
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This is based on assumptions referred to by Hampton (1987), relating to the 
exaggerated effect of necessity and impossibility compared to other grades of 
feature attribution. 
Tables of means and ANOVA tables of these raw scores are given in the 
appendix, tables A 1.2 and A 1.3 respectively. 
The ratings given to features listed under each compound were then compared to 
the ratings given to the same features for the compound's constituents. This 
provides a measure of noncompositionality (nc). The absolute differences were 
calculated as shown below. 
Calculation of Noncompositionality (nc ) 
For a compound ' AB' : -
±AB-At 
ncA=^ 
n 
where ^^AB ^^A + ^^B 
The higher the score, the less meaning there is in common between compound 
and constituents. This provides two results, one for nounl, and one for noun2. 
Absolute Differences Analysis 
The absolute differences between the ratings for each feature with respect to 
nounl and the compound and noun2 and the compound were calculated 
(absdiffl and absdifQ respectively). Because not all of the features rated for any 
single part were rated for the other parts of that item, only the subset of features 
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common to the compound and nounl or noun2 were used. The mean absolute 
difference scores in each condition are shown in Table 2.1. 
A 3 (Compound Type) x 2 (Absdiff Part) x 2 (Subject Group) analysis o f 
variance with repeated measures on the final two factors, was conducted for this 
data. Absdiff Part was the only significant main effect for this analysis (F( 1,61) = 
5.28, p < 0.05). Compound Type x Absdiff Part was the only significant 
interaction (F(2,61) = 2.72, p < 0.05). As with analyses reported throughout this 
thesis, means and fu l l anova tables are given in the appendix (see tables A1.2 
and A 1.3). 
Table 2 . 1 : Compound Type x Absdiff Part x Subject Group 
absdiff parti absdiff part2 Mean 
subject 
group 1 
subject 
group2 
mean subject 
group 1 
subject 
group2 
mean 
r.AA 2.461 2.162 2.312 1.716 1.651 1.684 1.999 
n.AA 2.137 2.038 2.088 1.765 1.801 1.783 1.936 
n.AN 2.144 2.013 2.079 2.224 2.158 2.191 2.135 
mean 2.245 2.071 2.160 1.900 1.870 1.886 2.023 
Figure 2.1 : Compound Type x Absdiff Part 
2.4 T 
r.AA 
n.AA 
n.AN 
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Absdiffl (mean = 2.16) is greater than absdifO (mean = 1.89). The interaction of 
this effect with Compound Type is shown in Fig 2.1. Inspection of Figure 2.1 
shows that the novel AN Compounds exhibit a reversal of the main effect of 
Absdiff Part, absdiff2 being greater in this case. 
Differences Scores 
Signed differences between the two nouns and the compound were also 
calculated for each common feature. Tables of means and ANOVA tables of 
these difference scores are given in the appendix, tables A1.4 and A1.5 
respectively. 
Discussion 
The only significant main effect was Absdiff Part (Absdiffl > Absdiff2). The 
interaction Compound Type x Absdiff Part was also significant. It had been 
predicted that noncompositionality would increase from real AA to novel AA to 
novel AN compounds. Since there was no main effect of Compound Type, this 
prediction was not upheld. 
The main effect of Absdiff Part shows that the compound has more meaning in 
common with noun2 than with nounl. This confirms the hypothesis that noun2 
will tend to act as the head of a compound. However, there is a significant 
interaction between Compound Type and Absdiff Part. This interaction is as 
predicted, with absdiffl being greater than absdifO for both r.AA and n.AA 
compounds, but there is little difference between absdiffl and absdifO for the 
n.AN compounds. The constituents of the n.AN compounds therefore seem to 
contribute equally to the meaning of the compound. Superficially, this finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that subjects would interpret n.AN compounds by 
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taking the union of the meanings of their constituent nouns. But contrary to 
prediction, this equal contribution between the two constituents is not due to an 
increase in the amount of meaning contributed by the nounl. Comparison with 
r.AA and n.AA compounds shows that it is in fact due to a decrease in the 
amount of meaning noun2 and the compound have in common. This result would 
therefore appear to refute the theory that the meaning of a n.AN compound is the 
union of the meanings of its constituents. However there are a number of other 
possible influences. Firstly, the n.AN condition is to be contrasted with the other 
two in that its component nouns are from different semantic groups, and are 
therefore unlikely to have much in common with each other. This in itself is 
likely to increase the apparent noncompositionality of the AN compounds. 
Also, i f the AN compounds are genuinely difficult to interpret, then different 
people are likely to come up with different interpretations of them. If this is the 
case then subjects who are rating compounds may well differ in their opinions 
about the meanings of compounds from those who generated the features. Some 
evidence for this influence can be found in the signed difference data (see the 
appendix, table A 1.4). Both dif f l and diff2 have positive scores for the real AA 
compound type, but negative scores for the novel compound types. This means 
that only in the real case were features rated higher with respect to the compound 
than with respect to its constituents. The likely reason for this is the high relative 
ambiguity of the novel compounds compared to real compounds. The increase in 
negativity of these scores from novel AA to novel AN compounds might 
therefore be accounted for by a similar increase in ambiguity, as would be 
predicted from the assumption that natural kind nouns are difficult to modify. 
However, the raw mean scores (appendix, table A 1.2), show that, compared to 
r.AA and n.AA compound types again, it is an increase in ratings for noun2 
rather than a decrease in ratings for the compound which is the source of the 
66 
highly negative n.AN diff2 score. The n.AN noun2 is natural kind noun condition 
in the experiment, and has been more highly rated than the other conditions 
(r.AA nounl and noun2, n.AA nounl and noun2 and n.AN nounl) which are all 
artefacts. It appears therefore that this is a simple effect of semantic category -
that the natural kind nouns were rated more highly with respect to the listed 
features than were the artefact nouns. Thus it seems that to the subjects, the 
features are somehow generally truer of the natural kinds than they are of the 
artefacts. A problem in the design of this experiment is that the same 
representative set of features is not rated with respect to each of the three parts of 
each compound. This prevents the teasing apart of any simple effect of semantic 
category which might occur, such as that postulated here, and any more complex 
effects concerning the interpretations given to different compound types. 
The implication of this finding is that the high absdifC score for the novel AN 
compound type is the result of particularly high ratings for the natural kind 
noun2 rather than low ratings for the AN compound. This effect seems to 
confound the overall comparison of novel AN compounds with the other two 
compound types to such an extent that it is not worthwhile attempting to explain 
the contrasts between them in terms of the meanings of the compounds. An 
experimental design which more closely controls the features presented to 
subjects ought to be able to examine any difference in compound types more 
properly. Such a design is used in the next chapter. 
It is still possible to compare the real AA compounds with the novel AA 
compounds. There was no overall effect of compound type in the analysis, and 
the interaction between Compound Type and Compound Part was due to the 
n.AN compounds. It must therefore be concluded that no effect of extensional 
feedback has been found here. It had been predicted that extensional feedback 
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would lead to an increase in the number of noncompositional features, so it 
remains to be determined why the real AA combinations did not exhibit 
significantly higher degrees of noncompositionality than the other categories. 
One possibility is that the process used to manufacture the novel AA compounds 
has actually resulted in producing combinations which people feel have real 
references. Some of those produced were rejected for this reason, e.g. "refuse 
bin', but these were selected only by the experimenter's intuition, and some of 
those not rejected may have suffered this drawback. However, it seems only a 
remote possibility that enough truly referential compounds slipped through the 
net to make a genuine difference to the results. 
An alternative explanation is one offered by Hampton, in his discussion of a pilot 
study (Hampton 1991). His subjects were asked to draw examples of non-
existent items, such as "a teapot that is a computer", "a bicycle that is a kind of 
stove" or "a fruit that is a kind of furniture". According to Hampton, 
noncompositional elements abounded (although quantitative analysis of the 
results was considered impossible). This is as he predicted, his subjects having 
been asked to "combine the uncombinable" then "struggled to find a consistent 
composite prototype to represent the new type of object" (Hampton 1991). 
Hampton suggests that presenting subjects with novel combinations will, i f these 
combinations are improbable enough, cause a greater than normal amount of 
maintenance of coherence inferences, which would counteract any 
corresponding decrease in extensional feedback. He goes on to state, in reference 
to such inferences, "One can see that as each change is implemented, the subject 
has to think through the consequences, and make further adaptations. Different 
people will have quite different answers to the problem." This highlights a 
related concern with the present study. Subjects were only given features to rate, 
they were not allowed to introduce their own interpretation, which was therefore 
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excluded unless it coincided with that produced by the feature generation stage 
of the study. This in itself may have distorted the proportions of emergent to 
inherited features present. This seems most likely to have occurred in the novel 
AN category, in which the combinations were particularly obscure, and so their 
resolutions particularly idiosyncratic. 
Again, although there is no overall effect of compound type with respect to 
noncompositionality, absdiffpartl and absdiffpart2 do seem to behave slightly 
differently between r.AA and n.AA compounds. The difference between the two 
absdiff parts is rather greater for the real compounds than for the novel ones. In 
fact the absdiffl of both the novel AA and the novel AN compound types are at 
the same level, both below that of the real AA type. This suggests that in general 
subjects are interpreting the novel compounds as inheriting more of the noun Is 
meanings than is the case for the real compounds. In this sense, the novel 
compounds can actually be considered more compositional than the real 
compounds. 
In conclusion, then, no overall difference in compositionality was found. This is 
not interpreted as denying that the processes of extensional feedback and 
maintenance of coherence inference are present, but that they have been 
confounded with other influences. There is evidence that artefacts and natural 
kinds may behave differently, making the results of the novel AN compounds 
difficult to compare with the results of AA compounds. However, it does seem 
that the contribution that each constituent makes to the compound is more equal 
for the n.AN compounds than for r.AA or n.AA compounds. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that real compounds derive less of their meaning from nounl 
than do novel compounds. 
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Chapter three: Factors that Influence Noncompositionality 
General Introduction 
Experiment 1 suggested that the relationship between the meaning of a noun 
noun compound and the meanings of its constituent nouns depends to some 
extent upon the semantic categories of those constituents. The following three 
experiments investigate this relationship in more detail. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
are best seen as follow-up studies to Experiment 1. Experiment 1 was to some 
extent inconclusive. It had been predicted that the novel artefact - natural kind 
case would be distinct from the other two types of compound, in that each of its 
constituent parts would contribute equally to the meaning of the compound. 
Although not conclusive, the data does suggest this is the case. However, it had 
also been predicted that there would be a different level of noncompositionality 
associated with each compound type - this was not found. Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
are therefore intended to re-examine these questions in a more robust design, to 
look more closely at the ratings given to specific groups of features, and to 
extend the scope of investigation to more types of compound. Experiment 2 
looks at the compositionality by examining the features listed for compounds and 
their constituents, while experiments 3 and 4 look at feature ratings. 
In experiment 1, the factors across which concept combinations were varied, 
compound type and extensional status, were only represented in 3 of their 8 
possible permutations. These experiments include examples of all possible 
combinations of the factors used, see table 3.1. The factor of Compound Type 
used in experiment 1 is therefore no longer appropriate, and compounds are 
varied across two factors: Compound Composition (AA, AN, NA and NN) and 
Extensional Status (real and novel). 
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Table 3.1 : Eight possible permutations of the factors Extensional Status and 
Compound Composition 
real artefact - artefact (rAA) novel artefact - artefact (n.AA) 
real artefact - natural kind (r.AN) novel artefact - natural kind (n.AN) 
real natural kind - artefact (r.NA) novel natural kind - artefact (n.NA) 
real natural kind - natural kind (r.NN) novel natural kind - natural kind (n.NN) 
It is difficult to predict the outcome of this more complete manipulation. It was 
predicted that the three original types of combination would exhibit successively 
less noncompositionality, however, this was not found to be the case in 
experiment 1. 
Experiments 3 and 4 also include one further factor, that of Feature Set (fs). This 
factor splits the features into 3 sets according to their derivation, i.e. i f they were 
originally listed as features of nounl, noun2 or the compound (fsl, fs2 and fs3 
respectively). Clearly this factor would be expected to interact strongly with 
Compound Part, each set of features should be highly descriptive of the concept 
they were originally used to describe. It is also predictable that this interaction 
should vary with the factor Extensional Status. Real compounds are well defined, 
and as such feature set 3 should provide a good description of the compound. 
Novel compounds are probably subject to a good deal more variation in 
interpretation, and as such fewer of the features in fs3 will be deemed to be 
highly descriptive of the compound. 
A fuller investigation of Extensional Status will also be allowed by experiments 
3 and 4, by offering a comparison between real and novel compounds of each 
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combination type. It is possible that the artefact artefact combination used for the 
real/novel distinction in Experiment 1 is an anomalous case, and that other 
combinations will exhibit the predicted increase in noncompositionality. 
Alternatively all combinations may prove consistent with respect to this factor, 
and so confirm the impression that the real/novel distinction is less powerful than 
was predicted. The present design will also enable further examination of the 
artefact natural kind combination. Experiment 1 suggested that n.AN compounds 
might not conform to the usual pattern of nounl acting as modifier to noun2 as 
the head noun. In this study, this finding is retested, and compared to other 
compound types not previously examined. Each of these compound types is also 
investigated at a more detailed level, in that the features used to measure the 
meanings of the compounds are divided into feature sets according to their 
origin. Thus the source of any variation from the standard modifier-head 
relationship is traceable. In looking at other compound types, particular attention 
is directed towards the r.AN compounds, and the n.NA compounds to see i f 
either of these types (which are clearly related to the n.AN type) behave in any 
similar way. 
In general, it is also expected that there will be an overall difference between the 
behaviour of nounl and noun2 in the compounds. With the possible exceptions 
mentioned above, noun2 is expected to act as head noun in most instances, and 
therefore to determine the majority of the meaning of the compound. This should 
have implications for several aspects of the results, including a higher mean 
rating of features with respect to noun2 than nounl, and a greater difference of 
meaning between the compound and nounl than there is between the compound 
and noun2. Similarly, it is also expected that in most cases the compound will 
exhibit a high degree of compositionality, and so features from all feature sets 
will be rated relatively high for the compound. This is in contrast to each of the 
compound parts, which should only have high ratings for a more limited range of 
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features, particularly those from the respective feature set. Thus a distinction 
between the mean ratings received with respect to the compound and with 
respect to the constituent parts is predicted. 
Experiment 2 ; Measuring Noncompositionality by Feature Lists 
This experiment looks at the features generated by subjects, comparing those 
listed for simple concepts with those listed for compounds. The factor of 
Extensional Status is included in an attempt to isolate the effect of extensional 
feedback. Also the different combinations of artefact and natural kind nouns are 
investigated to see if any differences occur with respect to such compound types. 
Such differences could be due to different conceptual structures. 
Method 
Design and Questionnaire Composition 
This experiment has a 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Extensional Status) x 3 
(Compound Part) factorial design, with repeated measures on the last factor. The 
three compound parts were simply nounl, noun2, and compound. The four 
compound types were determined by the type of constituent noun used (either 
artefact or natural kind) in each position (either nounl or noun2). Extensional 
Status was either real (the compound describes some entity that exists in the 
world) or novel (it describes something which does not exist, and can only be 
imagined). The concepts investigated therefore fall into eight separate categories, 
an example of each of which is shown in Table 3.2 below. (The order of mention 
of the constituents matches their position in the compound). 
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Table 3.2 : Compound Types and Examples 
Compound Composition Real Novel 
Artefact - Artefact coat hanger weapon clamp 
Artefact - Natural kind computer mouse carpet slug 
Natural kind - Artefact daisy wheel giraffe motor 
Natural kind - Natural kind crab apple whale pineapple 
Six compounds were selected in each condition, giving a total of forty-eight 
combinations, which are listed in the appendix, table A2.1. The real compounds 
were chosen first, and the novel compounds were generated by choosing words 
(artefact or natural kind nouns, as required) matching the word frequencies (from 
Kucera and Francis, 1967) to those in the real condition. Details of frequencies 
are also in the appendix. 
Subjects 
Forty eight unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying the University of Durham first year psychology course, 
aged 18-30 years. There was an approximately equal number of males and 
females. 
Materials 
Each of the forty-eight compounds was divided into a triple, the three elements 
of this triple being nounl (e.g., "carpet"), noun2 (e.g., "slug"), and the 
compound itself (e.g., "carpet slug"), resulting in 144 items. 
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Each subject was presented with items of the same composition (e.g., Artefact -
Natural kind), but from both categories of referential status (i.e., real and novel), 
so the materials were divided into four groups along these lines. Thus, the six 
real instances of each composition type were paired with the six novel instances 
of same composition type. From each of these four groups of twelve triples, 
twelve materials were selected for three different questionnaires, each 
questionnaire containing one part (nounl, noun2, or the compound) of each 
triple in the group. These three questionnaires were from only one compound 
type, so all four compound types resulted in a total of twelve different 
questionnaires. 
The elements within each questionnaire were randomised, into four different 
random orders, resulting in forty-eight different sets of materials, with each of 
the 144 items being presented four times. 
Each questionnaire contained twelve concept names (two to a page), and under 
each concept name were twelve dotted lines. 
Procedure 
Each subject was given a questionnaire, the first page giving the following 
instructions. 
"On the following pages are twelve different phrases, each made 
up of either one or two words. Each phrase names a type of object, and after 
each is a number of blank lines. I want you to imagine that you have to describe 
or define the object to someone unfamiliar with it. Do this by listing on the 
blank lines the properties or attributes that you consider important to this object, 
and which could be used to decide whether or not something is this kind of 
object. You may use a few short phrases i f it helps. 
Some of the phrases might describe things that don't actually 
exist as things in the real world. If this is the case, don't worry, they are meant to 
be like that. Just try and imagine what they might be like in some other world, 
and list these attributes as though it did actually exist. Try to list as many 
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attributes as possible. Aim for ten, but more i f you like. Take two or three 
minutes over each phrase." 
Results 
The lists of features produced by subjects were compared to see how many 
features were common to the elements of each concept triple. Of interest is the 
number of features (indicating the amount of meaning) common to the 
constituent concepts (nounl and noun2) and the compound concept. There are 
several different ways of counting the number of features that these concepts 
have in common. The counts presented here cover two alternative dimensions. 
First, there is the level of precision. Clearly there is a good deal of ambiguity in 
the notion of two features being "the same". In order to try to get consistent 
measures across all of the different categories involved, two levels of precision 
were used - exact and liberal. Although these categories are also ambiguous, 
using them should help to allay concerns that the notion of" sameness' is so broad 
as to be useless. Features were considered to be exactly the same i f their 
meanings were thought synonymous. This would included verbatim matches 
(e.g. "is black", "is black") but also some features which are worded differently, 
but cannot really be thought of as being different in meaning (e.g. "obscure", 
"rare/unusual"; "keeps animals in", "used to hold animals"). Features were 
considered liberally the same i f they referred to the same underlying meaning, 
or i f one feature was more specific or informative than the other (e.g. 
"vegetable", "yellow vegetable"; "circular container", "used to keep things in"). 
The other dimension included in the analysis of results was that of types and 
tokens. Between two lists of features there will be a certain number of matches 
between features such that a feature on one list matches a corresponding feature 
on the other list. These are token matches. There may, for example be 3 token 
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matches between two lists. But these matches may cover only a single type of 
feature. That is they may all refer to the same meaning (e.g. they might all state 
that the item concerned "is round"). So this would constitute only a single match 
of types. It is clearly sensible to distinguish this situation from one in which the 
three token matches were all of different types (e.g. "is round", "is green", "is 
edible"). So the feature lists generated by the subjects were worked through, 
counting the number of matches in each of the four different combinations of 
exact and liberal counts, and type and token counts. 
An analysis of variance was conducted for each of these counts according to a 4 
(Compound Composition) x 2 (Extensional Status) x 2 (Part) design, with 
repeated measures on the last two factors. Results from each of these analyses 
were similar, the significant effects being the same in all except for one case, 
which is detailed below, and all significant differences were in the same 
direction. For this reason, only the results for the exact type count are given 
here, since these are representative of the other results which are given in the 
appendix, tables A2.4 - A2.9. 
The main effects of Compound Composition (F = 8.00, df = 3,40, p < 0.001) and 
Part (F = 12.36, df = 1, 40, p < 0.001) were significant. Also significant was the 
interaction Compound Composition x Part (F = 3.92, df = 3, 40, p < 0.015) (this 
interaction was not significant in the analysis of the data of the liberal type 
count). 
As can be seen in Table 3.3, the main effect of Compound Composition seems to 
arise because there are fewer feature matches for AA and NA compounds than 
AN, which in turn had fewer than the NN compounds. The main effect of 
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Compound Part is due to there being more features common to noun2 and the 
compound than there are between nounl and the compound. 
Table 3.3 : Mean number of exact feature type matches for Compound 
Composition x Part 
AA AN NA NN mean 
Parti 1.00 0.85 1.34 2.59 1.45 
Part 2 1.50 3.75 1.17 4.67 2.77 
mean 1.25 2.30 1.26 3.63 
The interaction Compound Composition x Compound Part is shown in Figure 
3.1. Inspection of figure 3.1 shows that the main effect of Compound Part is due 
to the AN and NN compound compositions, the differences between parti and 
part2 being negligible for the AA and NA compounds. 
Figure 3.1: Compound Composition x Compound Part 
5 i 
Parti 
Part 2 
5 
1 
AA AN NA NN 
Discussion 
This experiment investigates the compositionality of compounds, in a design 
relying upon subjects producing descriptive lists of features. The number of 
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features common to the descriptions of the constituent concepts and the 
compound give a measure of this compositionality. Firstly, with respect to the 
factor Extensional Status. There was no difference between Real and Novel 
conditions. This result confirms and extends the findings of experiment 1 - that 
novel compounds are no more compositional than real compounds. As such, it 
provides no direct evidence of extensional feedback. However, this should not be 
interpreted as conclusively indicating that extensional feedback does not occur. 
It remains quite possible that extensional feedback is occurring here, but that 
some other influence is causing a similar increase in noncompositional features 
amongst the novel compounds, thus eliminating any difference between the two. 
Furthermore, there is a good candidate for causing such an increase in 
noncompositional features in novel compounds. This is the inferences needed to 
make novel compounds seem sensible and coherent, as Hampton (1991) 
suggested. 
To consider next the effects which were significant. The difference between 
compound parts is straightforward to account for. It is usually assumed that 
noun2 is the head in noun noun compounds, so the compound will inherit most 
of its meaning from this concept, and less from nounl. It therefore follows that 
noun2 should have more features in common with the compound than nounl 
does, which is found to be the case in this experiment. This result therefore gives 
support to the belief that noun2 is usually the head in both real and novel 
compounds. 
However, the interaction between Compound Composition and Compound Part 
modifies this conclusion. The greater number of common features for noun2 
only holds for AN and NN compounds. So the main effect of Compound Part 
was due only to the AN and NN compounds. The NN compounds also have more 
79 
features in common for nounl than other compounds have. The explanation of 
this finding would seem to lie in the number of common features in different 
concepts. Or more particularly between and within different types of concept. It 
seems that for the NN compounds features of both constituents are quite 
common in the description of the compound. In this case all of the concepts 
concerned are natural kinds. For the AA compounds fewer features are common, 
and this is true for the NA compounds too. However, in the case of the AN 
compounds few features are common between nounl and the compound, but 
many more are common between the noun2 and the compound. Following the 
principle than noun2 acts as head, we can assume that the AN compounds 
themselves are natural kinds, so this finding is consistent with the conclusion 
that features are relatively common between natural kind concepts, but rather 
less so between artefact concepts. 
In conclusion, no difference has been found between the levels of 
compositionality of real and novel compounds. But this cannot be taken as 
evidence that extensional feedback does not occur in real compounds, since it 
cannot be ruled out that some other influence causes similar noncompositionality 
among novel compounds. Differences in the number of features common to the 
two constituents of compounds were detected. This is simply due to noun2 
commonly acting as the head noun and so passing on most of its meaning to the 
compound. Differences in the compositionality of compounds composed of 
different types of concept are attributed to differences between how common 
features are between artefacts and natural kinds. 
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Experiment 3 : Measuring Noncompositionality by Feature Ratings 
Findings from experiment I suggest that the approach used to investigate 
noncompositionality is worthwhile pursuing. Experiment 3 therefore uses a 
similar design, with a more extensive range of materials. Experiment 1 was 
composed of a feature generation stage, followed by a feature rating stage. For 
experiment 3, the features used are those generated and analysed in experiment 
2, so experiment 3 uses a feature rating task. 
Method 
Features for this experiment were those generated in experiment 2. Subjects were 
required to rate the features derived from experiment 2 for their importance to 
given concepts. 
Subjects 
Twenty-four unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates or postgraduates studying psychology at the University of 
Durham. There was an approximately equal number of males and females, aged 
18-30 years. 
Materials 
The features to be rated were selected from those generated in experiment 2. 
Features were selected as follows. The lists of generated features were grouped 
into their triples, i.e. the list of generated features for a compound concept was 
grouped with those of its corresponding nounl and noun2 constituent concepts. 
From each of these three lists, 10 features were selected, and so a 30 feature list 
was compiled. This list was then presented for rating with each of the three 
concept headings. 
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The 10 features from each list were selected according to the following rules, in 
descending order of priority. 
• features were selected first from those generated for nounl, then 
noun2 and finally the compound concept, 
• no feature was included more than once. Thus, i f a feature was 
included from nounl (e.g. the feature "has wings" from 'sparrow') it 
wi l l not be duplicated i f it occurs in the compound as well (e.g. i f the 
compound were 'sparrow hawk' which also had "has wings" listed as a 
feature.) 
• i f a feature was generated more than once for a concept, then it was 
included, 
• features which were judged to be progressively less similar in 
meaning to others generated for the same concept were included until 
10 features had been selected from that concept. E.g., i f "small" had 
already been included, then some similar term such as "microscopic" 
would only be included when other features of a more distinct 
meaning had been selected. 
In some cases it was deemed necessary to adapt this procedure to particular 
circumstances. A ful l description of these adaptations is given here. 
Some of the concepts had obviously been ambiguous, and in these cases only 
those features concerning the predominant sense of the word (i.e. that with which 
most features were concerned) were considered. Thus, for "gum" the sense of 
"sticky substance" was used, and "mug" was taken to mean "a type of cup". In 
one case, the compound "weapon clamp", only 6 features were generated in total. 
To make up for this 2 extra features were added from each of the constituent 
lists. In the case of "daisy wheel" none of the features listed by any of the 
subjects implied that the subjects knew the real reference of the phrase. It was 
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decided that this lack of recognition was likely to be unfortunate coincidence 
rather than an accurate representation of the common understanding of the 
phrase. It was therefore assumed that subjects in the latter part of the 
investigation would be familiar with the term, and would be very confused at not 
having any appropriate features to rate for this item. Accordingly this concept 
was resubmitted to different subjects, who affirmed that they felt they knew the 
meaning of the term "daisy wheel". The features generated in this way were 
selected according to the procedure described above. 
When the lists were completed, the concept headings, along with the appropriate 
feature lists were compiled into questionnaires in the same random orders as the 
concept headings had been for stage 1. The features within each list were 
reordered randomly. Each questionnaire therefore contained a front page of 
instructions and rating scale, followed by 12 test pages. Each of these test pages 
was headed with a concept name, and had 30 features listed below in random 
order. Next to each feature was a short dotted line where the rating was to be 
recorded, and at the foot of the page the rating scale was reprinted for ease of 
reference. 
Design 
Again, the design with respect to subjects differs from that with respect to 
materials. A 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Extensional Status) x 3 
(Compound Part) x 3 (Feature Set) design, was used, with repeated measures on 
the last 3 factors for subjects, and on the last two factors for materials. 
The Compound Composition and Extensional Status factors are as in experiment 
2. The factor feature set referred to the origin of the features used. The 10 
features derived from the nounl constituent listing in stage one of this study 
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comprised feature set 1, the features from noun2 were feature set 2, and those 
from the compound comprised feature set 3. 
Procedure 
Subjects were either posted the questionnaire and asked to complete it according 
to the given instructions, or approached in person. Al l subjects completed the 
questionnaire in their own time. The following instructions to subjects were 
printed on the front page of each questionnaire. 
"Instructions 
At the top of each of the following pages is a different phrase, which is 
printed in bold, each is made up of either one or two words. Each phrase names a 
type of object, and below each is a number of possible attributes. I want you to 
rate these attributes as to how characteristic they are of the named object. In 
doing this, you should decide i f the attribute describes this object, and i f it could 
be used to decide whether or not something is this kind of object. 
Some of the objects might not actually exist in the real world. I f this is 
the case, then try and imagine what the object might be like in some imaginary 
world, and list its attributes as though it did actually exist. 
Please rate each attribute according to the following scale (just write the 
letter on the space provided to the left of each attribute). 
N = necessarily true for all possible examples 
A — a very important part of the definition 
B = a fairly important part of the definition 
C = typically true but not defining 
D = not usually true 
E = very unlikely, but possible 
I = impossible for any example 
You need not take long over this, but please try to accurately give your own 
opinion. 
The scale is printed at the bottom of each page for easy reference." 
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This is an adaptation of the scale used in Experiment 1, following Hampton 
(1987). The extremes of this scale (i.e. "necessary" and "impossible") are 
mapped to extended numeric values. This is in accordance with the principle that 
necessity, and its inverse, impossibility, should not be considered as simple 
continuations of probability, but rather that they imply a distinct order of 
difference from other sorts of possibility. The use of extended extremes here is 
intended to be a simple way of approximating this situation, rather than implying 
a specific quantitative description of the relationships between necessity, 
impossibility and intermediate probabilities. It was also felt that the scale in 
experiment 1 didn't allow sufficient expression of the status of features which 
were deemed not to be valid descriptions of a concept. Given that many features 
would, in the context of this experiment, inevitably fall into this category, the 
rating option "E = very unlikely, but possible" was added. 
Results 
Analysis of data 
The ratings given to each item were converted to numeric data. This was carried 
out in a similar fashion to that used in Investigation 1, observing the pattern of 
extended extremes suggested by Hampton (1988). The following mappings (table 
3.4) were used: 
Table 3.4 Numeric mappings used 
N - » 8 I 
A - » 6 
B - > 5 
C ^ 4 
D - > 3 
E - > 2 
I - » 0 1 
Treatment of Results 
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The absolute differences between ratings for features with respect to the 
constituents and compounds were calculated using the same function as in 
experiment 1. This is taken as a measure of noncompositionality. 
Following Clark (1973), two analyses are conducted for each set of data. One 
analysis treats subjects as a random factor, and collapses over items, the other 
treats items as a random factor, and so collapses over subjects. The F values of 
these analyses are known as F l and F2 respectively. Significant values of F l 
imply that results are generalisable across the subject population, and significant 
values of F2 imply that results are generalisable to the population of items. 
However, to ensure that an effect is generalisable to both subjects and items a 
further statistic is needed. The quasi F-ratio (F) fulfils this role, but because of 
the computational complexity of F, its simpler and more conservative relation 
Min F is used in this and subsequent experiments8. Whenever Min F is 
significant, it is reported. F l and F2 are reported i f either of them is significant 
and Min F' is not significant. 
Analyses of variance were conducted for the raw data, the absolute difference 
scores, and for the signed difference scores. Means and analyses for the raw data 
and signed difference scores are given in the appendix, tables A3.1 - A3.6. The 
absolute differences analysis is reported here. 
Absolute Differences Analysis 
The size of the differences between the ratings with respect to nounl and the 
compound and respect to noun2 and the compound were calculated. In the 
materials analysis this could be done for each feature, since features were 
common to each compound part. In the subjects analysis the difference between 
8Only the items analysis (collapsing across subjects) was conducted for earlier experiments (1 and 
2) because the design of the experiments did not allow the computation of subjects analyses. 
86 
the mean of the ten features of each feature set was taken, and the differences 
calculated from these means. This was necessary since the compound parts rated 
by subjects were from different items, and therefore the features of each 
compound part were different. 
Absdiffl = Absolute difference (c - n l ) , Absdiff2 = Absolute difference (c - n2). 
A 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Extensional Status) x 2 (Absdiff Part) x 3 
(Feature Set) analysis of variance was conducted for this data, with repeated 
measures on the final three factors by subjects, and the final two factors by 
materials. 
Compound Composition (min F' (3,80) = 5.12, p < 0.01), Absdiff Part (min F' 
(1,63) = 34.89, p < 0.01) and Feature Set (min F (2,107) = 4.44, p < 0.05) were 
significant by min F'. Compound Composition x Feature Set (Fl (6,86) = 7.06, p 
< 0.01; F2 (min F (6,80) = 2.36, p < 0.05) and Compound Composition x 
Extensional Status x Absdiff Part (Fl (3,43) = 14.55, p < 0.01; F2 (3,40) = 2.74, 
p < 0.05) were significant by F l and F2 independently, but not by min F. 
Inspection of Table 3.4 shows that the main effect of Compound Composition is 
due to the overall differences of the A N and NA compounds being greater than 
those of the AA and N N compounds. Also, NN differences appear slightly 
greater than AA differences. The main effect of Absdiff Part can be seen in the 
same table. Clearly the difference in ratings of features with respect to nounl and 
the compound is much greater than the difference between the ratings with 
respect to noun2 and the compound. 
Table 3.4 : Compound Composition x Extensional Status x Absdiff Part 
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Absd i f f l AbsdifO Mean 
Real Novel Real Novel 
A A 7.044 5.410 3.010 3.554 4.883 
A N 8.372 10.480 4.074 3.227 6.538 
NA 9.083 6.505 5.576 4.700 6.466 
N N 8.450 6.400 3.132 4.846 5.707 
Mean 8.237 7.199 4.077 4.082 
Mean 7.718 4.079 5.899 
Table 3.5 : Compound Composition x Feature Set 
fsl fs2 fs3 
A A 1.623 1.707 1.554 
A N 2.203 2.035 2.303 
NA 2.301 2.340 2.061 
N N 1.945 2.283 1.481 
Mean 2.018 2.091 1.850 
Figure 3.2 : Compound Composition x Feature Set 
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The main effect o f Feature Set can be seen from Table 3.5. Feature Sets 1 and 2 
have similar absolute difference scores, whereas the scores for Feature Set 3 are 
smaller. 
The interaction o f this Feature Set x Compound Composition is shown in Figure 
3.2 (means in Table 3.5). This figure shows that the effect o f Feature Set holds 
for all compounds apart from A N . For A N compounds Feature Set 2 has the 
smallest absolute difference scores. 
Figure 3.3 : Compound Composition x Extensional Status x Absdiff Part 
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The interaction Compound Composition x Extensional Status x Absdiff Part is 
shown in Figure 3.3 (means in Table 3.4). Here it is clear that although all 
Compound Compositions have a similar difference between the two Absdiff 
Parts in the real condition, the novel condition does show an interaction. In the 
novel cases the A N compounds show a much greater difference between Absdif f 
Parts than do the other compounds. Also Absd i f f l is generally larger in the real 
condition than in the novel condition, except for the A N compounds. 
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Discussion 
The principle motive for this experiment was the investigation of 
noncompositionality, and as such results with direct bearing on this wi l l be 
discussed primarily. Results of the analysis carried out on the raw data (i.e. data 
before computation of absolute differences) wil l be discussed where relevant to 
the noncompositionality analysis. However, the discussion will mainly focus on 
the absolute difference scores. 
It had been predicted that real compounds would show more 
noncompositionality than would novel compounds. In fact the results showed 
that there was no difference between the two groups. Interpretation of this result 
is not straightforward. The simplest explanation would imply that neither 
extensional feedback nor conventionality effects cause noncompositionality. 
However such a reading would be counter to intuition. Recalling such examples 
as "phone card" and "wooden spoon", it can confidently be stated that a process 
of extensional feedback really does operate in at least these cases. Moreover, the 
very simple nature of this effect suggests that it is unlikely to be limited to such a 
small set of examples, it should occur in many other cases too. It is also worth 
noting that any such effect operating on any compound is likely to be quite small. 
In this study, 30 features were used to describe each item. I f extensional 
feedback did occur, but only with respect to one or two features in each case, 
then any resulting effect would be small. Some effect operating in the opposite 
direction would not need to be on a large scale to eliminate evidence of 
extensional feedback. 
Hampton (1991) refers to a process which would seem to be a likely candidate 
for causing just such an effect. In a pilot study that he ran, he asked subjects to 
draw pictures of unlikely sounding things, the names of which he had made up 
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by putting together pairs of semantically unrelated nouns, e.g. "A teapot that is a 
computer" or "A fish that is also a vehicle". The pictures produced included 
many emergent features. Hampton attributes this high degree of 
noncompositionality to 'conflict resolution'. That is, the bizarre combinations 
required of the subjects necessitated that incompatibilities within the pairs of 
concepts be accommodated. In many cases this was achieved by considerable 
elaboration of the original concepts. This effect would seem in fact to be the 
same as the 'maintenance of coherence' effect referred to previously. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that such a process also occurred in the present 
experiment. It is therefore quite conceivable that two effects, extensional 
feedback and maintenance of coherence both occurred in this study, but neither 
led to a significant effect as they cancelled out one another by operating in 
opposing directions. 
In spite of this potential counter balancing effect, the data can in places be seen 
to suggest some of the differences between real and novel compounds which 
might be expected. Overall absdiffl was larger for real compounds than for 
novel ones, while absdiff2 was more or less constant across the two conditions 
(see Table 3.4). In fact, were it not for the anomalous behaviour of the A N 
compounds this difference would be very considerable. This would suggest that 
while both real and novel compound inherit a great deal of their meaning from 
the noun2, novel compounds (apart from AN compounds) have more meaning in 
common with nounl than do their real counterparts. 
One clear trend in the data is that the heterogeneous compounds (AN and NA) 
show more noncompositionality than do the homogeneous types (AA and NN). 
This is attributed to a general commonality of features between both constituents 
and the compound in the homogeneous cases, whereas in the heterogeneous 
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cases this commonality of features is restricted to the compound and one of its 
constituents. The fact that there is a difference between these two types is not 
seen as resulting from a different type of combination between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous compounds. Rather it is simply that features derived from one 
kind of concept are more likely to be apt descriptions of another concept of the 
same kind, than they are of a concept of a quite different type, e.g. the features of 
the concept Tiori - 'is furry', 'runs', and 'eats meat' - wi l l be more likely to be 
applicable to another natural kind, than to an artefact. Since homogeneous 
compounds wil l almost certainly be of the same general category as both of their 
constituents, they wil l exhibit this commonality to a greater extent than the 
heterogeneous compounds, which wil l be of a different kind to one of there 
constituents. This difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous 
compounds is also evident in several other results. It is particularly clear in the 
main effect of Compound Composition in the raw scores (see appendix, table 
A3.1). 
Returning to the issue of apparent noncompositionality, it had originally been 
predicted that the AN compounds would be less noncompositional than the NA 
compounds, due to the supposed inhibition of maintenance of coherence 
inferences in AN compounds. Clearly this prediction was not borne out, there 
being virtually no difference between the two with respect to mean absolute 
difference scores (mean absdiff: A N = 6.446, NA = 6.466). However, underlying 
this there is also a significant interaction between Compound Composition, 
Absdiff Part and Extensional Status (see f ig 3.3). In the real condition no clear 
difference emerges between the Compound Compositions, but in the novel 
condition the difference between Absdiff Parts 1 and 2 is much more extreme in 
the AN case than is the case for the other compounds. In fact, Absdiff Part 1 of 
the AN compounds is much higher than that of other compounds, while Absdiff 
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Part 2 of the A N compounds is the lowest. Evidently the apparently high level of 
noncompositionality of AN compounds is based on the very low amount of 
meaning common to the nounl and the compound. I f only the relationship 
between the noun2 and the compound is considered, then it can be seen that 
these two are closer in meaning than is the case in other compounds. Therefore, 
rather than outright rejection of the original prediction with respect to these 
results it seems more appropriate to modify it. It appears that when confronted 
with AN compounds subjects do, as predicted, find them difficult to interpret. 
However, rather than becoming more liberal in their interpretation as a 
consequence of this difficulty of interpretation, subjects appear to react by 
adhering more rigidly to the standard grammar of such compounds. As a result, 
AN compounds are very close in meaning to the noun2, but they have very little 
in common with the nounl. 
There were two other significant main effects within the analysis. That of 
Absdiff Part is straightforward to account for. Absdiff Part 1 (7.672) is greater 
than Absdiff Part 2 (3.991). This result is in accord with the expectation that the 
compounds should be right headed, there being less difference between the 
meaning of noun2 and the compound than there is between nounl and the 
compound. The final main effect is that of Feature Set. This effect shows that 
noncompositionality of the compounds is lower with respect to Feature Set 3 
than Feature Sets 1 and 2. This demonstrates the principle that the apparent 
compositionality of compounds is dependent upon the features by which they are 
investigated. It seems that compounds wi l l appear more compositional when 
compositionality is measured using features of the compound than of the 
constituents. 
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A final issue is the different results in this experiment from those in experiment 
1. Both this experiment and experiment 1 found that novel AN compounds 
behaved differently to other compounds. In experiment 1 the AN compounds 
showed a big difference in meaning from noun2, yet in the present experiment 
they should a big difference in meaning from nounl. There are several 
differences between the two experiments which might account for this. Firstly, 
the context in which subjects carried out the experimental task differed in that 
there were many more types of compound present in experiment 3 
questionnaires. Secondly, the rating scale changed, with the addition of an extra 
choice. Both of these could have altered subjects responses. However, perhaps 
the most significant difference was in the features presented to subjects. As 
shown by the significant effects involving Feature Set, the features used in 
experiments such as these can make critical differences. Although there is no 
ideal set of features for such a comparison, perhaps the more tightly controlled 
selection of features in the current experiment provides the more suitable range 
of features. 
In summary, therefore, several conclusions are drawn. Firstly, that there seems to 
be little difference between real and novel compounds with respect to how much 
meaning they have in common with their constituents. Such differences as do 
exist between these two types of compound are confined to artefact natural kind 
compounds (of the compound types studied here) and seem to result from the 
real compounds having a well known meaning while the novel compounds can 
be difficult to interpret. It is concluded that novel artefact natural kind 
compounds are probably more difficult to interpret than other such 
combinations. This seems to cause stricter adherence to the standard grammar of 
noun noun compounds. Secondly, any demonstration that extensional feedback 
and maintenance of coherence inferences contribute substantially to 
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noncompositionality has proved hard to come by, since it was concluded that 
both of these may have been operating, and so cancelled each other out. 
This experiment also provides further evidence that compounds have more in 
common with noun2 than nounl. This is interpreted as supporting the 
assumption that noun2 wil l tend to act as the head of a compound. Finally, the 
results with respect to the factor Feature Set lend support to the concern that care 
must be taken to ensure that a properly representative range of features is used, i f 
comparisons between the meanings of compounds and their constituents are 
being made. Results using features which were listed for the compounds are 
different to those which include features listed for the constituents. 
Experiment 4 : Feature Ratings with Reversed Compounds 
It is difficult to discount the possibility that the data from experiment 3 might 
represent materials which contain inherent imbalances. This experiment 
therefore uses the same constituent nouns to construct novel compounds in the 
reverse order to that used in experiment 3. Therefore AA and NN compounds are 
reversed but remain the same compound composition types, A N and NA 
compounds are reversed and exchange compound compositions with each other. 
The design and procedure of this experiment are along the same lines as 
experiment 3. This study compares the data from the novel condition of 
experiment 3 with data from a new set of novel compounds. 
Method 
Again, this was a two stage study; feature generation and then feature rating. For 
the feature generation stage however most of the necessary data was already 
available. Feature sets 1 and 2 for each item were the same as those in 
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experiment 3 (although they swapped places because of the constituents 
swapping position), features therefore had to be generated for feature set 3 only. 
Part 1 : Feature Generation 
This stage is similar to experiment 2. Two lists were compiled such that each 
contained twelve compounds, three of each compound composition. Four 
subjects for each list were each asked to provide features of the compounds, 
which were presented in random orders in paper questionnaires. The same 
instructions were used as in experiment 2. 
Part 2 ; Feature Rating 
Subjects 
Twenty-four unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18 - 30 years. 
Materials 
Only novel compounds were used in this experiment, the nouns of each novel 
compound used in experiment 3 were reversed in order, so a compound "AB" 
became "BA". 
Design 
The experiment was of a 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Word Order) x 3 
(Compound Part) x 3 (Feature Set) design, with repeated measures on the last 
two factors by both subjects and materials. The factor Word Order is composed 
of Word Order 1, from experiment 3, and Word Order 2, new data from this 
experiment. 
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Procedure 
The procedure used was the same as that in experiment 3 above. 
Results 
As with experiments, tables of means and analyses for raw and signed difference 
scores are to be found in the appendix (tables A4.1 - A4.6). 
Absolute Differences Analysis. 
Absolute difference scores were calculated as in experiment 3. A 4 (Compound 
Composition) x 2 (Word Order) x 2 (Absdiff Part) x 3 (Feature Set) analysis of 
variance was conducted for this data, with repeated measures on the final two 
factors. 
Compound Composition (min F (3,93) = 8.75, p < 0.01), Absdiff part (min F 
(1,77) = 20.19, p < 0.01) and Feature Set (min F (2,99) = 10.80, p < 0.01) were 
all significant main effects. 
Compound Composition x Absdiff Part (min F (3,75) = 3.21, p < 0.05) and 
Absdiff part x Feature Set (min F (2,198) = 9.43, p < 0.01) were significant 
interactions. Word Order x Absdiff part x Feature Set (Fl (2,174) = 4.42, p < 
0.05; F2 (2,80) = 5.24, p < 0.05) was significant by F l and F2 independently, but 
not by min F. 
Table 3.6 shows that as with experiment 3 the main effect of Compound 
Composition is caused by the heterogeneous compounds having higher 
differences than the homogeneous ones. In this case however, NN compounds 
also have considerably larger differences than AA compounds. The main effect 
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of Absdiff Part is also clear from this table. Absdiffl is again much greater than 
AbsdiffZ 
Table 3.6 : Compound Composition x Absdiff Part 
absl abs2 mean 
AA 4.985 4.695 4.840 
AN 8.682 4.516 6.599 
NA 7.517 5.658 6.588 
NN 7.311 4.999 6.155 
7.124 4.967 6.046 
Fig 3.4: Compound Composition x Absdiff Part 
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Fig 3.4 shows that the AN compounds again have the highest absdiffl and lowest 
absdiff2, causing the interaction between Compound Composition and Absdiff 
Part. 
Fig 3.5 : Feature Set x Absdiff Part 
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The effect of Feature Set is similar to that of experiment 3, feature sets l and 2 
are approximately equal, but feature set 3 is lower, as shown in Table 3.7. The 
interaction between Feature Set and Absdiff Part is illustrated in fig 3.5 It is 
apparently due to Feature Set 2 which has the highest of the three Absdiffl 
scores, and the lowest of the Absdiff2 scores. 
2 
1.5 
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Table 3.7 : Word Order x Feature set x Absdiff Part 
FS1 FS2 FS3 Mean 
Absl Abs2 Absl Abs2 Absl Abs2 
WOl 2.418 1.576 2.684 1.261 2.097 1.428 5.732 
W02 1.919 2.195 3.033 1.346 2.172 1.425 6.045 
2.169 1.886 2.859 1.304 2.135 1.427 5.890 
2.028 2.082 1 .781 
Fig 3.6 : Word Order x Feature Set x Absdiff Part 
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Fig 3.6 shows the interaction Word Order x Feature Set x Absdiff Part. The 
interaction is caused by Feature Set 1 in Word Order 2, for which Absdiff Part 1 
is greater than Absdiff Part 2, counter to the main effect of Absdiff Part. 
Discussion 
This study was conceived principally in order to asses the generalisability of 
results in experiment 3. The factor critical to this question is that of Word Order. 
Word Order was a significant main effect. However, the only significant 
interaction in which it participated was Word Order x Feature Set x Absdiff Part 
(fig 3.6). In this interaction Absdiffl is less than Absdiff2 for Feature Set 1 of 
Word Order 2. In all other conditions Absdiffl is greater than Absdiff2. There is 
no account in terms of compound structure for this finding, since there is no 
principled difference between the two sets of compounds and subject groups. A l l 
that can be said is that this finding is quite possibly unrepresentative. The 
difference between the two scores is small (W02 FS1 Absdiffl = 1.919, W02 
FS1 Absdiff2 = 2.195), and could have arisen by chance. As was concluded in 
the discussion of experiment 3, findings concerning just a limited set of features 
can be quite misleading. 
There is no interaction of Word Order in other effects. The main effect of Word 
Order itself seems to be due simply to the second group of subjects rating 
everything slightly higher than did the first subject group. This could be due to 
the difference in the range of materials presented to the two groups. In Word 
Order 1 (experiment 3) subjects were asked to rate features with respect to both 
real and novel compounds. This factor was not present in the Word Order 2 
condition. Word Order does not interact with any other effects, and experiment 4 
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can therefore be seen as dispelling the notion that significant results between 
Compound Compositions in experiment 3 might have resulted from initial 
chance biases in the materials. 
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Chapter four: Slot Filling and Property Mapping 
Introduction 
Previous experiments have investigated the amount of meaning, in terms of 
features, common to a compound and its constituent concepts. This chapter 
departs from a purely quantitative approach, and instead looks at the types of 
grammatical relationship which exist between the two nouns, and how this 
relationship may be influenced by a number of factors. As discussed in chapter 1, 
several researchers have proposed descriptions of the types of combination 
which are found in noun noun compounds. Levi (1978) and Shoben (1991) 
provide a number of possible relations which may be asserted to exist between 
the two constituent concepts. These descriptions can be likened to the more 
psychologically descriptive models of Smith et al (1988), and Murphy (1988). 
Underlying all of these seems to be the assumption that modifiers fill slots in the 
meanings of head nouns. In other words, the relationship between the modifier 
and the head noun is given by the slot that it fills. For the compound car door the 
slot' part of in the representation of door is filled with the concept car, and so a 
whole-part relationship is given. A number of problems are associated with this 
kind of account, several of which were discussed in chapter 1. This chapter 
addresses one of these problems - that slot filling may characterise only a 
proportion of noun noun compounds, and is not at all an appropriate description 
of the remainder. 
Wisniewski and Gentner (1991) made up a large number of novel noun noun 
compounds by combining artefact, natural kind and mass nouns. Subjects were 
asked to write down descriptions of the most likely meanings of these 
compounds. Postgraduate judges classified these definitions as to whether or not 
they described a slot filling relation. Only 40% of the definitions were found to 
be slot filling relations. 
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Although it would be unwise to assume that this figure is a reliable measure of 
the proportion of slot filling among novel compounds as we use them, it does 
suggest that a theory of noun noun compounds ought to have slot filling as only 
one of its components. There are several questions which this finding provokes. 
Firstly, i f slot filling fails to account for the ful l range of noun noun compounds, 
what other relationship or relationships make up the rest ? 
Wisniewski and Gentner report that two other types of relationship in particular 
were present in their data, what they called property mapping and structure 
mapping. Property mapping is said to occur when a single feature or property is 
mapped across from the modifier to the head noun. For example, in the 
compound robin snake, the property of having a red front is mapped to the head 
noun, resulting in the compounds meaning - "a red-fronted snake'. Structure 
mapping is along the same lines, although it is not a single property which is 
mapped from the modifier to the head, but a relationship between multiple 
properties. Wisniewski and Gentner give the example pony chair, which was 
interpreted as meaning "a small chair'. The authors suggest that this cannot 
simply be a property mapping interpretation, since i f the size of the chair became 
equal to the size of the average pony, then it would actually be a big chair, as far 
as chairs go. Wisniewski and Gentner propose that what is mapped is the relation 
between the size of ponies and the size of their superordinate category, horses. 
This relation is mapped onto the corresponding relation of the compound, i.e. the 
relative size of pony chairs compared to their superordinate category, chairs. 
Thus, ponies are somewhat smaller than horses and pony chairs are somewhat 
smaller than chairs. Experiment 5 investigates the proportion of slot filling, 
property mapping and structure mapping interpretations in a range of noun noun 
compounds. 
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Secondly, what are the conditions which favour each of these types of 
interpretation? Any of several factors could have an important bearing upon 
which type of compounding is favoured. Clearly context would have an 
important role to play. Interpreting a compound in a particular context is likely to 
bias towards a particular meaning. For example: 
A small island is the only home to a number of rare species. In 
particular, conservationists are concerned about the decline of the 
local robin population. Its numbers have declined rapidly since the 
accidental introduction of robin snakes from the mainland. 
Given this context it seems likely that most readers would arrive at a slot filling 
interpretation, that is something like, "a snake that eats robins", counter to the 
property mapping interpretation made out of context that Wisniewski and 
Gentner report. However, although a powerful context may be able to override 
other influences, this does not imply that interpretations will just randomly vary 
in the absence of such contexts. It may be that each noun has a preference for the 
type of compounds it will enter as a head noun or modifier, as suggested by 
Gagne and Shoben (1995). There could be more complicated interactions, such 
as in Murphy's concept specialisation model (1988), or analogical influences as 
suggested by Ryder (1994). Wisniewski (1996) reports that he has identified a 
factor which does have such an influence. He found that noun noun compounds 
which had similar constituent concepts (e.g. tie scarf) were likely to have 
property mapping interpretations, and compounds with dissimilar constituents 
(e.g. fork scarf) tended to have slot filling interpretations. Another plausible 
influence is the number of salient features a constituent has. Property mapping 
would seem to occur only when a highly salient feature of the nounl can be 
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mapped over to the noun2. The potential for this to happen wil l vary depending 
upon the salient properties of a particular pair of constituents. Experiment 6 
looks at the influence that constituent similarity and number of salient properties 
have upon slot filling and property mapping. 
Experiment 5 : The Extent of Property Mapping and Slot Filling 
Introduction 
This experiment compares the four compound compositions used in earlier 
studies, composed of artefacts and natural kinds, to see i f any differences arise 
between them. These are the same sorts of compounds as used by Wisniewski 
and Gentner. However, the design of their study seems not to have allowed a 
proper analysis of what influence the factor of compound composition may have 
had on the type of interpretation given to compounds. I f such an analysis is 
possible for their data, they appear to have chosen not to carry it out, because 
none is reported. It has been suggested that there are important differences 
between the representations of artefact and natural kind nouns. I f these 
suggestions are well founded then it would not be surprising to find differences 
between the different compound compositions. However, since the proposed 
differences are somewhat i l l defined, it's difficult to make a strong prediction 
about the type of differences that might arise in compounds. 
One prediction that is quite straightforward is that homogeneous compounds 
(AA and NN) should have more property mapping than heterogeneous 
compounds (AN and NA). This is because it can reasonably be expected that the 
properties of any concept wi l l be more likely to be applicable to another concept 
of the same general kind than to a radically different concept. For example, a 
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wolf is regarded as a voracious predator. While such an attribute may be true of a 
wolf fish, it is unlikely to be true of a wolf door. Data from this experiment wi l l 
also provide an opportunity for comparison with Wisniewski's findings about the 
effect of constituent similarity. 
Finally, why have non-slot-filling interpretations been overlooked until recently? 
Given Wisniewski and Gentner's findings it is rather puzzling that so many 
people interested in noun noun compounds have overlooked non-slot filling 
interpretations. Perhaps the reason lies in a difference between real and novel 
compounds. Wisniewski and Gentner only looked at novel compounds, so as yet 
we are unable to say whether or not slot filling can account for all real 
compounds. I f it can then this would provide some explanation for the attention 
paid to slot filling. Of course, any such difference between real and novel 
compounds would require an explanation itself. Real and novel compounds are 
included here to compare the types of constituent relations in each. 
Overall experiment 5 is similar to Wisniewski and Gentner (1991), but several 
changes have been made, such as the inclusion here of the real/novel 
comparison. The other principle difference is that Wisniewski and Gentner 
obtained only a single definition for each compound. This feature of their study 
would seem to make it vulnerable to idiosyncratic responses, and the results 
difficult to interpret, so by contrast eight subjects define each item in experiment 
5. The Wisniewski and Gentner study did include very many materials (400 
compounds), so obtaining multiple definitions is at the cost of reducing this 
number. The number of materials is further reduced by omitting mass noun 
compounds. 
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The design of Experiment 5 includes categorisation of paraphrases with respect 
to which of the compound's constituent nouns is the referent of the paraphrase. It 
is commonly assumed that noun2 wil l be the referent. Wisniewski and Gentner 
tested this and found that 38% of their paraphrases did not accord with this 
assumption. However, it's not clear what proportion of this 38% might be 
exocentric, and what proportion had nounl as the referent, nor i f there was any 
influence of compound composition on this effect. This is therefore another issue 
raised by the Wisniewski and Gentner (1991) study for which Experiment 5 
attempts to reproduce a reported result, and also answer more specific questions 
about the nature of that result. 
To summarise, experiment 5 looks at AA, AN, NA and NN compounds. The 
primary focus wil l be the extent to which slot fill ing, property mapping and 
structure mapping occur. Another result which wil l be looked at is which of the 
constituent nouns, i f either, is the reference of the compounds, and whether this 
interacts with the experimental variables. Real and novel examples are compared 
for each compound composition, to see i f this affects the type of relation used. A 
post-test of similarity between the constituents of each compound will be used to 
compare this data with that of Wisniewski (1996). 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty six unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18-30 years. 
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Materials 
Each questionnaire consisted of a front page of instructions and two subsequent 
A4 pages. The two test pages listed twelve noun-noun compounds along with 
two dotted lines below each. Each questionnaire contained four real compounds 
(e.g. oven glove), four novel-order 1 compounds (e.g. apron filter) and four 
novel-order2 compounds (e.g. filter apron - order2 compounds were simply 
order 1 compounds with word order transposed within each compound). The four 
compounds presented to each subject in each of these conditions comprised each 
of the four possible compound compositions : artefact - artefact (e.g. bottle 
candle), artefact - natural kind (e.g. computer mouse), natural kind - artefact 
(e.g. crow pencil) and natural kind - natural kind (e.g. tiger moth). These twelve 
items were presented in random orders. A list of items is given in the appendix, 
table A5.1. 
Design 
This investigation was of a 3 (Compound Category) x 4 (Compound 
Composition) design. Both factors were within subjects. 
Procedure 
Stage 1 : Paraphrase generation 
Subjects were presented with the questionnaire described above, and asked to 
write beside each of the noun-noun compounds a definition or paraphrase of 
what they understood the meaning of that compound to be, verbatim instructions 
are given below. 
"On each of the following pages are six different phrases, which are underlined 
and enclosed in separate boxes, along with some dotted lines. Each phrase is 
made up of two words, and names a type of object. I want you to write a 
definition of each of these, that is, write briefly and in your own words, another 
way of saying what you understand by this phrase. Please write this on the dotted 
lines directly below the relevant phrase. 
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Some of the objects referred to might not actually exist in the real 
world. If this is the case, then try and imagine what the object might be like in 
some imaginary world, and write a definition of it as though it did actually exist. 
You need not take long over this, but please try to give your own opinion 
accurately and clearly. Please do not leave any blank, i f you feel that some of the 
phrases are not possible to provide a definition for, then just write down your 
best attempt." 
No time limit was imposed, and subjects were left to complete the questionnaire 
unsupervised. 
Stage 2 : Reference Categorisation 
The paraphrases were categorised according to two criteria. Firstly, which of the 
two nouns was the referent of the compound, and secondly whether or not the 
first noun modified the second. These judgements were made independently by 
two cognitive science postgraduates, and in cases where these judgements were 
in disagreement, the two judges were asked to come to a consensus opinion. The 
judges were given the instructions page shown in fig 4.1. 
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Fig 4.1 : Instructions to Reference Judges. 
This booklet contains the responses given by subjects who were asked to define 
or paraphrase some noun-noun phrases. Some of the phrases are commonly 
known to English speakers (such as traffic light), others are quite novel (such as 
beetroot clock). I would like you to make judgements about these responses. 
There are two particular questions that are to be answered. 
i) What is the referent of the phrase ? 
By this question I mean that 1 want to know what kind of thing the subject had in 
mind in giving his/her response. For example, i f the stimulus was "beetroot 
clock", and the subject wrote 
"Jk dock u/fiicfi has a deep punp<!e cofou/t" 
Then I would expect you to record that the referent was "clock" But you should 
do this by ticking the appropriate box on the grid provided, like this, 
Referent: beetroot clock S both neither 
because "clock" is the second noun of the phrase 
"beetroot clock". Had the subject responded something like, 
"Jk hoot mqetabfte which das a /tound shape, ftke a clock's {ace" 
then I would expect you to indicate that the 
referent was "beetroot" by ticking the first box. You should beware that you are 
sure which noun is which in each case, because many of the noun-noun phrases 
used are reversals of one another. 
I f you think that the subject genuinely thought the noun-noun phrase referred to 
something which was simultaneously a beetroot and a clock, e.g. 
"LA genetica% engineered hoot vegetable which is adso a dock" 
then you should tick the box for "both". I f the 
subject's response seems to refer to neither the first noun, nor the second, e.g. 
"LA kind o{ hat" 
then you should tick the box for "neither". 
The second question that should be addressed is, 
ii) Does the first noun modify the second noun ? 
This simply requires a "yes" or "no" answer (please tick the appropriate box). I f 
the subject's response implies that some aspect of "beetroot" is being asserted of 
"clocks", then answer "yes". This could cover a whole range of possibilities, so 
don't dismiss it too quickly. I f no aspect of the first noun is being asserted of the 
second one in the subject's response, then you should tick the "no" box. Please 
be careful to select the answers you feel are most appropriate. Another person is 
also carrying out this task and I wil l be asking you to come to agreement with 
one another about any differences of opinion. 
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Stage 3 : Modification Classification 
Those paraphrases which indicated noun2 to be the head noun (i.e. noun2 is the 
reference) and in which nounl modifies noun2 were further categorised. Again, 
the judges were two postgraduate cognitive scientists (different individuals from 
those who had conducted the first categorisation task). They were asked to 
indicate what form of modification nounl made to noun2 in each case. The 
categories into which judges were able to assign these paraphrases are based 
upon the possible modification types discussed by Wisniewski and Gentner 
(1992), i.e. slot filling, property mapping and structure mapping. In addition to 
these, judges could also categorise a paraphrase as appearance mapping' or 
'other1. The "appearance mapping* category is included to cover those cases in 
which the paraphrase reads something like "an X which looks like a Y", which 
seemed a probable paraphrase, but which doesn't naturally fit into any other 
category. The 'other" category is simply present so that judges are not forced to 
put any paraphrase into a category which it doesn't really fit. Again, differences 
of opinion were resolved by consensus. Full instructions are given in f ig 4.2. 
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Fig 4.2 : Instructions to judges for the Modification Classification Stage 
The following pages contain definitions which people have given for various 
concepts. Each concept is a noun-noun compound (e.g. book shelf). Some of 
them really do exist, others have been made up, but you shouldn't worry about 
this difference. 
Your task is to categorise the type of relationship which exists between the two 
nouns of the compound, as described in the given definition. You should do this 
by ticking the appropriate box. Here is an explanation (with some examples) of 
the categories you should choose between. 
• Nounl fills a slot 
I f the first noun (nounl) itself describes a simple, single attribute of the second 
noun. The terminology here comes from the idea of each concept having a 
template of attributes, and nounl is itself the value of one of these, 
e.g. phrase: beetroot clock 
"u4 cCocfc made beetoooc" 
Seems to mean that the value of the slot "is made o f is beetroot, so you should 
tick the first box, like this. 
Nounl fills slot Nounl provides Nounl provides Nounl provides Other 
one property structure appearance 
V 
• Nounl provides one property 
This is the case i f a single property of nounl is apparently being asserted of 
noun2. e.g. i f beetroot clock were described as deep puftpfle cfiocfe", then 
you would probably want to tick this box. 
• Nounl provides structure 
This is the case if, rather than a single property being 'mapped' from nounl to 
noun2, some structural relation of nounl is asserted of noun2. e.g. i f the concept 
pony chair were described as "a smd# cfcatt" this would seem to be applying a 
structural relation of ponies to chairs, since ponies are not small things 
themselves, but they are small in relation to other horses, as presumably the chair 
is small in relation to other chairs. 
• Nounl provides appearance 
You should pick this category i f the entire appearance of nounl is being asserted 
of noun2, and not i f just a single attribute of appearance is intended, e.g. for the 
concept pony chair, the definition "a chair that looks like a pony" should make 
you tick this box. 
• Other 
I f none of the above categories seem appropriate you should tick this box. I f you 
choose this option, please give an explanation (i.e. say what kind of category it 
does fall into) on the line below. 
112 
Post-test of Constituent Similarity 
A measure of similarity between the two constituents of each compound was 
also collected, using a similar method as that used by Wisniewski (1996). 
Subjects 
Eight unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18-30 years. 
Materials 
Each questionnaire was comprised of a single instruction page followed by the 
full set of test items. Test items were the pairs of nouns used in the noun noun 
compounds of the main study. Each pair of nouns was presented in both orders 
(so subjects were asked how similar A is to B, and then later in the questionnaire, 
how similar B is to A). The items were presented to half of the subjects in one 
random order, and to the other half in a different random order. The format of 
each question, and the instructions given to subjects were as follows: 
"This booklet contains five pages - this instruction page followed by four test 
pages. 
Your task is to judge the similarity between pairs of concepts, and to record your 
judgement on a scale of 1 (extremely dissimilar) to 7 (extremely similar), by 
circling the appropriate number. 
E.g. 
The following question asks you to compare the concept tortoise' with the 
concept book'. 
{r3na8} 
How similar is tortoise to book ? 1 2 3 4 
In this example, it was decided that books and tortoises are very dissimilar, and 
so that has been recorded by putting a circle around the "2". (By the way, you can 
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ignore the code in curly brackets ({r3na8}), it just identifies the questions for 
me). 
You should work through the questions at your own pace. None of the 
judgements should take long, but make sure that you do record what you feel is 
the most appropriate response, so don't rush through them. I want your own 
opinion, so please don't discuss these with other people. 
Feel free to make use of the full range of the scale, from 1 right through to 7. 
Please make sure that you record your judgement for aU of the questions. It is 
important that none are missed out. I f you find some of them difficult then just 
record what you feel is your best assessment. 
Do make sure ypu get the scale the right way round ! 
extremely very very extremely 
dissimilar dissimilar dissimilar neutral similar similar similar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7" 
Results 
Reference and Modifier Categorisation 
The judges originally gave the same opinion on 84% of the cases. After 
consultation the remaining 16% of cases were agreed. The resulting 
categorisations are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. From Table 4.1 it can be 
seen that noun2 is highly preferred as referent in all cases. In all but one 
condition, noun2 is the referent in over 72% of the paraphrases. The exception is 
the real AN case, for which noun2 is only the referent on 47% of occasions. The 
same condition has the equal highest proportion of cases in which nounl is the 
referent (14%), and the highest proportion of cases in which neither noun is the 
compound referent (39%). In the other three Compound Compositions (AA, NA 
and NN) the real condition has a vast majority of paraphrases with a noun2 
referent, and no cases at all of nounl being the referent. Thus the real condition 
can be seen to follow the same pattern as the novel condition, but more 
extremely. Overall, noun2 (including "both nounl and noun2') was the referent in 
81% of the cases. 
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Table 4.1 : Percentage of paraphrases in which each noun provides the reference 
nounl noun2 both neither other 
AA 
novel 1 11 75 6 3 6 
novel2 j 75 11 8 3 
real 0 97 0 3 0 
AN 
novel 1 0 78 0 22 0 
novel2 3 86 0 8 3 
real 14 47 0 39 0 
NA 
novel 1 8 78 0 11 3 
novel2 3 92 0 0 6 
real 0 94 0 6 0 
NN 
novel 1 14 72 6 6 3 
novel2 6 78 6 11 0 
real 0 97 3 0 0 
overall % 5 81 3 10 2 
Table 4.2 : Percentage of paraphrases in which nounl modifies noun2 
AA nounl nounl 
modifies does not modify other missing 
noun2 noun2 
novel 1 69 25 3 3 
novel2 81 17 3 0 
real 77 22 0 0 
AN 
novel 1 86 14 0 0 
novel2 77 19 3 0 
real 81 19 0 0 
NA 
novel 1 77 19 0 3 
novel2 86 8 3 3 
real 97 3 0 0 
NN 
novel 1 72 25 0 3 
novel2 92 8 0 0 
real 56 44 0 0 
overall % 79 19 1 1 
115 
Table 4.2 shows that in all cases nounl is likely to modify noun2. Overall there 
seems to be little difference either between Compound Compositions or real and 
novel conditions. The one result which may be slightly anomalous is the real NN 
case, in which nounl modifies noun2 in only 56% of the cases. 
Modification Type Classification 
299 paraphrases (69% of the cases) were found to satisfy both the condition that 
they have a noun2 reference, and that nounl modified noun2. These paraphrases 
were further categorised, as described in the method section. 
Original agreement between the two judges occurred for 76% of the cases. The 
remaining cases were agreed after consultation. These classifications are shown in 
Table 4.3. The percentages of slot filling and property mapping are illustrated by 
Figure 4.3. Because novel 1 and novel2 results are similar, they have been 
collapsed to a single novel condition in this figure. 
Figure 4.3 : Percentages of slot filling and property mappinfi definitions 
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Table 4.3: Percentages of definitions in each modification type category 
slot property structural appearance other n 
filling mapping relation mapping 
mapping 
AA 
nl 83 9 0 4 4 23 
n2 62 38 0 0 0 21 
real 96 0 0 0 4 28 
AN 
nl 80 12 0 0 8 25 
n2 42 38 0 8 12 26 
real 100 0 0 0 0 15 
NA 
nl 85 12 0 0 4 26 
n2 87 13 0 0 0 31 
real 94 3 0 0 3 33 
NN 
nl 35 61 4 0 0 23 
n2 21 57 0 21 0 28 
real 10 85 0 5 0 20 
Overall % 67 26 0 3 3 299 
Overall, slot filling occurred in 201 cases (67% of the sample), property mapping 
accounted for 78 of the definitions (26%). In the novel conditions slot filling 
occurred in 126 cases (62%) and property mapping in 60 cases (30%). In the real 
condition there were 75 cases (78%) which were slot filling, and 18 cases (19%) 
which were property mapping. Figure 4.3 shows that in the AA, AN and NA 
cases the slot filling relationship is most common, whereas in the NN 
composition the property mapping is strongly preferred. The difference between 
the proportion of slot filling to property mapping is more extreme in each of the 
real cases than it is in the novel cases. Binomial tests were carried out between 
slot filling and property mapping for each condition. The results of these are 
given in Table 4.4. The results in Table 4.4 confirm that the difference between 
slot filling and property mapping was significant in each condition. 
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Table 4.4 : Binomial tests between slot filling and property mapping for each 
condition 
condition result 
real AA p < 0.00003 
real AN p < 0.00003 
real NA p < 0.001 
realNN p < 0.001 
novel AA p < 0.0007 
novel AN p < 0.0006 
novel NA p < 0.00003 
novel NN p < 0.0119 
Results of Post-test of Similarity 
The mean similarity rating for each compound composition is given in Table 4.5. 
Scores were on a scale of 1 (extremely dissimilar) to 7 (extremely similar), and is 
illustrated by figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 : Mean Similarity Rating for each Compound Composition 
5 T 
BAA BAN BNA UNN 
4 
s 
novel orderl novel order2 real orderl real order2 
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Table 4.5 : Mean Similarity Rating for each Compound Composition 
AA AN NA NN 
novel orderl 3.25 2.02 1.94 3.06 
novel order2 3.23 1.94 2.04 3.21 
real orderl 4.60 3.77 3.58 4.71 
realorder2 4.50 3.19 3.46 5.00 
As can be seen from figure 4.4, the constituents of the homogenous compound 
compositions (AA and NN) are more similar to each other than are those of the 
heterogeneous compounds (AN and AN). The real compound constituents also 
seem to be rated as more similar than the novel compound constituents. Order of 
presentation has no effect on rated similarity. To see i f there was any significant 
difference between the homogeneous compounds, t-tests were conducted, both 
by subjects and by materials. These proved nonsignificant in both cases: by 
subjects, (paired samples, 2-tailed), t = -0.73, df = 7; by materials (independent 
samples, 2-tailed), t = -0.10, d f= 34. 
In order to see i f there was any correlation between rated similarity and 
likelihood of property mapping interpretations, scatter plots of mean similarity 
rating by number of property mapping interpretations were produced. These are 
shown in fig 4.5. Fig 4.5(i) displays data for both real and novel orderl 
compounds, novel order2 compounds are excluded because the similarity ratings 
for these are the same as for novel orderl. Fig 4.5(ii) displays only novel orderl 
data, as this provides the appropriate comparison with Wisniewski's (1996) 
Experiment 2, which did not consider real compounds. 
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Figure 4.5 Scatter Plots of Mean Rated Similarity with Number of Property 
Mapping interpretations 
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Inspection of the scatter plots in fig 4.5 suggests that there is no correlation, and 
this is confirmed by the Spearman correlation coefficients (Spearman's rho): real 
and novel orderl, x = 0.042, N = 48, n.s.; novel orderl, x = 0.021, N= 24, n.s. 
Discussion 
Slot Filling and Property Mapping 
As in the study by Wisniewski and Gentner (1992), it was found that a slot filling 
mechanism did not account for all of the noun noun compound paraphrases. 
However, this study produced a rather greater proportion of slot filling responses 
(67%) than did Wisniewski and Gentner (40%). The clear implication is that 
models which rely upon a slot filling mechanism, such as that proposed by Smith 
et al will not be able to account for all compounds. The present study also found 
that of the two proposed alternative strategies, property mapping (26%) was 
much preferred to structure mapping, which was recorded in only one case 
(<!%)• 
Furthermore, the relative frequencies of slot filling and property mapping were 
subject to change with respect to Compound Composition. For the AA, AN and 
NA compounds slot filling was most frequent, but for the NN compounds 
property mapping was preferred. This is in partial support of the prediction that 
homogeneous compounds would favour property mapping because of the greater 
transferability of features within superordinate categories than between them. 
Clearly however, the fact that AA compounds do not favour property mapping 
requires some qualification of this hypothesis. 
A possible explanation would seem to lie in the different way that information in 
artefacts and natural kinds is represented. It can reasonably be expected that i f a 
modifier is to map one of its properties to a head noun, then it will be a property 
which is particularly salient to that modifier - in other words, some property for 
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which the modifier noun itself can act as a label (e.g. the red chest of a robin in 
robin snake, or the elongated curving shape of a snake in snake vase). In the 
case of most artefacts, the only such property will be its function (e.g. a train is 
used for transporting things along rails, and a telephone communicates sounds 
over long distances). However, i f this function is now mapped onto another 
artefact, then a conflict arises because the new function is competing with the 
head's original function (i.e. the head's most characteristic feature) and the 
compound cannot tolerate two conflicting values of the same attribute. In the 
case of salient features being mapped from one natural kind to another, such a 
conflict is much less likely to arise since the most salient features of any two 
natural kinds are much less likely to refer to the same attribute. The red chest of 
a robin can be mapped to a snake quite easily to make robin snake a property 
mapping compound, whereas the transportation function of a train would conflict 
with the communicative function of a telephone for the compound train 
telephone, making a property mapping relation unlikely. 
An alternative explanation can be devised in that there is some reason to suppose 
that natural kinds and artefacts might differ both in how well they act as slot 
fillers and offer slots to be filled, and in how well they offer and accept 
properties. Artefacts have by their very nature got slots ready to f i l l , in that they 
have a function, and therefore may have a predisposition to f i l l slots such as 
used for' (e.g. telephone exchange, animal house). They also have many slots 
such as "made of, "part of and "made by' which could be filled. Fewer available 
slots are obvious for natural kinds, "preys on' being perhaps the most likely. 
There are also differences in the type of slots artefacts and natural kinds might 
f i l l . An artefact for example is likely to be a good filler of a "part of slot, but 
much less good at filling a "preys on' slot. 
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Differences between artefacts and natural kinds of a similar type would seem to 
exist for property mapping. As has been stated above, natural kinds tend to have 
several salient features compared to the artefacts' one. In general it might 
therefore be supposed that natural kinds are better at engaging in property 
mapping relationships from the point of view of both modifier and head noun -
they seem like good property donors and acceptors. This difference alone could 
account for the effect of compound composition in this experiment. It is possible 
that property mapping will occur i f and only i f the modifier is a good property 
donor and the head noun is a good property acceptor, otherwise slot filling 
occurs. 
Two different explanations have therefore been proposed to account for the 
finding that NN compounds tend to be property mapping, and other compound 
compositions tend to be slot filling. Both explanations are founded on the 
assumption that artefacts tend to be more or less defined by their functions, and 
that natural kinds are represented more by several salient features. 
These analyses of the situation seems intuitively appropriate, but do pose a 
challenge to an assumption made by Wisniewski and Gentner, that is that slot 
filling is the first choice solution to the interpretation of compounds. They write, 
"....in terms of computation, slot filling may be an easier strategy than 
others. In general, one only has to check the meaning of the predicate 
noun rather than alter its structure. In contrast, we will suggest that 
other strategies [such as property mapping] require one to dismantle 
and significantly alter the meaning of one or both nouns." 
(Wisniewski and Gentner, p267,1992). 
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The present explanations of the AA - NN difference both entail that property 
mapping is a relatively simple process for some noun types, and that AA 
compounds tend be interpreted as slot filling because property mapping is 
difficult. The high proportion of property mapping paraphrases in the NN 
condition (68%) implies that for these compounds, either slot filling is very 
troublesome, or a property mapping solution is found prior to slot filling taking 
place. Support for the idea that property mapping is a primary interpretation 
mechanism can be found in theories relating to the interpretation of 'nonliteral' 
language, particularly metaphor. The notion of one thing 'standing for' another 
(as in the robin snake example) is very reminiscent of metaphorical meaning, 
and property mapping relations may be considered metaphorical. Also, the idea 
of a concept lending its name to a metaphorical meaning relating to its most 
salient feature is in keeping with some current theories of metaphor (e.g. 
Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990), as is the notion of this kind of meaning being 
simultaneous to, or even pre-literal (e.g. Gibbs, 1984). Taking this argument a 
step further, considering property mapping and slot filling as competing or 
alternative mechanisms may itself be unnecessary. This is because property 
mapping in a sense implies slot filling. If, in the process of combining two 
concepts, a subject identifies a property to be mapped from one concept to the 
other, he/she must then apply this mapping. This application of the property to 
the head noun is really the same process as slot filling. In the robin snake 
example, once the feature "has a red chest" is identified as the appropriate 
modification implied by robin, all that remains to be done is to fill the slot "chest 
colour" of the concept snake. By this view then, the difference between slot 
filling and property mapping compounds is not that different mechanisms are 
employed, but that a different aspect of nounl acts as the modifier, either its 
whole or a part of it. 
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The findings of Wisniewski (experiment 2, 1996) had suggested that property 
mapping is more likely when constituent similarity is increased. As a post-test of 
the materials in this experiment, similarity ratings were obtained for the pairs of 
concepts used as the constituents of each compound. It was found that the 
constituents of the heterogeneous compounds (AN and NA) were less similar to 
each other than were the homogenous (AA and NN) constituents, but that there 
was no difference between the homogeneous constituents. This shows that the 
difference in proportions of property mapping and slot filling obtained for NN 
compounds in this experiment is not due to differences in constituent similarity. 
A test of correlation (Spearman's rho) also found that there was no relationship 
between rated constituent similarity and the number of property mapping 
interpretations generated for the compounds used in this experiment. These 
results do not readily agree with those of Wisniewski. 
Since the experimental procedures in this experiment and in Wisniewski's are 
really quite similar, the reason for the different results probably lies in the 
materials used. Wisniewski was deliberately manipulating similarity as an 
experimental variable, and as such compounds in his 'similar' condition are 
composed of constituents which are very similar indeed, e.g. coat shirt, tie 
scarf, organ piano, saxophone trumpet. This very high level of similarity (not 
present in any of the materials in the present experiment) seems to have 
facilitated property mapping. The results of this experiment, and those of 
Wisniewski can therefore be seen as compatible. Wisniewski has demonstrated 
that a very high level of similarity of constituents does have an effect on the 
relative frequency of property mapping and slot filling interpretations. The 
present experiment has demonstrated that Compound Composition also has an 
effect at lower levels of constituent similarity. 
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Table 4,6 Percentages of property mapping interpretations for some compound 
compositions (adapted from Wisniewski, 1996. experiment 1) 
Compound Composition Percentage Property Mapping 
artefact-artefact 38 
artefact-animal 45 
animal-artefact 41 
animal-animal 74 
Further evidence in support of this finding is present in Wisniewski's experiment 
1. Wisniewski's experiment 1 did not manipulate constituent similarity, but did 
manipulate Compound Composition in a way similar to the present experiment. 
Among other Compound Compositions Wisniewski included four which are very 
similar to the four used in this study, artefact - artefact, animal - artefact, artefact 
- animal and animal - animal (the only difference being that Wisniewski used 
' animal' instead of natural kind). He found that his animal - animal compounds 
seemed to show more property mapping than the other compound compositions, 
as shown in Table 4.6, which is a very similar result to that for natural kind -
natural kind compounds in this experiment. 
Real/Novel Effect 
The difference in slot filling and property mapping for the four compound 
compositions seems to interact with whether the compound is real or novel. 
Differences are in the same direction, but are more marked for the real 
compounds than for novel ones. There are two possible explanations for this 
effect. First, such a situation would arise i f novel compound interpretation is 
carried out by analogy to real compounds. This supposes that when confronted 
with a novel compound to interpret, we attempt to find a real compound which 
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has similar constituents, and whose interpretation we are confident about. The 
novel compound will then be interpreted in an analogous way. Ryder (1994) has 
proposed such a theory, with the analogy occurring at any of several levels (e.g. 
same constituent, similar constituent meanings etc.). Shoben (1993), showed that 
we can be primed towards a certain type of slot filling relation by presenting 
subjects with novel compounds in a biased context, and then obtaining 
paraphrases of similar novel compounds. Such interpretation by analogy would 
mean that any bias occurring in the population of real compounds would result in 
a similar but less marked bias in novel compound interpretations, as is found in 
this data. The problem with such a theory is that it only explains how a bias 
might arise in novel compounds i f such a bias is already present in real 
compounds. How this original bias might come about cannot be accounted for. 
The alternative is to suppose that the biases are present in the population of 
novel compounds, due perhaps to some of the factors discussed above, such as 
natural kinds having many salient properties. Most interpretations of novel 
compounds will be in accordance with these biases, but some will not. Those 
interpretations that run counter to the trend are likely to have a low 
communicative value, in that they are less predictable. A compound is only 
useful if the utterer and interpreter are very likely to agree on its meaning. Such 
agreement is much more likely i f compounds are predictable, i.e. i f they agree 
with the common trend. Therefore compounds with predicable meanings are 
useful, and stand a good chance of being adopted as a part of the language (i.e. 
becoming 'real'), compounds which are less predictable are less likely to be 
accepted into the language. Biases evident in the population of novel compounds 
are thus likely to be more extreme in real compounds. 
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Both these theories would make similar predictions. Since Wisniewski found 
that novel compounds composed of highly similar constituents tend to have 
property mapping interpretations, we can predict a similar, though stronger bias 
would be found in real compounds with highly similar constituents. 
(Unfortunately, the practical difficulties of finding enough real compounds with 
highly similar constituents might render such an experiment impossible.) The 
same would go for any other bias detected for novel compounds, and vice versa 
for a bias detected in real compounds. 
Referential Status of noun2 
The finding that noun2 is the referent of the large majority of compounds will 
surprise no-one. However, the finding that real AN compounds are much less 
likely than other compounds to have a noun2 referent is more interesting. 
Inspection of the data shows that four of the compounds (toilet duck, clay 
pigeon, computer mouse and mug tree) are responsible for all of the responses 
which indicate that nounl, or neither nounl nor noun2 is the referent. In these 
cases the noun2 appears to contribute a metaphorical meaning to the compound. 
At the same time, there is some indication from the data that novel AN 
compounds are even more likely than other novel compound compositions to 
have a noun2 referent, and less likely to have a nounl referent. This effect is 
therefore in the opposite direction to that of real compounds. 
The finding that novel AN compounds often don't have a noun2 head implies 
that subjects found difficulty in modifying the natural kind head. This is 
discussed at some length in chapters 2 and 3. The difficulty seems to result from 
a lack of confidence about how a natural kind concept can be modified by an 
artefact without violating its essential characteristics. This leads to the possibility 
that the apparently metaphorical interpretation of noun2 in the real AN examples 
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is due to just such a modification, that is, that the real AN compounds which lack 
a noun2 reference have had their interpretation fixed by convention such that the 
defining characteristics of the head noun have been changed. Quite why this 
radical change to the head noun has been allowed in the real compounds but not 
the novel is open to question. It may just be due to chance selection of materials 
for this study. However it may be a function of the great difference in context 
provided for the interpretation of these compounds. When confronted with the 
novel compounds in this task, subjects had very little or no context influencing 
their interpretation. But for the real compounds the reverse is the case, because 
their interpretation of these compounds didn't really occur during the course of 
this study, all they did during this study was to recall an earlier interpretation, 
which was probably made in a very rich context. This rich context would have 
given them the support necessary to settle upon an interpretation which did not 
maintain some of the essential features of the head noun. This account of the 
difference between interpreting real and novel compounds therefore implies that 
the same processes occur in each case, but that without the support of context 
interpretations which violate the essence of the head noun will be very rare. With 
contextual support such interpretations can and do occur. 
Differences from Wisniewski and Gentner 
The overall difference in the amount of slot filling relations recorded in this 
study, compared to that of Wisniewski and Gentner might be a cause for 
concern. Some of this difference can be accounted for by the fact that the present 
study included real compounds, which Wisniewski and Gentner did not. These 
compounds did show an increased likelihood to have slot filling relations, 78% 
of real compound paraphrases were categorised as slot filling compounds, 
compared to 62% of novel compounds. However, this still leaves a substantial 
discrepancy. 
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It could be argued that this difference is due to the fact that not all of the 
paraphrases in this study were actually categorised for modification relationship. 
Those paraphrases which lacked a noun2 as head, or were judged not to conform 
to the nounl modifies noun2' pattern were excluded from the final stage. 
However, since the discarded paraphrases were predominantly classified as 
'nounl does not modify noun2' (61%) or uninterpretable data (a further 6%) it 
seems very unlikely that they could contain a high proportion of slot filling 
relations. An alternative explanation for the discrepancy might be sought in the 
fact that this study failed to include mass nouns. However, mass nouns are, as 
Wisniewski and Gentner point out, likely to specify what an artefact is made of 
(Wisniewski and Gentner report this to occur in 59% of all mass-count 
compounds). This is clearly a slot filling relation, so at least in this type of 
compound using a mass noun it would be expected that slot filling might 
increase. Again, it is unfortunate that Wisniewski and Gentner do not report on 
the extent of slot filling in the other compounds containing mass terms (count-
mass), and conjecture about it would only be confusing. Although it is not likely 
to be useful to speculate on this matter, it would seem surprising i f the remaining 
mass term compounds were so heavily biased against slot filling as to account 
for the difference in slot filling reported in these two studies. The most likely 
explanation for the difference would seem to be simply that the criteria for what 
is counted as a slot filling relation were not precisely the same in both studies. In 
fact, the judges in the Wisniewski and Gentner study were not explicitly told to 
look for' slot filling1 relations, rather they were instructed as to what to include in 
each category largely by way of several examples. Judges in the present study 
were explicitly asked to look for ' slot filling' relations (since they were cognitive 
psychology postgraduates this kind of theory of conceptual representation was 
not new to them). It would seem quite possible that picking out slot filling 
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relations by similarity to a few examples would give a more conservative 
measure than doing the same task when using more theoretically based criteria. 
Summary 
In summary then, this experiment has lead to several conclusions. Firstly, it 
replicated the result of Wisniewski and Gentner (1991) that slot filling is not the 
only method used to interpret noun noun compounds, but it is the single most 
common. The other important mechanism is property mapping. For AA, AN and 
NA compounds slot filling was far more common than property mapping, but for 
NN compounds this was reversed. This effect is attributed to differences between 
the representations of natural kind concepts, which tend to have several salient 
features, and artefact concepts which are defined principally by their functions. 
This explanation entails that property mapping is not a secondary mechanism 
called upon only when slot filling fails, and has much in common with current 
theories of metaphor interpretation (e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990). 
It was also found that the difference in proportions of slot filling and property 
mapping interpretations between compound compositions was more extreme for 
real compounds than it was for novel compounds. This is explained in terms of 
novel compound interpretations being more successful, and so more likely to be 
adopted into the language, i f they are in accordance with a general trend. 
Counter to the findings of Wisniewski (1996), constituent similarity had no 
effect upon the proportion of property mapping interpretations given to a 
compound. It is suggested that this is because the effect reported by Wisniewski 
only occurs when constituents are extremely similar. In compounds composed of 
less similar constituents discrepancies of constituent similarity between 
compounds have little or no effect. 
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It was also found that real AN compounds had a surprisingly high proportion of 
interpretations which did not have noun2 as the reference. The noun2 of several 
of these compounds was given a metaphorical interpretation in many cases. This 
is attributed to the difficulty of modifying a natural kind by an artefact. This 
difficulty is overcome for real compounds by giving the noun2 a metaphorical 
reading, which is possible in the supportive context assumed to be present for 
real compounds. Since no such contextual support was available for the novel 
compounds such metaphorical interpretations were less likely. 
Experiment 6 : Possible Causes of Property Mapping 
Introduction 
Experiment 5 examined the influence of several factors on the proportion of slot 
filling and property mapping interpretations given to noun noun compounds. It 
was found that compounds composed of two natural kind concepts were more 
likely to have property mapping interpretations than were other compound 
compositions. 
Wisniewski (1996) examined the effect of similarity between the two constituent 
concepts, and concluded that compounds of similar concepts were more likely to 
have property mapping interpretations than were compounds of dissimilar 
concepts. He accounts for this in terms of structural alignment. Wisniewski 
suggests that when two constituents are similar, people mentally align their 
representations with each other, and so compare them for points of contrast. 
When a salient contrast is found, we then resolve it by mapping across a feature 
from the modifier to the head, so the compound inherits the value of the 
contrasting attribute from the modifier. 
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However, in apparent contradiction of Wisniewski's finding a post-test of the 
materials used in experiment 5 found that rated similarity did not have any such 
effect in those data. The explanation proposed for this discrepancy relies on 
differences in the procedures used for the selection of materials for the two 
experiments, and on the identification of another possible influence on the type 
of interpretation given to noun noun compounds - the number of highly salient 
features available. This factor, the number of salient features of the constituent 
concepts, along with the factor of constituent similarity, are the subject of this 
investigation. The hypothesis is that the number of salient features available and 
constituent similarity should both have an influence on the type of interpretation 
given to a compound. 
Method 
This study investigates the influence of two factors in particular on the 
interpretation of novel compounds - feature clashing and constituent similarity. 
In order to select appropriate materials for the experiment, two preparatory 
stages were used to gather a suitable range across each of these two factors. 
1 - Obtaining defining features 
Subjects 
Thirty six unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18-30 years. 
Materials 
Forty eight natural kind nouns and forty eight artefact nouns were selected. 
These were the same nouns as those used in the compounds of experiment 5 (see 
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appendix, table A5.1). These were used to compile two similar questionnaires 
(twenty four artefacts and twenty four natural kinds in each) in which each item 
was enclosed within an outline border along with a single dotted line. There were 
twelve such presentations per page of a five page booklet, the first page being 
subjects' instructions, as follows: 
"This booklet contains this instruction page followed by four test pages.Each of 
the test pages contains twelve boxes similar to this : 
{i3N4} snake 
I would like you to read the underlined word, and decide what you think is the 
most defining characteristic of the concept it names. Please write this 
characteristic on the dotted line below the word. 
You shouldn't need to spend long on each item, but please do try to write the answer 
which you feel is most appropriate." 
The test items were sorted into two different random orders. 
Design 
This part of the experiment had a single two level within subjects factor, 
Concept Type (artefact or natural kind). 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked to read each item and write on the dotted line what they 
judged to be the most defining feature of that concept. They were given as long 
as they need to complete this task, which was typically 12-15 minutes. 
Treatment of the data 
The defining features listed for each item were collated, and the data were used 
to select concept pairs in two different conditions, those likely to exhibit a clash 
134 
(Clash) of defining features, and those unlikely to exhibit such a clash 
(Nonclash). 
To produce the pairs of the clash condition, concepts which had one or two 
defining properties listed very frequently were chosen. These were paired with 
one another in the cases in which the values of frequent properties were not the 
same. For example, the slot "function^ was frequent for both glove (8 times) and 
door (10 times), and had a different value in each case ("for protecting a hand', 
and 'for allowing entry/exit'), so these were paired in the clash condition. For the 
nonclash condition items were paired which did not have the same highly salient 
slots. For example, glove was paired with street for which function was only 
mentioned once. Whereas the clash condition only contained concepts which 
were characterised by one or two highly salient features, the nonclash condition 
also included concepts which were defined by several moderately frequent 
features as well. Combinations of artefacts and natural kinds were made in all 
possible permutations, giving all four possible compounds types. Details of 
materials are given in the appendix, table A6.1. 
2 - Obtaining similarity judgements. 
The concept pairs in both the clash and nonclash conditions were then submitted 
to subjects to obtain ratings of the judged similarity between the concepts within 
each pair. 
Subjects 
Four unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
postgraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. 
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Materials 
Four questionnaires were produced, each containing the full set of paired 
concepts. Concept pairs were sorted into a random order on which the four 
questionnaires were based. In order to eliminate any bias from presentation the 
four questionnaires differed according to two binary criteria, pair order and 
presentation order. Pair order simply refers to which way round the similarity 
judgement was to be made (i.e. "how similar is A to B?" versus "how similar is B 
to A?"). Presentation order is the sequence in which the questions were 
presented, either forwards (question 1 first) or reversed (question 1 last). 
Design 
This part of the experiment was of a 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Clash v 
Nonclash) design, with repeated measures on both factors. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked to work their way through the questionnaire, and answer 
each question by circling the appropriate number on a scale of one (extremely 
dissimilar) to 7 (extremely similar). Subjects were able to take the questionnaire 
away and complete it at a convenient time. 
Treatment of the data 
The data were used to assess the similarity of each concept pair, regardless of 
pair order, so for each pair of concepts there were four ratings. Concept pairs 
were sorted into two conditions, high similarity and low similarity. In the first 
instance, pairs with three ratings of 5 (similar) or higher were put into the high 
similarity condition, and those with 3 ratings of 2 (very dissimilar) or below 
were put into the low similarity condition. However, these criteria left some 
conditions very low or empty, so they were relaxed until there were several 
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concept pairs in each condition. Some conditions were much less likely to have 
items for certain similarity ranges, so the numbers in each condition varied. 
3 - Experimental questionnaires 
Subjects 
Eighteen unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18-30 years. 
Materials 
The noun pairs selected by the two preparatory stages of the study were made 
into compounds, the constituents being combined in each order. Table 4.6 shows 
the number of noun pairs, and the mean similarity rating in each condition. The 
compounds were then sorted into two random orders, and each presented above a 
dotted line, 10 such presentations per page. Nine questionnaires were of one 
random order, nine of the other. Of each set of nine, five questionnaires had the 
original page order, and the remaining four had the pages in reversed order, to 
counter any order effect. Materials and their similarity ratings are given in the 
appendix, table A6.1. 
Design 
A 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 (Clash / Nonclash) x 2 (Similarity) design was 
used, with repeated measures on all factors. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked to write what they understood by each compound on the 
dotted lines. They were able to take the questionnaires away and complete them 
at their leisure. 
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Table 4.6 : The number of noun pairs and the mean similarity rating in each 
condition9 
High Similarity Low Similarity Mean 
Clash Non-clash Clash Non-clash 
sim n sim n sim n sim n sim n 
AA 3.85 (10) 3.65 (10) 1.89 (14) 1.69 (26) 2.77 15 
AN 2.75 (3) 2.75 (5) 1.75 (7) 1.50 (6) 2.19 5 
NA 2.75 (3) 2.75 (5) 1.75 (7) 1.50 (6) 2.19 5 
NN 4.89 (32) 4.58 (16) 3.25 (18) 3.5 (8) 4.06 19 
Mean 3.56 (12) 3.43 (9) 2.16 (12) 2.05 (12) 2.80 (11) 
Mean 3.50 ( ID 2.11 (12) 
Results 
Although not directly the subject of this investigation, some statistics associated 
with the data generated in the preparatory stages of this study are given here. 
1 - Defining Features 
Table 4.7 shows the mean number of different defining features for each 
concept. 
Table 4.7 Mean number of different defining features per item 
artefacts natural kinds 
5.9 8.0 
9 A N and NA conditions have the same similarity scores and numbers because the compounds in 
these conditions are simply reversals of each other, i.e. "AB" in the AN condition becomes "BA" 
in the NA condition. 
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2 - Experimental results 
The definitions given by subjects for each of the compounds in the four 
conditions were categorised according to the type of relationship they implied 
between the two constituent nouns. The categories used were the same as those 
used in experiment 5. A 2 (Clash / Nonclash) x 2 (Similarity) x 4 (Compound 
Composition) analysis of variance with repeated measures on all factors by 
subjects, and on none by materials was conducted for the mean number of 
property mapping interpretations listed per item. 
The main effects of Similarity (Min F = 7.13, df = 1, 8, p < 0.05) and Compound 
Composition (Min F = 8.744, df = 3, 14, p < 0.01) were both significant by Min 
F. 
The interactions Similarity x Compound Composition (Fl = 5.88, df = 3,45, p < 
0.002; F2 = 1.49, df = 3, 7, n.s.), Clash x Compound Composition (Fl =6.71, df 
= 3,45, p < 0.001; F2 = 1.81, df = 3, 7, n.s.) and Clash x Similarity (Fl = 5.73, df 
= 1, 15, p < 0.03; F2 - 2.97, df = 1, 7, n.s.) were significant on the Fl analysis 
only. No other effects were significant. 
As can be seen from the data in Table 4.8 below, the main effect of Compound 
Composition is principally due to a higher proportion of property mapping 
interpretations in the NN compounds, although the effect is somewhat graded. 
The same table also shows that the Similarity effect is due to property mapping 
interpretations being more prevalent amongst high similarity compounds than 
low similarity compounds. 
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The Clash / Nonclash x Similarity interaction which approaches significance in 
the materials (F2) analysis is illustrated in Fig 4.6. The main effect of 
Constituent similarity is more marked for compounds in the nonclash condition 
than it is for compounds in the clash condition. 
Table 4.8 : Mean Proportion of Property Mapping Interpretations by Compound 
Composition and Similarity and Clash/Nonclash 
Clash NonClash Mean 
High Low High Low 
AA .30 .20 .35 .16 .25 
AN .44 .35 .40 .10 .32 
NA .19 .29 .25 .14 .22 
NN .55 .36 .67 .45 .51 
Mean .37 .30 .42 .21 
Mean .34 .32 
Fig 4.6 : Proportion of Property Mapping Interpretations for Clash/Nonclash x 
Similarity (sig. by Fl only) 
0.5 n 
c lash 
nonclash 
0.1 -
0 -I —i 1 
high low 
Fig 4.7 shows the Clash/Nonclash x Compound Composition interaction, which 
was also nonsignificant by F2. For NN compounds there are more property 
mapping interpretations in the nonclash condition. This difference is reversed for 
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A N and NA compounds, and the clash and nonclash conditions are almost equal 
for A A compounds. 
Fia 4.7 : Proportion o f Property Mapping Interpretations for Clash/Nonelash x 
Compound Composition (sia. by F l only ) 
0.6 -
AA 
AN 
NA 
NN 
0.2 -
0.1 -
0 -
Clash Nonclash 
The Similarity x Compound Composition interaction (nonsig. by F2) is 
illustrated in f ig 4.8. The N A Compound Composition does not fol low the main 
effect o f Constituent Similarity, since property mapping is equally frequent in 
both high and low similarity NA compounds. 
Fig 4.8 : Proportion o f Property Mapping Interpretations for Constituent 
Similarity x Compound Composition (sia. by Fl only) 
0.7 n 
AA 
AN 
NA 
NN 
0.1 • 
0 -I , 
Low High 
Discussion 
The main effect of similarity is significant, property mapping being more 
frequent in high similarity than low similarity compounds. This result would 
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seem to offer support to the suggestion that property mapping is facilitated by 
structural alignment. However, a cognitive mechanism involving structural 
alignment is not the simplest account which might explain such a result. It could 
simply be that i f a property is "offered" by the modifier, then that property is 
most likely to be acceptable if the head concept is similar to the modifier. This 
too would predict that property mapping would be most common among 
compounds composed of similar constituent concepts. Although these two 
accounts are rather alike, it's important to distinguish between them. Structural 
alignment is postulated as a cognitive process. The alternative account suggests 
that the increase in property mapping is simply the inevitable consequence of an 
increase in constituent similarity. It is based on the increased probability of 
features being acceptable to both concepts, regardless of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying property mapping. 
Since the two explanations do have much in common, determining which is 
more appropriate is not easy. Consideration of the behaviour of the compounds 
with respect to compound composition in this study could help in this respect. 
The main effect of compound composition is significant, NN compounds 
exhibiting the most property mapping. This result repeats a finding of 
experiment 5. However, in the present study the result is somewhat confounded 
with similarity, since the rated similarity is also highest for NN compounds. But 
the effect of Compound Composition here cannot be written off on the basis that 
it is simply due to similarity differences between compound compositions, 
because the order of the effect does not match that of similarity differences, as 
shown in Table 4.9 below. 
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Table 4.9 : Order of Effects of Rated Similarity and Property Mapping 
similarity: NN > AA > AN = NA 
property mapping: NN > AN > AA > NA 
Importantly, property mapping is more common in AN compounds than AA or 
NA compounds. This is relevant firstly in that it is counter to the ordering of 
rated similarity of constituents. Apart from this however, it is also not the case 
that property mapping is more common in homogeneous compounds than in 
heterogeneous compounds. Such evidence counts against the hypothesis that the 
important influence is whether or not constituents are of a similar nature. Clearly 
the picture is more complicated than that. In this respect then, the main effects of 
Similarity and Compound Composition can be taken as supporting the 
hypothesis that property mapping is facilitated by structural alignment. 
But this seems a far from complete explanation of the data. The graded effect of 
Compound Composition suggests that other influences are present. Structural 
alignment (via similarity) accounts for why NN compounds exhibit more 
property mapping than AN compounds, and why AA compounds have more 
property mapping than NA compounds. The constituents of NN and AA 
compounds are more similar than AN and NA compounds. But it also seems that 
compounds with a natural kind head noun are more likely to be interpreted by 
property mapping than those with an artefact head. It was a finding similar to this 
in experiment 5 that lead to the hypothesis that the likelihood of feature clashes 
might be responsible for the difference. But the main effect of Feature Clash in 
the present study proved to be nonsignificant, and so that hypothesis would seem 
to be refuted. Having replicated the original result, however, some explanation of 
the effect is needed. The results for the Similarity x Clash/Nonclash interaction 
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suggest that the presence of feature clashes does have some influence. This 
interaction was highly significant by Fl , and the nonsignificant F2 result is quite 
possibly due to the low numbers of materials in some conditions (see Table 4.6). 
The data for this interaction (Table 4.8) suggest that the main effect of 
Constituent Similarity is largely confined to the nonclash condition. It therefore 
would seem reasonable to interpret these data as indicating that feature clashes 
do have an influence on property mapping. It seems that the presence of feature 
clashes does interfere with the effect of Constituent Similarity. Ideally this 
interpretation ought to be tested with a larger pool of materials. The other 2 way 
interactions are also significant by Fl but not F2. the Clash/Nonclash x 
Compound Composition interaction (fig 4.7) also suggests that feature clashes do 
have an important influence over compound interpretation. Property mapping is 
equal in both clash and nonclash conditions for AA compounds, but more 
common in the clash condition for AN and NA compounds, and more common 
in the nonclash condition for NN compounds. Perhaps for diverse constituents 
(AN and NA compounds) a property clash actually acts as a useful point of 
comparison, and so helps structural alignment. For more closely related 
constituents, it has little overall effect (AA) or makes structural alignment more 
difficult (NN compounds). 
The Constituent Similarity x Compound Composition interaction (sig by Fl 
only) also suggests that Constituent Similarity is not the only important factor. 
NA compounds do not show the main effect of Constituent Similarity, property 
mapping being equally frequent in both high and low similarity conditions. 
However, with there being only a few NA compounds tested in each condition, 
and F2 proving nonsignificant, it would be inappropriate to read too much into 
this result. 
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In summary, the main effect of Constituent Similarity replicates the finding of 
Wisniewski (1996). Given the further result that property mapping is not more 
frequent in each of the homogeneous compounds (AA and NN) than in the 
heterogeneous ones (AN and NA), the data supports a structural alignment theory 
rather than one of simple feature transferability. 
The low F2 values for many effects are attributed to low numbers of materials in 
some conditions. The data do however suggest that feature clashes are influential 
in compound interpretation, since there appears to be some interaction with the 
main effect of Constituent Similarity, and with Compound Composition. A 
further study with balanced materials would be needed to examine these effects 
more properly. 
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Chapter five: The Significance of Each Constituent 
Experiment 7 : Concept Identification 
Introduction 
In the 1970's, largely due to the work of Rosch and co-workers (e.g. Rosch 
1977), the classical view of concept representation was seen to be inadequate in 
its account of how we mentally represent concepts. Thus the notion of concepts 
being defined by sets of 'necessary and sufficient' features was replaced by the 
idea that concepts were somehow represented by 'prototypes', and that category 
membership was related to the degree of similarity to that prototype. 
This theory reflected the wealth of psychological data which demonstrated the 
prototypical behaviour of human concepts. But there are problems associated 
with such a view. Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) showed that some 
concepts which were clearly and explicitly classical' in their definition, such as 
'triangle' and 'odd number', also exhibited 'prototypicality effects'. From this 
they argued that apparently prototypical behaviour should not be taken as 
indicative of an underlying prototypical structure. Smith and Medin (1981) have 
shown that standard probabilistic models make erroneous predictions about the 
levels of typicality of category members to a combined concept. This line of 
reasoning has been extended by Murphy (1990), who claims that much of the 
behaviour of concepts is too complicated to be modelled in such a restrictive 
fashion. This has lead to the idea that concepts may be represented in a complex 
structure. Murphy subscribes to the view that theoretical knowledge of the world 
at large is integral to concept representation. Less extreme than this notion is the 
idea that a concept has some central core combined with features which are 
typical of instances of that concept, and which can be used for identification / 
classification purposes. This idea was explored by Miller and Johnson-Laird 
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(1976), a more recent formulation exists in Keil (1987). The idea of 
identification procedures' has also been suggested from a philosophical 
tradition, Putnam (1975). 
The 'core' in such a theory could be various things. It has been suggested that 
such a core is valid only psychologically, in that it corresponds to nothing in the 
real world - this is known as psychological essentialism (Medin and Ortony, 
1989). Putnam also claimed that the core was in some sense illusory, in that 
people defer knowledge of such things to experts - who may or may not in fact 
know of essential defining characteristics. It has also been widely suggested that 
the nature of a concept's "core' depends upon the super-ordinate semantic 
category of the concept. Artefacts seem to be defined by their function (or 
something close to it), whereas living things are essentially defined by their 
genetic code and atoms by their atomic number (Keil, 1989). 
The idea that artefacts and natural kinds could differ in their core content has not 
been widely empirically investigated. One recent paper which did examine this 
theory is that of Malt and Johnson, 1992. They attempted to test the claims that 
the function (or in fact the 'intended function', i.e. what something is 
'manufactured and sold to do') of an artefact is both necessary and sufficient. To 
test the assumption that intended function is sufficient for categorising artefacts 
they presented subjects with passages, each of which contained two types of 
information, relating to the features and intended function of a particular object. 
Each passage was followed by a question such as "Is this thing a sweater?". The 
two conditions of the experiment were usual and unusual. In the usual condition 
the features were typical of the concept referred to in the subsequent question (in 
this example, made of wool, has buttons on the front and has open sleeves). In 
the unusual condition the features were highly atypical (made of rubber, buckles 
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at the back, and closed sleeves). In both cases the second half of the passage 
described the usual intended function of the target object (provides warmth for 
the upper body, and worn over a shirt). Subjects were found to respond that the 
passage did describe the target object far more frequently in the usual condition 
than in the unusual condition. In fact, the unusual condition resulted in less than 
half of the responses being positive. Thus Malt and Johnson claimed that 
artefacts can be excluded from categories in spite of possessing the associated 
function, so it is not a sufficient criterion for category membership. 
They used a similar paradigm in their second experiment, in which they varied 
the intended function between normal, related, bizarre and denial, and 
maintained the features as constantly typical of the target. This was designed to 
test the hypothesis that having the appropriate intended function is necessary for 
categorisation as a certain artefact. Findings for this study showed that while the 
normal function led to the greatest likelihood of categorisation as the target, all 
the other conditions still led to many subjects affirming that the object described 
was an example of the target concept. Malt and Johnson therefore conclude that 
intended function provides neither necessary nor sufficient information for the 
categorisation of artefacts, and as such is unlikely to be a concept core in the 
commonly understood sense. 
There are however problems with this strong interpretation of the results. Results 
of two other studies (by Keil, 1989, and Rips, 1989) which have included similar 
sorts of tasks to this have found that subjects' judgements were determined by 
the intended functions of artefacts. Malt and Johnson suggest that due to 
problems of the design of Keil's study, and problems of interpretation of Rips' 
study, these results are actually compatible with theirs. However, there are a 
number of issues which might be made about Malt and Johnson's experiments, 
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that question the interpretation of the results obtained. The experimental design 
seems to bias towards their findings. Importantly, in their test of sufficiency of 
function, Malt and Johnson always presented subjects with passages which 
contained feature information at the start of the passage, and then function 
information at the end. Since it is this kind of feature information which has 
been claimed to be utilised in concept identification, it is perhaps not surprising 
that subjects' responses are influenced by it. It is quite possible that subjects 
identify the concept from this information, and the following information about 
function is then simply accommodated within this concept. 
Further, the experiment then asks the subject to make a categorisation decision 
about the object, but in doing so prompts the subject with the name of the target 
concept. Asking "Is this thing a sweater?" introduces a confounding influence. If 
the subject thought that it was a sweater, but had some doubt, this question might 
well support such doubts. I f the subject thought that there was only a slight 
possibility that it was a sweater, the question might suggest that it really was one. 
Perhaps better would be to simply ask "What is this thing?", or "Choose the 
appropriate name for this from the following...". Another problem associated 
with how the question is asked is the possibility of over interpreting the question. 
Subjects might interpret it as "Is this a sweater by all criteria?" rather than "Can 
this be called a sweater?". Finally, for most subjects participating in a study like 
this, it would surely seem odd to consistently ignore the majority of the 
information given for each task, and to give only the simplest response in each 
case. Subjects might well expect that such behaviour would be regarded as either 
obtuse or deliberately disruptive. 
The materials used in the second experiment are also questionable, particularly 
the 'denial' condition. These intended functions are supposed to explicitly 
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contradict the intended function of the target, but to this reader they plainly do 
not, see Table 5.1 below. 
These various criticisms do not entirely dispel the conclusion that intended 
function is not absolutely necessary and sufficient for the categorisation of 
artefacts. The fact remains that, for whatever reason people have been shown to 
use so called characteristic features for categorisation even when information 
about function is made explicit. 
Table 5.1: Example 'denial' functions from experiment 2 (Malt and Johnson, 
1992) 
BOAT: ...for collecting samples of marine flora and fauna under sterile 
conditions and is totally mechanised so no people are allowed on board under 
any circumstances. 
COUCH: ...a seating area for participants in mood experiments in psychology 
labs and is very uncomfortable so it induces anger and frustration. 
STOVE: ...to heat foods in a laboratory for various tests, but in so doing releases 
toxins that make the foods inedible. 
Similar finding have been reported by Hampton (1995). Using a variety of 
concepts, he found that subjects' categorisations were influenced by supposedly 
characteristic features both when the supposedly defining features for a concept 
were explicitly present, and when they were explicitly absent. Over a series of 
four experiments, Hampton altered the experimental conditions slightly in each 
case (mainly alterations to subjects' instructions and questions), and in so doing 
increased the relative importance of the 'defining' features over the 
characteristic' features. But the influence of the characteristic features could not 
be eliminated. The sensitivity of this effect to experimental detail suggests that 
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the effect itself could be an experimental artefact, and may be practically 
impossible to eliminate in such studies. As in the above criticism of Malt's 
experiments, it is unreasonable to expect subjects' categorisations to be 
insensitive to the peculiar demands of the experimental task. 
This sort of interpretation is apt to provoke criticism from those who would see it 
as counter-empirical. Hampton writes, 
"Philosophers and psychologists may agree that natural kinds such as 
WATER or LEMON should be defined in terms of some essential and 
hidden structural property. The subjects in these experiments and in 
Malt's studies do not apparently share this view. The question then is 
whether the psychology of concepts should be modelling concepts per 
se, or people's categorisation behaviour." (Hampton, 1995, p703) 
However, it is in the nature of such studies to influence the categorisation 
behaviour of subjects. The failure to observe subjects treating some features as 
defining and others as characteristic may be a limitation of this kind of 
experiment rather than an indication that people do not behave in that way. 
Function can still be seen as some kind of a core for artefacts. In the light of the 
studies by Malt and Johnson and Hampton this core cannot be seen as 
constituting a rigorously necessary and sufficient condition for category 
membership. Such judgements are subject to influences of context. However, 
these results do not show that concepts lack a core of meaning which subjects 
would tend to rely on in a suitable context. These results can be interpreted as 
the behaviour of subjects who do have function at the centre of their artefact 
concepts, but who are also subject to contextual influences which may override 
the rigorous and logical application of this categorisation scheme. It is far from 
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unheard of that a subject might make a decision more influenced by contextual 
cues than by logical principles. 
In the light of these problems with the Malt and Johnson study, and considering 
other investigations with apparently contradictory findings, it would seem 
premature to reject the 'core + identification features' type of model, or to deny 
the role of function / intended function in the core of artefacts. The work so far 
discussed has investigated the nature of the proposed concept core, and possible 
differences between semantic categories with respect to this core. Little work has 
been carried out on the identification procedure, or how this might be subject to 
differences between semantic types. 
This experiment concerns people's identification of concepts. Descriptions of 
different types of concept are presented to subjects, who are asked to identify the 
target concept. The descriptions are feature listings in which the features have all 
been rated as to how descriptive they are of the target. Subjects were also asked 
to indicate (by ticking them) which of these features they actually used in 
coming to their decision. 
The types of concept vary in several ways. Firstly, concepts are either artefacts or 
natural kinds. As has been discussed, it has been widely suggested that these two 
semantic categories may differ structurally, principally with respect to the 
proposed concept core. There is evidence to show that manipulation of this core 
information can alter how an object is categorised. This experiment will 
determine whether one of these types of concept is easier to recognise from a list 
of features than the other. Malt and Smith (1984) also showed that natural kind 
concepts tend to have a more limited and defined set of features than do 
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artefacts. It will therefore also be interesting to compare the number of features 
used by subjects to identify these two types of concept. 
As well as these simple concepts, subjects are also asked to identify complex 
concepts, in the form of noun noun compounds. Both real and novel compounds 
are used as targets. It is predicted that, it will be much easier to identify real 
compounds than novel ones, mainly because the former are familiar parts of the 
language and so less ambiguous. The compounds are composed of the simple 
artefacts (A) and natural kinds (N) already used in the experiment, so as to form 
each possible combination (AA, AN, NA, NN). Comparison of these different 
compounds will also be of interest, since in other experiments in this thesis, they 
were found to have some different properties. 
The present study also includes the factor of feature set (fsl, fs2, fs3), in which 
features are divided according to which part of the compound (nounl, noun2, or 
the compound itself) they were originally generated for. Examination of the 
features used by subjects with respect to this factor should reveal information 
about the kind of features which are of most use in identifying compounds, and 
so give an insight into the identification procedure employed. 
This experiment should therefore be able to provide a range of information about 
concept identification, and in doing so enable a more informed judgement on the 
validity of the core + features theories of concept representation. Data may also 
relate to possible differences between artefact and natural kind concepts and 
concept combination. 
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Method 
Subjects 
144 unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18-30 years. 
Materials 
The same experimental items used in experiments 2, 3 and 4 were used here (see 
appendix, table A2.1). The format and design of the questionnaires used in this 
experiment is described below. The questionnaire set contained 24 different 
questionnaires, and six replicas of this set were used in this study, totalling 144 
questionnaires. 
Questionnaire format 
Each questionnaire contained seven different pages, the first being instructions 
and then six test pages. The order of these test pages was randomly determined. 
Of the six sets of questionnaires, three were in one random order, and the other 
three were in the reverse of this order. Each test page of these questionnaires had 
a blank dotted line at the top for the subject to enter his/her response. This was 
followed by a list of thirty features, which were grouped into categories, as can 
be seen in the example test page shown in fig 5.1. At the foot of each page were 
several dotted lines, on which the subjects could record any further information 
relating to the derivation of their response. 
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Fig 5.1: Example test page from a questionnaire 
{lali 
Necessary 
• heats 
Very important 
• uses gas or electricity 
• temperature controlled by a thermostat 
• hot 
D cooks 
Fairlv important 
0 racks inside 
• kitchen preparation 
• huge cube/box shape 
• hatch opens at the front 
• enclosed 
Typically true 
0 insulating material 
Not usually true 
• padded and insulated 
• keeps hand warm 
Very unlikely 
0 used to carry hot things safely 
D soft 
• smaller than 20cm 
• shape of human hand 
• no separate finger holes 
• five fingers 
0 5 cylindrical extensions 
Impossible 
• worn on the hands 
0 the two hands are joined by a strip of material 
• strip of strong heat-resistant cloth 
D stop hands being burnt 
• protects hand 
• material 
• made of linen 
• fits on a hand 
0 cloth may be plain or patterned 
• 2 pockets at each end for hands 
155 
Questionnaire design 
The features used, and the categories to which they were assigned were derived 
from experiments 2 and 3 in which subjects had been required to produce 
features and give descriptiveness ratings for them with respect to given concepts. 
Each set of thirty features relates to a concept triple, comprised of three 
Compound Parts i.e. a noun noun compound, and its constituent nouns, nounl 
and noun2. Thus each set of thirty features is itself composed of three subsets of 
10 features, referred to as Feature Sets each Feature Set being the 10 most 
commonly produced features when subjects were asked to list the features of the 
nounl, noun2 and compound. The example test page in fig 5.1 is for the concept 
"oven", and the features are derived from "oven", "glove" and from the 
compound "oven glove" 
In experiment 3 subjects were required to rate these lists of thirty features as to 
how descriptive of each of the three associated concepts each of the features 
was, on a scale which allowed conversion to numeric ratings 0 to 8, given in 
Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 : Categories which subjects used to rate features in experiments 1 and 2 
numeric code entered Category Description 
score by subjects 
8 N necessarily true for all possible examples 
6 A a very important part of the definition 
5 B a fairly important part of the definition 
4 C typically true but not defining 
3 D not usually true 
2 E very unlikely, but possible 
0 I impossible for any example 
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Experiment 3 collected four ratings from different subjects for each of these 
features with respect to each item. These ratings were used to determine the 
feature categories for this study. Features were assigned to the appropriate 
categories based on a function of the average (i.e. mathematical mean) and the 
mode (i.e. the most frequent) ratings given to them in experiment 3. Details of 
this are given in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 : Rules for assignment of features to categories 
• If three scores are the same, and the difference between this value and that of 
the fourth score is greater than 2, then the outlying score was discarded. 
• The mean of all remaining scores was calculated (x). 
• If x<l, a value of 0 was recorded 
• If l<x<2, a value of 2 was recorded 
• If x>7, a value of 8 was recorded 
• If 6<x^7, a value of 6 was recorded 
• x was then rounded to the nearest integer, and this value converted back to the 
corresponding category assignment. 
Since this study used the data obtained from experiments 2 and 3, the materials 
varied along the same factors. There were therefore two values of Extensional 
Status - real and novel. Each compound was also one of four possible Compound 
Compositions, either artefact artefact, artefact natural kind, natural kind artefact 
or natural kind natural kind. Each questionnaire contained items from only one 
level of each of these factors. Questionnaires reflecting all possible permutations 
of the factors Extensional Status (2 levels), Compound Composition (4 levels) 
157 
and Compound Part (3 levels) were produced, resulting in a total of 24 different 
questionnaires. 
Design 
This study was of a 2 (Extensional Status) x 4 (Compound Composition) x 3 
(Compound Part) x 3 (Feature Set) design. Repeated measures were used on the 
last two factors by materials, and on the final factor only by subjects. 
Procedure 
Subjects were given the questionnaires, and asked to read the instructions 
carefully. The instructions informed subjects that each of the following pages 
contained features which had been categorised to form a kind of profile' of 
concepts, and it was their task to identify what each of these concepts was. The 
instructions actually varied slightly according to the test condition, in that 
subjects were told whether the target was a one or two word concept, and also 
they were told that the concept was novel in the novel/compound condition. A 
short example was also given (not a genuine test item), and this too varied so as 
to accord with the test condition. Subjects were asked to indicate what concept 
they thought the features described by writing it at the top of the page. They were 
also asked to indicate which of the features had been useful to them in coming to 
this decision by placing a tick next to them. Finally, they were asked to make any 
further comments about how they arrived at their decisions on the few blank 
lines at the foot of each page. Subjects were then left to complete the 
questionnaire unsupervised, and the experimenter returned to collect it later. 
Results 
Correct concept identification 
Concept identification was recorded on two different measures, precise and 
liberal. I f the exact wording of the target was used by the subject, then this was 
158 
correct by the precise criteria. The liberal measure includes all of the precisely 
correct responses in addition to those responses which are either semantically 
very close to the precisely correct answer (e.g. "falcon" when "hawk" was the 
target, and "pen" when "pencil" was the target) or it had the correct head noun. 
Responses were judged to have the correct head noun if the response was a 
compound which had the target noun as its noun2 (e.g. "oven glove" when 
"glove" was the target). 
Table 5.4 below shows the number of correct responses in each category for 
nounl and noun2, by Compound Composition. Each Compound Composition 
was represented by 6 items, and each of these was tested with 6 subjects, so for 
each condition N = 36. 
Table 5.4 : Correct responses for Nounl and Noun2 by Compound Composition 
and Extensional Status 
Nounl Noun2 
precise liberal precise liberal 
AA real 15 28 27 34 
novel 21 23 23 30 
AN real 31 33 31 35 
novel 30 31 32 35 
NA real 35 36 2 34 
novel 13 19 27 32 
NN real 30 30 18 28 
novel 22 26 31 32 
Overall, there appears to be little difference between the number of correct 
responses recorded for artefacts and natural kinds, as shown in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 : Comparison of Number of Correct responses between artefacts and 
natural kinds 
artefacts natural kinds 
precise liberal precise liberal 
176(61%) 244(85%) 212 (74%) 241 (84%) 
Similar data was recorded for the compounds. In these cases, the liberal count 
includes only the precise plus semantically close responses. Two other categories 
of response were recorded in this condition. I f the response was only a single 
word, and i f that word was the noun2 of the target compound (e.g. "kettle" when 
the target was "fish kettle"), then this was recorded as head only. I f the response 
gave the correct two nouns, but in reverse order to the target (e.g. "pineapple 
whale" i f the target was "whale pineapple"), this was recorded as a reversed 
response. These data are given in Table 5.6. To give an idea of how many 
responses were in the broad semantic area of the target answer, reverse, liberal 
and head scores have been summed in the overall column. 
Table 5.6 : Correct Responses for the Compound by Compound Composition 
and Extensional Status 
reverse precise liberal head overall 
AA real 0 24 24 6 30 
novel 2 6 8 9 19 
AN real 0 32 33 2 35 
novel 6 6 6 12 24 
NA real 0 17 20 10 30 
novel 11 3 7 8 26 
NN real 0 13 13 15 28 
novel 8 5 7 3 18 
Total real 0 86 (60%) 90 33 123 (85%) 
novel 27 20(14%) 28 32 87 (60%) 
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Two 4 (Compound Composition) x 1 y} tests were carried out on these data in 
the real condition, one for the precise and one for the liberal data. In both precise 
and liberal counts y} was significant by a at the 0.05 level. More correct 
responses were given in the AN compounds than in the others. 
Precise measure : X 2 = 9 - 2 9 > 0.05 > p > 0.02 
Liberal measure : y} = 9.72, 0.05 > p > 0.02 
Because of the small number of correct responses in the novel condition no such 
test was carried out for those data. 
Number of features used to correctly identify concepts 
The number of features used by subjects to correctly identify the concepts was 
also recorded. These data were analysed in a 4 (Compound Composition) x 2 
(Extensional Status) x 3 (Part) x 3 (Feature Set) analysis of variance, with 
repeated measures on the final factor by subjects (Fl) , and repeated measures on 
the last two factors by materials (F2). Similar analyses were also conducted for 
the number of features used in identifying concepts for all results (i.e. including 
those cases in which the concept was incorrectly identified). The details of these 
analyses are given in the appendix (tables A7.3 - A7.5). all of the significant 
findings from the correct results analysis were also significant in the all results 
analysis, and operated in the same direction. Because this analysis only included 
data from those cases in which the subject correctly identified the target, some 
data points from the original data set were treated as missing. This meant that 10 
cases were excluded from the subjects analysis (leaving 134 valid cases), and 
107 cases were excluded from the items analysis (leaving 37 valid cases). 
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Part was a significant factor (min F'= 6.606, df = 2, 163, pO.Ol), as was Feature 
Set (min F - 10.062, df = 2, 141, p<0.01). No other main effects were significant. 
Part x Feature Set was a significant interaction (min F = 90.857, df = 4, 273, 
p<0.01). No other interactions were significant by min F', but Part x Compound 
Composition (Fl = 2.28, df = 6, 110, p < 0.05; F2 = 2.99, df = 6, 58, p<0.05), 
and Part x Compound Composition x Feature Set (Fl = 2.32, df = 12, 220, 
p<0.01; F2 = 3.02, df = 12, 116, pO.Ol) were both significant by both F l and F2 
analyses independently. 
Table 5.7 : Mean number of features used to reach correct answer by Part x 
Feature Set x Compound Composition 
AA AN NA NN mean 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
nounl 
fs sum 
4.21 0.19 
5.02 
0.62 4.90 0.31 
6.02 
0.81 4.19 0.08 
5.01 
0.74 3.94 0.15 
4.66 
0.57 
5.18 
noun2 
fs sum 
0.51 3.94 
5.80 
1.35 0.13 3.55 
4.97 
1.29 0.13 3.63 
4.46 
0.70 0.77 4.85 
7.05 
1.43 
5.57 
comp 
fs sum 
0.77 2.14 
6.11 
3.20 1.67 1.74 
5.78 
2.37 2.89 3.35 
10.10 
3.86 2.77 4.44 
9.45 
2.24 
7.86 
mean 
mean 
1.83 2.09 
5.64 
1.72 2.20 1.87 
5.56 
1.49 2.40 2.35 
6.52 
1.77 2.49 3.15 
7.05 
1.41 
6.19 
Concept type of the constituents (artefact or natural kind) was not specifically 
addressed in this experiment, so no analysis is conducted for this comparison. 
However, the mean number of features used to correctly identify the constituents 
was calculated, and it was found that approximately the same number of features 
was used in each case: Artefacts = 5.33, Natural Kinds = 5.43. 
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Inspection of Table 5.7 reveals that considerably more features were used in 
correctly identifying the compound than either nounl or noun2. Also, features 
from feature sets 1 and 2 are more frequently used than those from feature set 3 
(fsl = 2.27, fs2 = 2.39, fs3 = 1.60). 
The Compound Part x Feature Set interaction is shown in fig 5.2. This shows that 
for each Compound Part the corresponding Feature Set provides the largest 
number of features. 
Fig 5.2 : Mean number of features used to reach correct answer for Part x Feature Set 
5 n 
fs1 
fs2 
fs3 
nounl noun2 compound 
Fig 5.3 shows the Compound Part x Compound Composition interaction. This 
appears to be due to the large difference in the number of features used to 
correctly identify the AA and AN compounds and the number used for the NA 
and NN compounds. Subjects used more features for the NA and NN 
compounds. 
The 3 way interaction of Compound Part x Feature Set x Compound 
Composition is shown in fig 5.4. Feature Set clearly modifies the finding that NA 
and NN compounds required the greatest number of features to be correctly 
interpreted. The effect holds for fsl and fs 2 (although here NN requires more 
than NA) but not for fs3. In fact fewer fs3 features were used for NN compounds 
than for any other Compound Composition. 
163 
FIR 5.3 : Mean number of features used to reach correct answer for Part x 
Compound Composition 
12 n 
10 
8 
noun i 
noun2 
compound 
2 -
0 -| 1 1 1 i i 
AA AN NA NN 
Fig 5.4 ; Mean number of features used to correctly identify each concept for 
Compound Part x Feature Set x Compound Composition 
FS1 
noum 
noun2 
compound 
1 
NN NA AN AA 
FS2 
nouni 
noun2 
compound 
1 
NN NA AN AA 
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Discussion 
This experiment addressed issues relating to the identification of a range of 
concept types. Two measures involved were how many concepts were 
successfully identified, and how many features were used to identify them. The 
results of these two measures are discussed, first with respect to simple concepts, 
and then compounds. 
The comparison between artefact and natural kind concepts shows that there is 
no clear difference in how easy it is to identify these concepts (correct 
identification (liberal count): artefacts = 85%, natural kinds = 84%). So, by this 
measure at least, the two kinds of concept behave similarly. However, this result 
should not be interpreted as implying that no structural difference exists between 
artefacts and natural kinds. Theories which postulate difference between the 
cores of artefacts and natural kinds do not predict a difference in ease of 
identification. In fact, it has been suggested that identifiability is determined 
more by the ordinate level of category (i.e. superordinate, basic level and 
subordinate) than by semantic classification (Rosch, 1978). The materials in this 
study were not controlled for their level, but were mostly basic level concepts. 
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It was also found that the same number of features was used to correctly identify 
artefacts and natural kinds (5.33 and 5.43 respectively). The lack of any 
difference here is rather more of a challenge to the idea that artefacts and natural 
kinds are differently represented. It might be expected that artefacts could be 
identified by a single feature - their function, whereas natural kinds would be 
identified by clusters of features. Also, in experiment 6 of this thesis it was found 
that subjects listed fewer features as "defining" for artefacts (mean = 5.9) than 
for natural kinds (mean = 8.0). The result in the present study however suggests 
that either no such difference exists between artefacts and natural kinds, or that i f 
it does exist then the process of concept identification is insensitive to the 
difference. A mean number of features used of around 5.4 suggests that subjects 
used an identification technique which relied upon a handful of indicative 
features rather than regarding a single property as absolutely diagnostic. 
But it is also possible to offer an account of this result while retaining the idea 
that artefacts and natural kinds have different essences. Importantly, the subjects' 
task is this experiment is one of concept identification. The information provided 
about each item may be peculiarly informative, for example it might explicitly 
state the intended function of some item. This sort of information is often 
difficult to come by in realistic encounters with the world. As such, subjects may 
choose to ignore it, and rely on cues which are more usually available in real-life 
concept identification, such as shape, size, texture etc. This account therefore 
suggests that whatever differences may exist between artefact and natural kind 
concepts at a representational level, in terms of identification they tend to rely 
upon a similar numbers of features. 
Of the compound concepts, the real compounds were much more likely to be 
identified, as predicted. There are several factors which may contribute to this. 
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First, it is likely the case that the feature list or profile' given for each item was 
inherently more coherent, and so more helpful, for real compounds than for 
novel ones. This is a consequence of the way the profiles were produced. In the 
generation of these profiles, subjects were asked to list, and to rate for typicality, 
features of both real and novel compounds. Since the novel compounds would 
have some degree of ambiguity, and the real compounds would be virtually 
unambiguous, it is inevitable that the profiles of real compounds wil l be more 
consistent and coherent. Secondly, the real compounds are terms which describe 
things which definitely do exist, and which subjects are likely to be familiar 
with. This is unlikely to be the case in the novel condition. It is also important 
that each real compound is the privileged label for a particular reference. Thus, i f 
the reference has been successfully understood from the given profile, then the 
subject need only recall the appropriate linguistic label. In the case of novel 
compounds, subjects who did manage to apprehend the correct reference of the 
profile had no single phrase to label it with, so they are then faced with the task 
of thinking up an appropriate label. This, then, is a difference in how easy it is to 
be precise about the identification. 
I f this difference in the ease of precision were the only effect in operation here, 
then the difference should be eliminated by including all those responses which 
were somehow imprecise, but were in the correct semantic area. These totals 
(Table 5.6, overall' figures) show that the difference in ease of identification 
between real and novel compounds persists even when using the most general 
criteria. This suggests that precision is not the critical factor, and that the other 
two influences alluded to above (profile coherence and familiarity with the target 
concept) do account for the difference in identification between real and novel 
compounds. 
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Compounds were also categorised according to the semantic categories of their 
constituent nouns. Too few of the novel cases were correctly identified to 
observe any effect, but in the real condition there did prove a difference between 
Compound Compositions. The fact that there is no such difference between 
simple artefacts and natural kinds suggests that the difference between 
compounds is the result of interaction between the constituents, rather than an 
effect simply inherited from the head nouns. This is borne out by the fact that 
differences between the four compound types are not in accordance with the type 
of noun2; number identified: AN > AA > NA > NN. The compounds in fact 
seem to divide into the A N and A A compounds, which are quite well identified 
(correct in 32 and 24 cases respectively), and the NA and N N compounds which 
are only successfully identified in about half as many cases (correct in 17 and 13 
cases respectively). 
Examining these results along with those concerning the number of features 
used by subjects to identify compounds, a pattern begins to emerge. Subjects 
used just over half as many features in successfully identifying the A N and AA 
compounds (6.10 and 5.79) as they did to identify the NA and NN compounds 
(10.01 and 9.45), as illustrated in f ig 5.3. This suggests that subjects need to 
attend to more features to identify NA and NN compounds than to identify AA 
and AN compounds. It appears that this extra required effort means that fewer 
NA and NN compounds are correctly identified. The questions remain as to 
which extra features are needed in the NA and NN cases, and why. Data for the 
compounds by the factor Feature Set (illustrated in figure 5.4) shows that the 
most marked increase is from feature sets 1 and 2 (and also from fs3 for in the 
NA condition). The extra information required to identify the NA and NN 
compounds is therefore mainly compositional (fsl and fs2) rather than 
noncompositional (fs3). It is not possible, from the data of this experiment, to 
168 
come to a firm conclusion about the underlying cause of this effect. However, it 
is the case that the type of modifier varies along with the likelihood of successful 
identification and the number of features used. Compounds with an artefact 
modifier are better identified and require fewer features than those with a natural 
kind modifier. This suggests that the role of the modifier within the compound 
may be central to the effect. 
In summary, no difference was found between how well simple artefact and 
natural kind concepts are identified, nor in how many features were used to 
correctly identify them. This might suggest that there is no difference in the 
number of defining features in each case, but might also be due to subjects using 
an identification strategy which is relatively inefficient in the context of this 
experiment. It was also found that real compounds were better identified than 
novel ones. Three possible reasons were considered; the coherence of the feature 
profiles, subject familiarity with the target compound, and the linguistic 
precision of compounds. The latter of these can be ruled out as the sole cause of 
the effect, since the difference persists even when less precise responses are 
counted. Finally, among real compounds it seems that two Compound 
Compositions, NA and NN, are harder to correctly identify than the other two, in 
that fewer are correct, and of these more features were needed to identify them. 
The common factor between these two less well identified Compound 
Compositions is that they have natural kind modifiers. It is possible that this has 
some effect on the ease of identification of the compounds. 
Experiment 8 ; Constituent Position 
Introduction 
This experiment addresses an issue about compound nouns on which a number 
of authors seem to have made assumptions, but which has been the subject of 
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little empirical research. That is the question of which, i f either, of the 
constituent positions in a compound is more influential in determining the 
overall relation between the nouns. There would appear to be three possibilities. 
Either nounl is of principle importance in determining the overall relationship, 
or noun2 is, or there is an interaction between the two. Clearly this latter 
situation is true to some extent, since different relations do exist between pairs of 
compounds with the same noun Is or noun2s; consider elephant shrew and 
elephant gun, and bulldog clip and paper clip, each pair contains one property 
mapping relation and one slot filling relation. More interesting is the question of 
whether there is any significant difference in the relative importance of the two 
positions in determining the overall relation. 
There are theoretical arguments to be made in support of each position being 
more important than the other. Nounl is in the leftmost position, and as such is 
the first element of the compound to be encountered, it could therefore have a 
primary influence on the compound's structure. From a linguistic point of view, 
nounl is also the modifier, in that it supplies the reference of the modification. 
This being the case, it might also be expected to specify the type of 
modification. There is some empirical evidence in support of this. Gagne and 
Shoben (unpublished manuscript, 1995) compared the influences of nounl and 
noun2. Using data from an earlier study (Medin and Shoben, 1988) they 
identified types of slot filling relationships that certain nouns entered into as 
noun Is or noun2s either frequently or infrequently. From these data, they 
composed compounds based on whether the frequency was high (H) or low (L) 
for each of the nouns, such that they had HH, HL and LH combinations (not 
enough data was available to generate LL compounds). 
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Subjects were presented with these compounds, and asked to judge i f they were 
meaningful, with the response time being recorded. Clearly HH compounds 
would be expected to be accepted rapidly. Gagne and Shoben further reasoned 
that i f nounl was critical to the compound's relation, then reaction times for HH 
and HL compounds would be similar, and shorter than those for LH compounds. 
Conversely, i f noun2 were critical, then HH and LH would be fastest, and HL 
slower. I f neither was important alone and only the combination was critical, 
then HH compounds should be judged faster than LH or HL. They found that HH 
and HL compounds had very similar judgement times for correct responses, both 
being significantly faster than LH compounds. From this they conclude that 
nounl is critical in determining the relation in nonpredicating compounds. 
However, this interpretation maybe going a bit too far. Clearly the data implies 
that the frequency of relation is more important with respect to the modifier than 
to the head in terms of how rapidly we make sense of compounds. But this is not 
the same as claiming that the modifier is the critical element in determining the 
meaning of compounds. 
In a further experiment, Gagne and Shoben include a comparison of nonword -
word compounds with word - nonword compounds in a lexical decision task. 
They found that compounds with a nonword modifier are more rapidly rejected 
than those with a nonword head. They interpret this as being due simply to 
subjects encountering the modifier first, and so being able to make an early 
decision to reject compounds with a nonword modifier. This result and 
explanation hint at an alternative interpretation of the data from their initial 
experiment. The subjects' first hypothesis as to the compound's relation wil l 
probably be based on what is a likely relation for the first encountered noun (i.e. 
the modifier) to enter into, and for HH and HL compounds this is likely to be the 
correct choice. For LH compounds this initial hypothesis wi l l be incorrect, and i f 
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the subject is to interpret the compound correctly, the hypothesis wil l have to be 
rejected, and an alternative sought. This process of rejecting the initial supposed 
relation and generating a new alternative wil l inevitably mean an increase in the 
time taken to judge whether or not the compound is meaningful. There is, 
however, no good reason to suppose that the modifier has a greater influence in 
determining the ultimate interpretation of the compound just because it has the 
initial input in the sequence of processing. Gagne and Shoben therefore seem to 
have demonstrated that the modifier does provide us with an initial relation to 
consider for a compound, but it is not clear that this carries any more weight than 
the influence of the head noun in determining the ultimate relation when a 
meaning for the compound is resolved. 
In fact, there are theoretical reasons to suppose that noun2 could be more 
influential in determining the ultimate interpretation of compounds. Since noun2 
acts as the head of compounds, it defines the central reference of the compound, 
in a sense defining just what kind of thing it is that the compound refers to. In 
characterising the compound in this way, it might reasonably be supposed that 
the head would impose the more severe limitations on a compound's 
interpretation. Again, there is some empirical evidence to support this view. 
Shoben (1993) has shown that the interpretation of a novel compound can be 
influenced by prior encounters of contextualised compounds with the same head 
noun. Subjects read short passages which contained one of two novel 
compounds, which had different nounls, but a common noun2. Each context 
supported a different relation in the compounds, e.g. cat rash - a rash caused by 
a cat (causal relation), hamster rash - a rash on a hamster (locative relation). 
Afterwards, the subject had to define a third compound with the same noun2, e.g. 
horse rash. It was found that an original bias towards one relation for a given 
compound was shifted towards the relation previously encountered in a 
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compound with the same noun2. So although horse rash was interpreted by most 
people to contain a locative relation, more subjects used this relation i f they had 
previously seen the hamster rash passage (locative) than i f they had seen the cat 
rash passage (causal). 
This demonstrates that we can be influenced by analogy to compounds with the 
same noun2 when we interpret novel compounds. Shoben describes the process 
as a kind of priming of a certain thematic role 1 0 for a head. Clearly, there is some 
influence here. It is not possible to say however whether this kind of priming or 
interpretation by analogy can occur over periods greater than the few minutes 
involved in such an experiment. It is plausible that such a mechanism might be 
limited to operating within the limits of the average discourse, rather than 
spanning days and weeks. On the other hand, it's quite possible that a novel 
compound will commonly trigger a search for a compound with the same head 
whose meaning is known, and may have been learnt some considerable time ago. 
Indeed some vivid recent coinages seem to require just this mechanism, e.g. 
trolley rage is a supermarket equivalent of road rage, while a net potato is the 
internet version of a couch potato. But such compounds may well be the 
exceptions rather than the rule, their rhetorical impact may result from their 
analogical interpretation being a somewhat unusual strategy. 
Others have also investigated the possibility of compound interpretation using 
analogy. Ryder (1994) was able to some extent to predict the interpretation of 
novel compounds using analogy to lexicalised compounds. However, the 
analogies drawn could be between whole compounds (i.e. both nounl and noun2 
10Shoben uses the term "thematic role" to refer to the set of roles a noun might participate in (e.g. 
causal, locative, etc.). In other contexts, thematic roles are specifically associated with the 
arguments of a verb. Thus a given noun may fill the agent thematic role in one sentence, the 
patient role in another and so on. This is not how Shoben uses the term. 
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simultaneously), or just a single noun in common, or, at the most abstract level 
just between compounds with similar nouns. For example, at the whole 
compound level, Ryder suggests that we may interpret the novel compound 
water sock in accordance with a linguistic template fluid sock, derived from the 
real compound wind sock. At the intermediate level water sock might be 
interpreted by analogy to water bed. At the most abstract level water sock could 
be interpreted by analogy to snow suit or rain coat. 
Because the analogies were so broad, similar results would seem to be attainable 
by predictions based on semantic plausibility rather than analogy to linguistic 
templates. Van Jaarsveld et al (1994) used a lexical decision type task to look at 
analogy processes online. They found evidence of priming between lexicalised 
and novel compounds, for both noun Is and noun2s indiscriminately in 
experiment 1, and for compounds with common noun2s and related nounl s in 
experiment 2. However, this simple priming effect did not interact with 
productivity in experiment 1 (i.e. how common nounl and noun2 are in 
lexicalised compounds) or with the frequency of the lexicalised analogue in 
experiment 2 (van Jaarsveld et al suggest that a frequently occurring constituent 
ought to be a salient analogue). This lack of interaction leads the authors reject 
the idea that compound interpretation is analogy based, since the effect of 
priming is not subject to the size of the search (experiment 1) nor to the apparent 
salience of a suitable analogue (experiment 2). 
Apart from these studies, little empirical work has been conducted either in the 
area of interpretation of compounds via analogy, or into the question of whether 
nounl or noun2 is more significant in determining the relation of a novel 
compound. Most importantly, these studies tend to have examined the role of 
only one constituent, or of both in a design where independent effects are 
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undetectable. Only the Gagne and Shoben study has actually compared the roles 
of the two constituents in the same design, but as discrete factors. The issues of 
analogy and the possible priority of one constituent over the other seem to be 
somewhat tied. I f one noun is more important than the other, it seems plausible 
that it effects this influence by analogy to similar lexicalised compounds. 
This experiment uses a simple paradigm designed to compare nounl and noun2, 
to see i f either has a greater effect on the interpretation given to a novel 
compound than the other. Subjects are simply asked to paraphrase a number of 
novel compounds. Each compound is part of a triple, in which the central 
(original) compound shares a nounl with one member of the triple, and a noun2 
with the other. This wi l l allow a comparison between the two types of altered 
compound, to see whether those with the same nounl as the central compound, 
or those with the same noun2 tend to have the same relation. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-four unpaid volunteers participated in this experiment. They were all 
undergraduates studying psychology at the University of Durham. There was an 
approximately equal number of males and females, aged 18 - 30 years. 
Materials 
There were three sets of questionnaires, with eight questionnaires in each set. 
Each of the questionnaires in any one set contained the same items. Items were 
in triples (original, same nounl and same noun2; e.g. bee bag, worm bag and 
worm razor), and no items from the same triple were in the same questionnaire, 
they were split between the three questionnaire sets. 
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Compounds were composed of natural kind (N) and artefact (A) nouns in each of 
the possible combination types (AA, AN, NA and NN), ten items in each triple in 
each combination type. These combination types were equally represented in 
each questionnaire. The sets of ten natural kind nouns were subcomposed of 
seven animals (e.g. baboon, lobster), two living non-animals (e.g. fern, 
mushroom), and one inanimate natural kind (e.g. star, mountain). A ful l list of 
materials is in the appendix, table A8.1. 
Each questionnaire contained four pages of ten compounds, in half of the 
questionnaires the pages were in one order, in the other half the order of pages 
was reversed. 
Design 
The experiment was of a 3 (Noun in Common) x 4 (Compound Composition) 
design, with repeated measures on the first factor by subjects, and on the last 
factor by items. 
Procedure 
Subjects were given the questionnaires described above, and asked to complete 
and return them in their own time. Each questionnaire took around 15 minutes to 
complete. There was an instruction page fixed to the front of each questionnaire, 
containing the following instructions: 
"On each of the following pages are several different phrases, which are 
underlined and enclosed in separate boxes, along with some dotted lines. Each 
phrase is made up of two words, and names a type of object. I want you to write a 
definition of each of these, that is, write briefly and in your own words, another 
way of saying what you understand by this phrase. Please write this on the dotted 
lines directly below the relevant phrase. 
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The phrases might not refer to real things, and might not be familiar to you. I f this 
is the case, then try and imagine what the object might be like i f it did exist, and 
write a definition of it as though it did actually exist. 
You need not take long over this, but please try to give your own opinion 
accurately and clearly. Please do not leave any blank, i f you feel that some of the 
phrases are not possible to provide a definition for, then just write down your 
best attempt." 
Results 
Each o f the definitions generated by the subjects was categorised according to 
the relation that it asserted between the two nouns of the compound. There were 
two main classes of relationship; property mapping and slot filling. Some 
definitions were otherwise categorised, details of these other categories are given 
in Table 5.8 below. In some cases a subject would offer multiple definitions of 
one compound. I f this was so, only the first definition was considered. 
Those definitions that implied a slot filling relationship were further categorised 
according to the nature of that relationship. This finer categorisation was based 
upon the taxonomy suggest by Shoben (1991). However, some kinds of slot 
filling relation were recorded which were not listed by Shoben. Of these several 
were deemed frequent enough to warrant recognition in their own right, these are 
given in Table 6.1 below. Other of Shoben's categories were slightly adapted to 
better describe the data. Slot filling relations not listed by Shoben, and appearing 
only infrequently in the data were simply classified as novel slot filling. 
In order not to cause the categories to proliferate any further, inclusion into 
existing categories was really quite liberal. For example, phrases meaning 
located in, on, at and living in were all included in the located in category. 
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Table 5.8 : Categorisation of definitions, with examples from the data. 
Category e.g. Compound E.g. Definition 
Property Mapping 
t property mapping 
Slot Filling 
Other 
t 
t 
t 
t 
* 
t 
*t 
*t 
t 
n2 is about nl 
n2 belongs to nl 
n2 eats nl 
n2 is eaten by nl 
n2 has nl 
n2 is located in nl 
n2 is location of nl 
n2 makes nl 
n2 is made of nl 
n2 sells nl 
n2 uses nl 
n2 is used by nl 
n2 is used fornl 
novel slot filling 
hybrid 
missing 
nounl is the head 
structure mapping 
superordinate class 
unclear 
relationship 
interpreted as a 
verb 
bullet virus 
taxi magazine 
baboon piano 
mushroom wolf 
badger grass 
hippopotamus beer 
igloo scorpion 
fossil box 
basket canary 
camel whisk 
jug shop 
tractor penguin 
ant fort 
bee bag 
beach cat 
fox buffalo 
cup dolphin 
tractor locust 
worm razor 
deer mole 
shed toad 
"a virus that strikes suddenly" 
"a magazine describing taxis" 
"a piano belonging to a baboon" 
" vegetarian wolf..." 
"what badgers eat to aid digestion" 
"make of beer with hippo logo"113 
"insect found in igloos" 
"box containing fossils" 
"a canary which makes a basket like nest" 
"made of camel hair, to be used for beating 
carpets..." 
"a shop that sells jugs of different types" 
"a lego piece shaped like a penguin which will 
fit onto the tractor" l l b 
"a fort governed by ants" 
"a bag to put bees in" 
"a cat that likes the beach" 
"a cross-species, about the size of a deer" 
"a type of cup" 
"locust with back legs much bigger than the 
front legs" 
"shaving with a worm" 
"a mole" 
"type of toad which sheds its skin like a snake" 
* Nonspecific categorisations, excluded from analysis, 
f Categories not included in Shoben's 1989 taxonomy. 
lla&bfjjgjg definitions also involve construal'. 
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The main purpose of the present study was to see i f compounds with a nounl in 
common were more or less likely to have similar definitions than compounds 
which have a noun2 in common. Therefore, each definition for the Nounl in 
Common and Noun2 in Common compounds was compared to the definitions of 
its counterpart in the Original compound condition. The number of instances in 
which the common noun compound's definition category was the same as the 
original compound's definition category was recorded. Since there were eight 
definitions given to each compound (one provided by each of the subjects who 
saw that item), the maximum number of matches possible was eight. The only 
categories excluded from this count were those which did not genuinely pertain 
to a specific type of relationship between the compound constituents, such as the 
categories missing data or unclear data (see items marked * in Table 5.8 for a 
ful l list). It would be misleading to count correspondences of these nonspecific 
categorisations as definition matches. 
In order to see i f either of the two common noun conditions showed more 
matches than would arise by chance, a further level was added to the common 
noun factor. This extra level - "No Noun in Common' - is the number of 
definition type matches between the Nounl in Common compounds and their 
respective Noun2 in Common compounds. These compounds do not share any 
common nouns with one another. A l l that they do have in common is that the 
constituent nouns are of the same superordinate types (i.e. natural kinds or 
artefacts). This third level therefore provides a baseline control condition. 
The mean number of valid matches for each item is shown in Table 5.9. These 
data were submitted to a 3 (Noun in Common) x 4 (Compound Composition) 
analysis of variance, with repeated measures on both factors by subjects and on 
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the final factor by items. The main effect of Compound Composition was 
significant by both subjects and items analyses (Min F = 5.57, df = 3, 80, p < 
0.01). The factor Common Noun was significant by Fl and F2 independently, but 
not by minF (Fl = 10.28, df = 2, 46, p < 0.0005; F2 = 3.27 df = 2, 72, p < 0.044). 
The interaction Compound Composition x Common Noun was also significant 
(Min F = 2.50, df = 6, 152, p < 0.05). 
Table 5.9 : Mean number of matches per item per subject by Compound 
Composition and Noun in Common 
AA AN NA NN mean 
nounl in common 0.79 1.25 1.13 2.74 1.48 
noun2 in common 1.00 1.15 1.22 1.80 1.29 
no noun in common 0.41 0.87 0.54 1.32 0.79 
Mean 0.73 1.09 0.96 1.95 1.19 
Fig 5.5 : Interaction between Compound Composition x Noun in Common 
3 - i 
2.5 
nounl 
noun2 
* no common noun 
0 -) 1 1 i 1 
AA AN NA NN 
Inspection of figure 5.5 shows that the main effect of Compound Composition is 
mainly due to the NN compounds, but is somewhat graded, with AA having 
fewest matches, NN having most and AN and NN being intermediate between 
them. The figure also reveals that the main effect of Noun in Common appears to 
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be due to the No Noun in Common level (the control condition) having fewer 
matches than either of the other two levels, since the Nounl in Common and 
Noun2 in Common conditions are very similar. 
The one exception to Nounl in Common and Noun2 in Common levels being 
almost identical is the case of NN compounds. The interaction Compound 
Composition x Noun in Common results from the increase in matches for NN 
compounds being more extreme in the Nounl in Common condition than in the 
other conditions. It is possible that both of the main effects might depend entirely 
upon the NN condition. In order to test this a further analysis was conducted 
from which NN compounds were excluded. In all other respects this second 
analysis was similar to the initial one. 
This second analysis found that the Noun in Common factor was significant by 
subjects (Fl = 5.42, df = 2, 46, p < 0.05), but marginal by items (F2 = 2.55, df = 
2, 54, p < 0.087). No other effects approached significance. It therefore appears 
that the significant main effect of Compound Composition and the interaction of 
Compound Composition x Noun in Common were due to the NN compounds. 
The main effect of Noun in Common probably obtains across all Compound 
Compositions. 
Table 5.10 shows the distribution of property mapping and slot filling definitions 
in these data (illustrated in fig 5.6). Clearly there is some effect of compound 
composition operating. For AA and NA compounds slot filling is about twice as 
common as property mapping, for NN compounds this is reversed, and for AN 
compounds the numbers of slot filling and property mapping definitions are 
approximately equal. 
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Table 5.10 : Numbers of slot filling and property mapping definitions in each 
condition, out of 80. 
AA AN NA NN Mean 
SI PM SF PM SF PM SF PM SF PM 
original 37 27 31 24 36 24 10 43 29 30 
nounl common 45 18 21 29 49 17 31 31 37 24 
noun2 common 38 20 L9 3! 41 19 20 44 30 29 
mean 40 22 24 28 42 20 20 36 32 28 
Fig 5.6 : Numbers of slot filling and property mapping, definitions in each 
condition, out of 80. 
45 
40 
35 
30 slot filling 
25 property mapping 
20 
15 
10 
i 
aa an na nn 
Discussion 
The first analysis shows an interaction Noun in Common x Compound 
Composition, and main effects of both factors. In the second analysis, from 
which the NN compounds were omitted, only the main effect of Noun in 
Common remains (and this is only marginal in the items analysis). This implies 
that the original Compound Composition x Noun in Common interaction, and 
the main effect of Compound Composition were both due to the NN compounds. 
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The main effect of Compound Composition can be explained in terms of the 
preferred type of interpretation for NN compounds. In experiments 5 and 6, it 
was found that property mapping was preferred for NN compounds, whereas slot 
filling was preferred in other Compound Compositions. Figure 5.6 shows that the 
same is true in this experiment. Since all property mapping interpretations were 
counted as matches to each other (unlike the slot filling compounds which were 
subcategorised and counted as matches accordingly), it is unsurprising that NN 
compounds, for which property mapping is most frequent, also show the most 
matches. Such a result could therefore be regarded as an experimental artefact. It 
could perhaps be eliminated by subdividing the property mapping interpretations 
into categories relating to the specific property concerned (e.g. colour, size, etc.). 
However, there is no real theoretical justification for such a division. Many of 
the slot filling categories could themselves also be subdivided, for example "n2 
located in n l " included a variety of relations, such as "located in", "located on", 
"located at" and "lives in" etc. 
The NN compounds have already been identified as the source of the interaction 
Noun in Common x Compound Composition (there is no interaction when the 
NN compounds are omitted). Although all three levels of the Noun in Common 
factor exhibit an increase in interpretation matches for NN compounds, the 
increase is most marked in the Nounl in Common condition, as shown in figure 
5.5. Having established that the increase in interpretation matches among NN 
compounds is probably due to the high frequency of property mapping it is 
interesting to note this has its greatest effect for compound pairs which share a 
nounl. It seems credible that the nounl is more important than the noun2 in 
determining whether or not a property mapping interpretation is appropriate. 
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The central aim of this experiment was to investigate the relative importance of 
the two constituent positions in determining the overall relation between the two 
nouns of a compound. Figure 5.5 shows that, with the exception of NN 
compounds, the Nounl in Common and Noun2 in Common levels are almost 
identical. There is virtually no difference between them. The main effect of 
Noun in Common, which persists (albeit marginally on F2) when NN compounds 
are omitted, is due to both these conditions having more interpretation matches 
than the No Noun in Common condition. So although neither constituent 
position can be said to be more influential than the other, it seems that each does 
have some effect. Indeed, the baseline provided by the No Noun in Common 
condition may itself be a little higher than a true baseline, since it doesn't provide 
a comparison between entirely unrelated compounds, but compares compounds 
of the same Compound Compositions (e.g. NA compounds were compared only 
with other NA compounds). Such a comparison corresponds to the most abstract 
level of compound analogy hypothesised by Ryder (1994) discussed above, and 
so interpretation matches even for this condition may be above a true chance 
level. 
Given that both Common nounl and Common Noun2 levels do show more 
matches than the control condition, what is the best account of this 
phenomenon? The consistency of interpretation between compounds sharing a 
common constituent might be due to our interpreting novel compounds by 
analogy with other more familiar compounds, as suggested by Ryder (1994). 
However, the same result could be accounted for by constituent concepts being 
limited with respect to what relationships they are likely to enter into by their 
nature. To borrow an example from Ryder (1994), there are many compounds 
with the nounl fire' - fire man, fire engine, fire hydrant, fire station etc. In each 
case the relation of the noun2 to 'fire' is the same, a general paraphrase being 
184 
something like ra noun2 used to combat fires'. Thus when we encounter a novel 
compound, Tire X' we can recall these analogous examples and interpret it 
accordingly. Alternatively it could be that the predictability comes not from the 
external relations of the word, but from the meaning of the word itself. Fire tends 
to be a dangerous phenomenon, something which society guards against and 
fights. It is therefore very appropriate for us to interpret a novel compound "fire 
X" in accordance with the schema of fire fighting. In the terms of Shoben, (1993) 
nouns tend to have a limited number of plausible thematic roles. This study does 
not provide data which can distinguish between these accounts. 
In summary, the main effect of Compound Composition is best regarded as an 
experimental artefact. This is due to the way property mapping interpretations 
are treated in the data, and the fact that NN compounds are more likely to be 
interpreted by property mapping than are other Compound Compositions. That 
this effect is most marked in the Nounl in Common condition may be 
significant. This interaction provides some support for the intuition that nounl 
might be more important than noun2 in determining that a compound be 
interpreted by property mapping. Inspection of f ig 5.5, and the persistent main 
effect of Noun in Common demonstrate that while neither constituent position is 
more important than the other in determining the overall relation between the 
nouns of a compound, each does have some effect. However, it is not possible to 
determine whether such findings result from analogical interpretation, as 
suggested by Ryder (1994), or by semantic limitations. 
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Chapter six ; Final Discussion 
Compositionalitv 
Experiments 1 to 4 of this thesis examined the compositionality of noun noun 
compounds. Subjects listed the features of compound noun concepts, and also 
listed features of the simple concepts of which the compounds were composed. 
Compositionality was measured by comparing the feature lists (experiment 2), 
and by comparing typicality ratings of these features (experiments 1, 3 and 4) for 
each of the compounds and its constituents. The absolute differences between 
ratings of these features with respect to constituents and compounds was taken as 
a measure of noncompositionality. Compounds were either real or novel, and 
were composed of artefacts (A) and natural kinds (N) in each possible 
combination type (AA, AN, NA and NN). 
Extensional Feedback (EF): Extensional feedback is the process of modifying a 
representation of a concept such that it includes attributes common among 
instances of the concept. For example telephone boxes are commonly red, and 
so this becomes a feature in our representation of them. Clearly such a process 
introduces noncompositional elements into conceptual representations. Also 
evident is that extensional feedback can only occur i f concepts have instances of 
the concept available to provide such information.1 2 It was therefore predicted 
that real compounds would exhibit more noncompositionality than novel 
compounds due to the additional possibility of extensional feedback. 
1 2 Some nonextensional terms may be instantiated by particular representations, and so can exhibit 
something like extensional feedback. For example, the unicorn is said to be a horse with a single 
horn, and in pictures unicorns are usually white. This attribute of colour may be included in the 
mental representation by a process very like extensional feedback. 
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Maintenance of Coherence Inferences : The other hypothesised source of 
noncompositionality is inferences about the compound in order that it is 
coherent. For example, we might infer that a pet shark is smaller than other 
sharks, because of the size restrictions of living in someone's home. Such 
inferences tend to modify the meaning of the head of the concept (i.e. shark in 
this example). Because of possible differences in how we represent artefact and 
natural kind concepts, it was predicted that the extent to which people make 
inferences such as these would depend upon what sort of concepts (artefacts or 
natural kinds) the compound was composed of. 
The results showed the following: First, novel AN compounds showed more 
noncompositionality than novel A A or real AA compounds, particularly for 
noun2 (experiment 1). Second, fewer features common to the constituents and 
the compound were generated for A A and NA compounds than for NN and AN 
compounds. This was most marked for NN compounds and for noun2 
(experiment 2). Third, features of homogeneous compounds (AA and NN) were 
rated as more similar to the features of their constituents, than were those of 
heterogeneous compounds (AN and NA). As would be expected, features were 
most descriptive of the compound part (nounl, noun2 or compound) which they 
were originally listed as describing. However, this was not true of AN 
compounds, for which features for noun2 were most highly rated (experiment 3). 
As discussed in the experimental chapters, the most obvious explanation for the 
lack of difference between real and novel conditions, that EF does not happen, is 
probably wrong. The evidence that EF is a real phenomenon is certainly quite 
persuasive. That wooden spoons are large is a fact we have learnt from 
experience. The most probable alternative is that EF does occur in the real 
compounds, but also that a similar effect also occurs in novel compounds, thus 
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eliminating any difference in the amount of compositionality. A number of 
different researchers, using different models, have alluded to mechanisms which 
could account for an increase in noncompositionality in novel compounds. 
Murphy (1990), in his concept specialisation model suggests that combining 
concepts involves reference to our general knowledge of the world. This 
knowledge is used to infer things about the compound concept which couldn't be 
directly inherited from its constituent parts. For example, we might expect an 
'apartment dog' to have certain physical and behavioural characteristics. 
However, the problem with this account in explaining the current data is that this 
mechanism would seem to operate on all compounds, real and novel. But the 
data show no evidence of the additional noncompositionality we would expect to 
be caused by EF in real compounds. 
Another candidate mechanism for increasing noncompositionality is construal. 
Wisniewski (1996) highlights the process of construal. In his data, he found that 
subjects would commonly interpret a compound not as being a combination of 
the two constituents, but as the combination of one constituent with a 
semantically related concept of the other constituent. For example "tiger chair" 
was reported as being a chair with a tiger skin seat, an "artist collector" is one 
who collects the works of an artist. But construal again would seem to operate 
equally powerfully with real and novel compounds, and so as with the use of 
world knowledge cannot account fully for the data of experiments 1 to 4. 
Ryder (1992) proposes that we use a mechanism that she calls "accommodation". 
It is possible that a novel compound wi l l not be coherent with our prior beliefs 
about its constituents. Indeed in using a compound we are in some sense 
asserting that the referent differs in some significant way from the usual meaning 
of its head. Ryder gives the example of a wine drinking dog. To understand the 
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phrase, we probably need to alter, slightly, our understanding of dogs. That dogs 
can drink wine is unlikely to be a preconception held by many people. Clearly 
this mechanism would increase the apparent noncompositionality of novel 
compounds, since the compound has meaning which was not true of its 
constituents. Significantly, the situation with respect to real compounds would be 
somewhat different. Because we have encountered real compounds previously, 
what was once novel to us has by now been incorporated into our understanding 
of the concepts concerned. For example, on encountering the notion of a wine 
drinking dog for a second time, we are already aware that it is a possible feature 
of dogs that they drink wine. As such, accommodation is more in keeping with 
the present data, providing a mechanism by which noncompositionality is 
increased in novel compounds, parallel to EF in real compounds. 
The final possibility comes from Hampton (1991). He found that when people 
were asked to describe certain "impossible combinations" (for example "a teapot 
that is a computer", or "a fish that is a vehicle") they included many diverse 
adaptations of the constituent concepts. It seems that people are prepared to 
elaborate extensively in this kind of task, introducing noncompositional 
features. In experiments 1 to 4 of this thesis, the novel combinations were 
random, and so naturally tended to be pretty unlikely / impossible. By contrast, 
the compounds of the real condition, by virtue of the fact that they are in 
common use, are likely to be more sensible combinations, and as such wil l not 
need such extensive elaboration. 
Experiments 1 to 4 also looked at compositionality with respect to the 
ontological category of a compound's constituents. It has been suggested that 
artefact and natural kind concepts might differ significantly in the way they are 
represented. Importantly, one such proposed difference is the accessibility of the 
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core or essential characteristics of the concept (e.g. Schwartz, 1978). Although 
no strong predictions were formulated about the effect compound composition 
might have on compositionality, differences in the accessibility of the essence of 
a concept might reasonably be expected to have a bearing on the process of 
modification. With this in mind, some effect of compound composition would 
not be a surprise. Experiment 1 showed higher noncompositionality in novel AN 
compounds than in either real AA or novel AA compounds. This result was 
interpreted as indicating that subjects struggled to combine the concepts, and so 
had to make a large number of inferences about what such a combined concept 
would be like. However, the result was not replicated in experiments 3 and 4. In 
experiments 3 and 4, the data show no overall effect of compound composition 
with respect to compositionality. However, a closer examination reveals that 
there are potentially important differences between compound compositions in 
how much each constituent concept has in common with the compound. Again, 
the novel AN compounds stood out. However, their behaviour varied in different 
experiments. In experiment 1, the nounl actually had more in common with the 
compound than did noun2. This was counter to the pattern of other compound 
compositions, and clearly not what would be expected in light of noun2 being 
the head. In experiments, 3 and 4 however, the novel A N compounds behaved 
differently. In these experiments, AN novel compounds did follow the predicted 
pattern of noun2 having more in common with the compound than did nounl. In 
fact in these experiments the novel AN compounds were unusual in that the 
difference in noncompositionality between nounl and noun2 was in the same 
direction as the other compound compositions, but more extreme. 
Possible reasons for findings differing in these experiments include changes in 
the rating scale, different methods of compiling the feature lists, and different 
experimental variables. More significant is the fact that the novel AN 
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compounds appear to have behaved anomolously in each case. This does suggest 
that there is something about the process of modification in compounding which 
is sensitive to differences between concept types. However, the results of 
experiments 2, 3 and 4 are probably more reliable, since feature lists were more 
controlled and a full range of types of combination was tested. (In fact, in 
experiment 2, AN and NN compounds behaved similarly. This might be 
explained by reference to differences between slot filling and property mapping 
interpretations. This possibility is addressed along with further discussion of 
these issues below). 
Perhaps the somewhat inscrutable nature of natural kinds has a polarising effect 
on the way we modify them. In some cases the difficulty of assessing how the 
head can safely be modified wi l l lead to it remaining virtually intact, with 
minimum contribution from the modifier. In other cases, as with Hampton's 
subjects, combining two quite different concepts could mean radical elaboration, 
and many changes to the head. Such a situation would account for the different 
results obtained in these experiments (under differing conditions), but with the 
A N compounds tending to behave differently to other compound types in each 
case. 
The Implications of Noncompositionality : The compositionality or otherwise of 
combined concepts has become a troublesome issue within the current debate 
about concepts. Clearly concepts ought to be compositional, otherwise 
unreasonable constraints are placed on the human cognitive capacity. Some 
argue that, since current theories of concepts involve elements of 
noncompositionality, they are utterly wrong, (Fodor and Lepore, 1996). 
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Rips (1995) attempts to finesse the problem, by trivialising the examples of 
noncompositional features found in the literature. Most emergent features are, he 
claims, due to EF, we are told "There is something suspicious however about 
emergent properties based on extensional feedback" (Rips, 1995, p92). Because 
such features are based on prior experience, Rips argues it would be asking too 
much of a theory of conceptual combination to be able to generate them. He does 
go on to acknowledge that some emergent properties are not down to EF. He 
gives the example of "smoky apples" being thought to be "bad tasting", although 
this is not a feature of either smoky things nor of apples generally. Neither is it 
likely that subjects have experience of the flavour of smoky apples. But Rips 
claims that such emergent properties as this are, in principle, predictable or 
computable. We simply need rather more sophisticated models and knowledge 
bases. He does however concede that theoretical computability may not in itself 
be fully satisfactory. Time and search constraints would have to be met for any 
theory to be psychologically plausible. Essentially, Rips is able to claim that 
noncompositionality is not a problem i f it is either due to EF, or it is minimal in 
its extent. 
If, as suggested by the quantitative data in experiments 1 to 4, and by Hampton's 
(1990) qualitative investigation, novel compounds exhibit more extensive and 
elaborate emergent features, Rips arguments begin to look thin. Fodor's 
criticisms of current theories of concepts would thus be all the more persuasive. 
Perhaps the current problem is to quantify and characterise noncompositionality 
appropriately. 
Headedness 
It has commonly been assumed, often tacitly, that compounds in English are 
right-headed, that is that nounl acts as a modifier to noun2 as the head (e.g. Levi, 
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1977; Wisniewski and Gentner, 1991). However, although this can be seen to 
hold for many compounds, there appears to be no empirical evidence as to its 
universality. Some evidence on this matter can be derived from several of the 
experiments in this thesis. In experiments 1 - 4 it was found that noun2 had more 
meaning in common with the compound than did nounl. This is interpreted as 
indicating that people interpreted the compounds as being right-headed. A more 
explicit and quantitative measure was made in experiment 5. Subjects' 
paraphrases of compounds were examined, and it was found that in 81% of cases 
the phrase referred to a kind of noun2. In 10% of cases neither noun provided the 
reference, and in 5 % of the cases nounl provided the reference. So compounds 
would seem to be right-headed a large majority of the time, but exceptions are 
not impossible. 
Concept Identification 
Experiment 7 looked at concept identification. Following the findings with 
respect to noncompositionality and compound composition, it was anticipated 
that a concept identification task might cast more light on the ways that different 
types of concept combine. The first part of the experiment compared simple 
artefact and natural kind concepts. Both were found to be equally identifiable 
(85% of artefacts and 84% of natural kinds identified correctly, by a liberal 
count), and the same number of features (5.3 and 5.4 features per item 
respectively) was used to identify each. 
These findings are a little surprising. They run counter to the intuition that the 
function of an artefact would lead to a quick and easy identification13. As 
discussed in chapter 5, part of the reason may lie in the use of non-basic level 
1 3 Malt (1992) has provided some evidence that function may not be a simple core for artefact 
concepts. This has been addressed further in chapter 5. 
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concepts, which probably require more specification. It is also possible that 
subjects simply failed to make use of such information in the most efficient way 
possible. The function of something is often not explicitly available. Unless we 
see something in use, only such surface features as colour, shape and weight may 
be available to us. For this reason, we may tend to rely on these less diagnostic 
cues such as appearance, and this may be the strategy which subjects needlessly 
adhered to in this experiment. 
Of the compounds, 63% of those in the real condition were correctly identified, 
and only 19% of the novel ones (both by liberal counts). Even considering the 
ambiguity built into the feature profiles, very few of the novel compounds were 
correctly identified. Many compounds were generated for the novel compound 
concept profiles, and few were "correct". The poor performance of subjects on 
this identification task has two possible interpretations. Firstly, it could be taken 
as an indication that the feature profiles themselves provide a poor representation 
of novel compound concepts. The other possible reason is simply that subjects 
were more familiar with the concepts referred to by real compounds, and so 
recognised them more easily. 
With the real compounds, there were more correct responses, and there did seem 
to be a pattern. AN and AA compounds were better identified, and fewer features 
were deemed necessary in this identification. Perhaps the common factor of an 
artefact modifier is influential in this respect. Whether or not the modifier is 
privileged in defining the relationship between the constituents of a compound is 
open to question. Gagne and Shoben (1995) provide some evidence that this may 
be the case, but results from experiment 8 suggest that i f this is so, it is not 
always the case, perhaps varying with the details of the task. 
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Slot Filling and Property Mapping 
Experiments 5 and 6 of this thesis address the differences between two 
alternative ways of combining concepts in a compound: slot filling and property 
mapping. Until quite recently only slot filling interpretations have been seriously 
looked at by researchers, (e.g. Levi, 1977; Shoben, 1991). Wisniewski and 
Gentner (1991) introduced the term 'property mapping', and made some 
comparison between the two kinds of process. They asked subjects to paraphrase 
novel noun noun compounds, and found that although slot filling seemed to be 
the most common interpretation type, property mapping interpretations were not 
uncommon. Experiment 5 replicates this finding. Of interpretations in which 
nounl modified noun2, 67% were slot filling and 26% property mapping. It was 
further found that although slot filling was preferred to property mapping for 
AA, AN and NA compounds, this balance was reversed for NN compounds. 
Counts of property mapping were included in experiments 5, 6 and 8. In each 
case NN compounds had markedly more property mapping interpretations than 
other compound types. Much less marked, but also consistent in these three 
experiments, AN compounds showed more property mapping than AA 
compounds, which in turn showed more than NA compounds. However, these 
differences were small, so only the high frequency of property mapping among 
NN compounds can be confidently expected to generalise.14 
In the real compound condition of experiment 5 NN compounds again showed 
more property mapping than other compound types, but the difference was more 
pronounced. The real / novel comparison is consistent with an analogical model 
1 4This ordering of property mapping frequency (NN>AN>AA>NA) is the same as the order of 
frequency of feature matches between noun2 and the compound in experiment 2. It is plausible 
that the two findings are related, since property mapping alters the meaning of the head noun only 
on a single feature, leaving the noun2 and compound with all other features in common. 
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of compound interpretation, in that the pattern for novel compounds is rather 
like a noisy echo of that for real compounds. However, the same data could be 
explained in other terms. The process of lexicalisation of novel compounds 
could itself account for such a pattern developing. If there is a some underlying 
semantic influence which biases novel NN compounds to be interpreted by 
property mapping, and other novel compounds to be interpreted by slot filling, 
then compounds which do not fit with the general partem will probably be 
slightly less good at conveying their meaning, and so these are less likely to be 
adopted into common use. This would lead to the kind of polarisation of 
compound compositions seen in the data for real compounds. 
Wisniewski (1996) found that compounds with similar constituents were more 
likely to have property mapping interpretations than those with less similar 
constituents. He interprets this as implying that property mapping interpretations 
are arrived at by "structural alignment", in which concepts are compared for any 
salient differences which are then resolved by mapping the modifier's value of 
the contrasting property across to the head noun. However, a post-test of 
similarity for the materials in experiment 5 found that the NN constituents were 
no more similar to each other than were the AA constituents, and yet NN 
compounds had many more property mapping interpretations, Neither was there 
any correlation between property mapping interpretations and constituent 
similarity. The increase in property mapping in NN compounds was therefore 
interpreted as being due to two factors. Firstly, because the constituent were of 
the same type, properties of the modifier were naturally more likely to be 
appropriate to the head than would be the case for heterogeneous compounds 
(AN and NA). Secondly, natural kinds seem to be characterised by having 
several salient features, whereas an artefact's most salient feature is usually its 
function. This means that artefacts will often have clashing (i.e. mutually 
196 
contradictory) salient properties, and so mapping the salient property of one to 
another will be inhibited. Thus NN compounds would be more likely to have a 
property mapping interpretation than other compounds. 
Experiment 6 looked at possible reasons for the variation in interpretation types 
across Compound Compositions. Three factors were included in this experiment; 
Compound Composition (AA, AN, NA or NN), Constituent Similarity (High or 
Low), and Feature Clash (Clash or Nonclash, referring to whether or not the 
constituents defining properties conflicted with each other). 
Compounds composed of highly similar constituents were found to be more 
likely to be interpreted by property mapping than those composed of dissimilar 
constituents. But this effect was confounded with the significant effect of 
Compound Composition, for which NN compounds again showed more property 
mapping than other compounds. High levels of similarity seem to be more 
frequent in pairs of natural kinds than in other concept combinations, and this 
factor proved difficult to isolate. However, since the main effect of Constituent 
Similarity was not limited to NN compounds, the results do support the theory of 
structural alignment. 
Because Constituent similarity tended to vary with Compound Composition it 
proved difficult to obtain many materials in some conditions, so interactions that 
were significant on Fl were nonsignificant on the F2 analysis. However, the data 
strongly suggest three interactions; Constituent Similarity x Feature Clash, 
Feature Clash x Compound Composition and Constituent Similarity x 
Compound Composition. The Constituent Similarity x Feature Clash interaction 
is due to similarity having a much reduced influence in the clash condition. This 
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suggests that a clash of salient properties may inhibit property mapping among 
compounds with similar constituents. 
The remaining interactions are difficult to interpret due to the confounding of 
similarity and compound composition. However, they do suggest that 
Constituent Similarity is only one of several influential factors in determining 
that a compound should have a property mapping interpretation. 
Property mapping interpretations of noun noun compounds have not been the 
subject of much attention in the literature thus far, but are worth finding out 
more about. They are in a unique position, having the potential to offer insights 
into several other phenomena such as slot filling compounds, adjective noun 
compounds and metaphor. 
Relative importance of nounl and noun2 
Various authors have investigated the possibility that one noun position in a 
compound or the other may be of primary importance in deciding the type of 
modification used in interpreting the compound (e.g. Van Jaarsveld et al (1994), 
Gagne and Shoben (1995)). As already mentioned, the results of experiment 5 
suggest that nounl may be particularly important in concept identification. In 
experiment 8 subjects were asked to paraphrase original compounds (e.g. worm 
bag), same nounl compounds (e.g. worm razor) and same noun2 compounds 
(bee bag). These paraphrases were then compared to see which pair were most 
likely to have the same modification type. They were also compared to cases 
where there were no constituents in common to assess whether the presence of a 
common noun increased the modification type matches above chance level. 
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It was found that Nounl in Common and Noun2 in Common comparisons were 
equal, both being more similar than the control comparison with no common 
constituents. It was therefore concluded that both nouns do have an influence in 
determining the modification type, but that neither position was more influential 
than the other. This could be seen as supportive of a theory of compound 
interpretation by analogy, such as that of Ryder (1994). However, semantic 
information could also bring about such preferences. 
There was also an interaction between Compound Composition and Noun in 
Common in experiment 8. The Nounl in Common comparison showed a marked 
increase in matches for the NN compounds. This was attributed to the high 
frequency of property mapping among these compounds. This suggests that 
nounl may have a primary role in determining that a compound has a property 
mapping interpretation. Other studies have involved such complicating factors as 
influential contexts (Shoben, 1993), prior exposure to analogues (Shoben, 1993; 
Van Jaarsveld et al, 1994), or time pressure (Gagne and Shoben, 1995). The 
results from experiment 8 can best be seen as an indication that as a baseline 
both positions are equally important. Nounl may be more important in property 
mapping compounds, but also other factors may be significant in different 
circumstances. 
Findings across experiments 
Two themes in particular run throughout these experiments; a comparison of real 
and novel compounds, and a comparison of AA, AN, NA and NN compound 
compositions. Some overall conclusions about these factors are drawn here. 
Real / Novel Comparison 
In experiments 1 - 4 there was no overall difference between real and novel 
compounds. Both were found to exhibit similar degrees of noncompositionality. 
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However, there was a difference between real and novel compounds with respect 
to how much each of the constituent concepts has in common with the 
compound. In each case noun2 is more similar to the compound than nounl, but 
the difference is greater for real compounds than for novel ones. In experiment 7 
real compounds were found to be considerably easier to identify correctly from a 
feature profile than were novel compounds. In experiments 5, 6 and 8 it was 
found that property mapping was more common in NN compounds than in other 
compound compositions. In experiment 5 this difference was more marked for 
real compounds than for novel ones. No real compounds were included in 
experiments 6 and 8. 
With respect to the issue of compositionality, it proved very difficult to measure 
quantitatively the extra noncompositionality associated with real compounds that 
would be expected due to extensional feedback. There are several possible 
explanations, but the matter is perhaps worth pursuing in light of the possible 
conclusion that, ultimately, it may prove difficult to propose an account of 
compounding which is compositional. 
The finding from experiments 1-4, that the pattern of feature inheritance is 
similar for real and novel compounds, but more marked in the real cases, is 
similar to the finding in experiment 5 with respect to the pattern of property 
mapping and slot filling among real and novel compounds. In both cases, the 
differences in the real compounds are also found in novel compounds, only less 
marked. This suggests some interesting relationship between real and novel 
compounds, but could be interpreted in two different ways. Firstly, such 
similarity could be due to the fact that real compounds were themselves once 
novel. Perhaps one factor which increased the likelihood of their being adopted 
into the lexicon was that they conformed to the standard. The alternative 
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possibility is to view the process the other way around, to see the interpretation 
of novel compounds as influenced by existing real compounds, in a manner 
something like Ryder's analogy model (1994). These data do not provide a way 
of deciding between these two explanations. 
Experiment 7 found that real compounds were more likely to be correctly 
identified than novel ones. Three possible causes of this were considered. First, 
that real compounds are easier to identify since subjects are simply more familiar 
with them - they are more salient, and we know more about them. Second, that 
the feature profiles that subjects were presented with were more coherent for real 
compounds due to the way they were generated. Finally, that real compounds 
have a unique linguistic label associated with them, so it is easier for subjects to 
be precisely correct in their identification. This latter influence was shown to 
have some small effect in the increase in correct identifications when 
semantically close responses were included. 
Compound Composition 
The ontological category of compound constituents looks like it ought to be 
important. Although usually ignored, other researchers have occasionally 
included this factor in experimental designs, but either not reported results for it 
(Wisniewski and Gentner, 1991) or failed to comment on apparent differences 
(Wisniewski, 1996). 
Results in experiments 1 to 4 here suggest that there are implications of 
compound composition for the modification process. In each of these 
experiments, the novel AN compounds were found to be anomalous with respect 
to the amount of meaning each constituent had in common with the compound. 
In experiment 1 novel AN compounds had higher noncompositionality than the 
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other compounds tested, particularly with respect to noun2. In experiment2 it 
was found that the noun2s of AN and NN compounds more features in common 
with the compounds than other conditions. In experiments 3 and 4 
noncompositionality with respect to nounl was higher for novel AN compounds 
than the others. 
Although the differences from other compound compositions were not the same 
in each case, it does appear that AN compounds may be a special case with 
respect to compositionality. Variations in their behaviour between experiments 
are attributed to differences in the task, and in experimental design. 
In the identification of simple concepts in experiment 7 no difference was found 
between artefacts and natural kinds. There was however some difference 
between Compound Compositions in the real condition. More AA and AN 
compounds were correctly identified, and fewer features were needed to do so 
than for NA and NN compounds. In experiment 5, property mapping was found 
to be more frequent in NN compounds than in others. This finding was replicated 
in experiments 6 and 8. Although the differences within each individual 
experiment were small, the rank order of Compound Compositions in terms of 
property mapping frequency was the same in each of these experiments. 
NN>AN>AA>NA. Results from experiment 6 suggest that no single factor can 
account for property mapping, since Constituent Similarity, Feature Clashes and 
Compound Composition all interact. Finally, the results of experiment 8 suggest 
that nounl may play a primary role in determining property mapping among NN 
compounds in particular. 
Looking at Compound Composition from these several different points of view, 
it looks like it is a factor of some importance. Differences between Compound 
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Compositions seem more dependent upon the details of the experiment in some 
cases (e.g. with respect to compositionality) than others (e.g. property mapping / 
slot filling). Also the relationships between these findings are hard to determine. 
For example, whether a compound is interpreted by property mapping or slot 
filling ought to have an effect on its compositionality, but no clear pattern 
emerges from these results. Other factors can also vary along with Compound 
Composition, and it has proved difficult to control for them, such as Constituent 
Similarity in experiment 6. Overall, however the results from these experiments 
suggest that the ontological category of a compound's constituents can have a 
significant influence over several aspects of the compound. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, these experiments have resulted in a number of key findings. Real and 
novel compounds show noncompositionality, both to a similar extent, and it has 
been demonstrated that noun2 tends to be the head in such combinations. Also, 
people find it difficult to identify compounds from a feature profile of the 
concept, particularly in the case of novel compounds. The most common type of 
modification is slot filling, but property mapping does occur in a large number of 
cases, and is actually more common than slot filling for NN compounds. This 
difference is more marked for real compounds than for novel ones. Compounds 
are also more likely to be interpreted by property mapping if the constituents are 
similar than i f they are quite different, but i f the salient features of the 
constituents clash, the effect of similarity diminishes. It was also found that 
neither constituent position is necessarily dominant in terms of predicting the 
preferred type of modification used in interpreting compounds, but the details of 
specific tasks probably have an influence over this. Also, nounl seems to be of 
particular importance in the interpretation of NN compounds, perhaps due to the 
high frequency of property mapping among NN compounds. 
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These results illustrate the importance of considering differences between 
compounds (whether they are real or novel, and what semantic categories they 
are composed of), and differences between experimental tasks subjects are asked 
to undertake. 
These various results can be related to existing theories of concepts and 
conceptual combination. Experiments 1 -4 looked at noncompositionality of 
compounds by combining compound constituents in a manner based on that used 
by Hampton (1987). The predicted differences in compositionality were not 
found. This is particularly troublesome for the comparison between real and 
novel compounds, in which the effect of extensional feedback ought to be 
evident. In this respect the hypothesis fails. However, Hampton's model was 
proposed for explicitly conjunctive combinations and so may not apply to 
compounds. 
Experiment 7, showed that people seem to find it difficult to identify compound 
concepts from feature lists, particularly novel compounds. Perhaps such a 
representation (e.g. Smith et al, 1984; Wisniewski and Gentner, 1991) is simply 
not rich enough. A more elaborate representation which involved more causal 
relationships, and reference to real world knowledge might lead to better 
compound identification (e.g. Murphy 1990). Structural alignment (Wisniewski, 
1996) could be implemented in any of these theories, and experiments 6 and 7 
taken together provide support for it as a mechanism for facilitating property 
mapping. However, the results also suggest that property mapping can occur in 
compounds with dissimilar constituents in which structural alignment is unlikely. 
Finally, several results are consistent with a theory of compound interpretation 
by analogy (Ryder, 1992). In experiment 6, it was found that the pattern of 
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results for novel compounds followed that of real compounds, but was less 
marked. Such a finding might well be accounted for by analogical interpretation. 
In experiment 8, it was found that compounds which share a common constituent 
(whether it is nounl or noun2) are more likely than other similar compounds to 
have the same sort of interpretation. Again, this is as would be predicted by 
theories of interpretation by analogy. Such results however might also be 
accounted for by reference to purely semantic information (van Jaarsveld et al, 
1994), or by thematic roles (e.g. Shoben, 1993). 
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Table A l l : Materials used in Experiment! 
real AA novel AA novel AN 
bicycle clip bicycle spoon bicycle moth 
bread bin bread sack bread mushroom 
cable television cable umbrella cable tree 
carpet shampoo carpet hook carpet leopard 
coat hook coat shampoo coat frog 
desk chair desk box desk dog 
drawing pin drawing boot drawing leaf 
football boot football curtain football monkey 
goal post goal gun goal sea 
library shelf library pin library stag 
makeup bag makeup television makeup snake 
match box match chair match rose 
oven glove oven slate oven eagle 
paint brush paint handle paint grass 
pen lid pen polish pen lion 
phone card phone belt phone cat 
refuse sack refuse shelf refuse peacock 
roof slate roof glove roof elephant 
seat belt seat card seat bird 
shoe polish shoe lid shoe bull 
shower curtain shower bin shower apple 
soup spoon soup clip soup owl 
staple gun staple post staple horse 
umbrella handle umbrella brush umbrella animal 
Table A1.2 , Mean Raw Scores, Experiment! 
subject 
group 
nounl noun2 compound 
real AA 1 0.676 1.478 1.020 
2 0.555 1.432 0.636 
novel AA 1 0.676 1.509 0.680 
2 0.555 1.345 0.451 
novel AN 1 0.676 2.410 0.762 
2 0.555 2.254 0.685 
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Table A1.3 : Analysis of Variance of Raw Scores, Experiment! 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subiects 43.07 6J. 0.71 
Compound Type 9.13 2 4.56 6.46 < 0.003 
Within Subjects : involving 22.05 61 0.36 
Subject Group 
Subject Group 1.69 1 1.69 4.69 < 0.034 
Type x Group 0.00 2 0.00 0.00 ns 
Within Subjects : involving 124.13 122 1.02 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 96.21 2 48.11 47.28 < 0.001 
Type x Part 13.21 4 3.30 3.24 < 0.014 
Within Subiects: involving 28.01 122 0.23 
Group x Part 
Group x Part 0.11 2 0.06 0.25 ns 
Type x Group x Part 0.62 4 0.15 0.67 ns 
Table A1.4 : Mean Signed Difference Scores. Experiment! 
subject di f f l diff2 
group 
real AA 1 0.316 0.362 
2 0.118 -0.120 
novel AA 1 -0.227 -0.172 
2 -0.187 -0.287 
novel AN 1 -0.290 -0.807 
2 -0.135 -0.720 
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Table A1.5 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Signed Difference Scores, Experiment! 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subiects 190.07 61 3.12 
Compound Type 17.09 2 8.54 2.74 ns 
Within Subiects: inolving 54.43 6_i 0.89 
Subject Group 
Subject Group 0.65 1 0.65 0.73 ns 
Type x Group 1.95 2 0.98 1.09 ns 
Within Subjects: inolving 91.19 6J. 1.49 
Difference Part 
Difference Part 2.75 1 2.75 1.84 ns 
Type x Difference Part 2.20 2 1.10 0.74 ns 
Within Subjects: inolving 29.76 61 0.49 
Subject Group x Difference 
Part 
Group x Difference Part 0.71 1 0.71 1.46 ns 
Type x Group x Difference Part 0.29 2 0.14 0.30 ns 
Table A1.6 : Mean Absolute Difference Scores. Experiment! 
subject absl abs2 
group 
real AA 1 2.461 1.716 
2 2.162 1.651 
novel AA 1 2.137 1.765 
2 2.038 1.801 
novel AN 1 2.144 2.224 
2 2.013 2.158 
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Table A1.7 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Absolute Difference Scores, 
Experiment! 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subjects 58.23 61 0.95 
Compound Type 1.50 2 0.75 0.79 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 21.96 61 0.36 
Subject Group 
Subject Group 0.34 1 0.34 0.93 ns 
Type x Group 0.27 2 0.14 0.37 ns 
Within Subjects : involving 42.64 61 0.70 
AbsdiffPart 
AbsdiffPart 3.69 1 3.69 5.28 < 0.025 
Type x AbsdiffPart 5.20 2 2.60 3.72 < 0.030 
Within Subjects : involving 22.31 61 0.37 
Subject Group x AbsdiffPart 
Group x AbsdiffPart 0.42 1 0.42 1.15 ns 
Type x Group x AbsdiffPart 0.02 2 0.01 0.03 ns 
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Table A2.1 : Materials used in Experiments 2, 3,4 and 7, with Word Frequencies 
from Kucera and Francis (1967) 
Nnvp.l 
AA oven elove aoron filter 
(word frequency) (7,9) (7,9) 
car door street church 
(274, 312) (255, 348) 
coat hanger weaoon clamo 
(43, 0) (42, 0) 
oen knife candle bottle 
(18, 76) (18, 76) 
tire lever Ditch gum 
(22, 14) (22, 14) 
brick wall drain floor 
(18, 160) (18, 158) 
AN dairv cow airDort corn 
(19, 29) (19, 34) 
toilet duck tub moss 
(13, 9) (13,9) 
house flv school rice 
(591, 33) (492, 33) 
computer mouse caroet slug 
(13, 10) (13, 10) 
clav Dieeon bridge beaver 
(100, 3) (98, 3) 
mue tree ladle bear 
(1, 59) (1, 57) 
NA doe dish animal iar 
(75, 16) (68, 16) 
bird cage tea inn 
(31,9) (28, 9) 
fish kettle fruit moD 
(35, 3) (35, 3) 
butterfly net crow Dencil 
(2, 34) (2, 34) 
horse shoe Dlant arrow 
(117, 14) (125, 14) 
daisv wheel giraffe motor 
(0, 56) (0, 56) 
NN stag beetle Dig DarsniD 
(8, 0) (8, 0) 
crab aDDle whale oineaDDle 
(0,9) (0,9) 
cat fish sheeD chicken 
(23, 35) (23, 37) 
tiger moth algae zebra 
(7, 1) (7, 1) 
sDarrow hawk lizard bull 
(0, 14) (0, 14) 
eagle owl otter shrimD 
(5,2) (5, 2) 
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Table A2.2 : Mean Exact Type Matches with Compound, Experiment2. 
nounl noun2 
real novel real novel 
AA 1.3333 0.6667 2.1667 0.8333 
AN 0.1667 0.0000 3.1667 4.3333 
NA 1.5000 1.1667 1.5000 0.8333 
NN 2.0000 3.1667 5.1667 4.1667 
Table A2.3 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Exact Type Matches with Compound, 
Experiment2. 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subiects 150.92 40 3.77 
Compound Composition 90.53 3 30.18 8.00 < 0.001 
Extensional Status 1.26 1 1.26 0.33 ns 
Composition x Extensional 7.78 3 2.59 0.69 ns 
Status 
Within Subiects: involving 179.58 40 4.49 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 55.51 1 55.51 12.36 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 52.86 3 17.62 3.92 < 0.015 
Extensional Status x Part 1.26 1 1.26 0.28 ns 
Extensional Status x 9.28 3 3.09 0.69 ns 
Composition x Part 
Table A2.4 ; Mean Exact Token Matches. Experiment2. 
nounl noun2 
real novel real novel 
AA 1.6667 1.3333 2.1667 1.0000 
AN 0.1667 0.0000 3.5000 7.0000 
NA 1.5000 2.0000 1.8333 0.8333 
NN 6.1667 5.3333 7.6667 6.1667 
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Table A2.5 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Exact Token Matches with Compound. 
Experiment2. 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subjects 352.00 40 8.80 
Compound Composition 262.25 3 87.42 9.93 < 0.001 
Extensional Status 1.50 1 1.50 0.17 ns 
Composition x Extensional 19.58 3 6.53 0.74 ns 
Status 
Within Subjects: involving 483.33 40 12.08 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 84.37 1 84.37 6.98 < 0.012 
Composition x Part 119.54 3 39.85 3.30 <0.03 
Extensional Status x Part 2.04 1 2.04 0.17 ns 
Extensional Status x 42.71 3 14.24 1.18 ns 
Composition x Part 
Table A2.6 : Mean Liberal Type Matches. Experiment2. 
nounl noun2 
real novel real novel 
AA 2.3333 1.3333 5.0000 1.5000 
AN 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 6.6667 
NA 1.8333 2.5000 3.3333 3.0000 
NN 2.8333 4.8333 6.8333 5.8333 
Table A2.7 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Liberal Type Matches with Compound. 
Experiment2 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subjects 226.25 40 5.66 
Compound Composition 99.78 3 33.26 5.88 < 0.002 
Extensional Status 2.34 1 2.34 0.41 ns 
Composition x Extensional 30.36 3 10.12 1.79 ns 
Status 
Within Subjects: involving 234.25 40 5.86 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 157.59 1 157.59 26.91 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 68.61 3 22.87 3.91 < 0.015 
Extensional Status x Part 5.51 1 5.51 0.94 ns 
Extensional Status x 29.53 3 9.84 1.68 ns 
Composition x Part 
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Table A2.8 : Mean Liberal Token Matches. Experiment2 
nounl noun2 
real novel real novel 
AA 2.8333 2.3333 7.1667 2.3333 
AN 1.1667 0.0000 6.5000 11.000 
NA 2.0000 4.1667 6.1667 4.5000 
NN 6.1667 10.000 12.8333 9.6667 
Table A2.9 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Liberal Token Matches with 
Compound. Experiment2. 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F P 
Between Subiects 6.84.08 40 17.10 
Compound Composition 553.78 3 184.59 10.79 < 0.001 
Extensional Status 0.26 1 0.26 0.02 ns 
Composition x Extensional 60.11 3 20.04 1.17 ns 
Status 
Within Subiects: involving 900.75 40 22.52 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 372.09 1 372.09 16.52 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 146.78 3 48.93 2.17 ns 
Extensional Status x Part 33.84 1 33.84 1.50 ns 
Extensional Status x 138.03 3 46.01 2.04 ns 
Composition x Part 
Table A3.1 : Mean Raw Scores. Experiment3 
Real 
nl n2 c 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 5.125 2.810 2,949 2.544 5.121 3.788 2,585 4.881 4.814 
AN 5.275 1.013 2.367 1.621 5.383 3.688 2.371 3.067 5.054 
NA 5.738 1.413 1.875 1.329 4.886 3.354 2.400 3.958 4.400 
NN 5.700 2.071 2.838 2.963 5.421 4.104 3.025 5.521 4.521 
5.459 1.826 2.507 2.114 5.203 3.733 2.595 4.357 4.697 
9.792 11.05 58.246 
Novel 
AA 4.775 2.638 2.713 2.495 5.058 3.553 3.293 4.378 4.133 
AN 5.216 1.058 1.274 0.979 5.195 4.188 1.638 4.742 4.167 
NA 5.388 1.458 3.001 1.196 4.821 2.804 3.425 4.121 3.733 
NN 5.321 2.117 3.633 1.813 5.650 3.354 3.421 4.254 4.113 
5.175 1.818 2.655 1.621 5.181 3.475 2.944 4.374 4.037 
9.648 10.277 11.355 
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Table A3.2 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Raw Scores by Subiects. Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F l P 
Between Subiects 93.32 43 2.17 
Compound Composition 55.83 3 18.61 8.58 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 30.63 43 0.71 
Extensional Status 
Extensional Status 3.57 1 3.57 5.01 < 0.030 
Composition x Extensional Status 3.58 3 1.19 1.67 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 65.12 86 0.76 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 52.11 2 26.06 34.41 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 15.74 6 2.62 3.47 < 0.004 
Within Subiects: involving 42.45 86 0.49 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 33.08 2 16.54 33.51 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 11.43 6 1.90 3.86 < 0.002 
Within Subjects: involving 55.03 86 0.64 
Extensional Status x Part 
Extensional Status x Part 1.55 2 0.78 1.21 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 9.02 6 1.50 2.35 < 0.038 
Part 
Within Subiects: involving 48.53 86 0.56 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 2.81 2 1.41 2.49 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 11.90 6 1.98 3.51 < 0.004 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 132.80 172 0.77 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Featrue Set 1294.91 4 323.73 419.27 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Featrue Set 60.94 12 5.08 6.58 < 0.001 
Within Subiects : involving 74.88 172 0.44 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 14.80 4 3.70 8.50 < 0.001 
Composition x Extensional Status x 42.33 12 3,53 8.10 < 0.001 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A3.3 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Raw Scores by Materials, Experiment3 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 44.40 40 1.11 
Extensional Status 1.96 1 1.96 1.77 ns 
Compound Composition 33.95 3 11.32 10.19 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Compound 1.68 3 0.56 0.51 ns 
Composition 
Within Subjects : involving 34.00 80 0.43 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 25.41 2 12.71 29.89 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part 0.86 2 0.43 1.02 ns 
Composition x Part 7.84 6 1.31 3.07 < 0.009 
Extensional Status x Composition x 3.89 6 0.65 1.53 ns 
Part 
Within Subjects: involving 64.70 80 0.81 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 16.38 2 8.19 10.13 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 1.15 2 0.58 0.71 ns 
Composition x Feature Set 6.53 6 1.09 1.35 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 6.48 6 1.08 1.35 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 104.02 160 0.65 
Compound Part x Feature Set 
Compound Part x Feature Set 655.05 4 163.76 251.90 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 7.69 4 1.92 2.96 < 0.022 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 31.96 12 2.66 4.10 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Composition x 22.47 12 1.87 2.88 < 0.001 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A3.4 : Mean Signed Difference Scores (compound - constituents). 
Experiment3 
Real 
diffl diff2 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA -0.366 2.071 1.865 0.040 -0.240 1.026 
AN -0.829 2.054 2.688 0.750 -2.317 1.367 
NA -0.604 2.546 2.525 1.071 -0.928 1.046 
NN -1.683 3.450 1.683 0.063 0.100 0.417 
-0.871 2.530 2.190 0.481 -0.846 0.964 
3.849 0.599 
Novel 
AA -0.143 1.740 1.420 0.799 -0.681 0.611 
AN -0.913 3.683 2.893 0.658 -0.453 0.363 
NA -0.896 2.663 0.732 2.229 -0.700 0.763 
NN -0.608 2.138 0.479 L608 -1.396 0.758 
-0.639 2.556 1.381 1.324 -0.807 0.624 
3.298 1.141 
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Table A3.5 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Signed Difference Scores by Subjects. 
Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F l P 
Between Subjects 125.25 43 2.91 
Compound Composition 3.68 3 1.23 0.42 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 112.11 43 2.61 
Extensional Status 
Extensional Status 0.34 1 0.34 0.13 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status 9.99 3 3.33 1.28 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 23.36 43 0.54 
Difference Part 
Difference Part 13.77 1 13.77 25.35 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 14.52 3 4.84 8.91 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 187.86 86 2.18 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 459.36 2 229.68 105.15 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 29.43 6 4.90 2.25 < 0.046 
Within Subjects: involving 17.66 43 0.41 
Extensional Status x Part 
Extensional Status x Part 1.44 1 1.44 3.50 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 5.69 3 1.90 4.62 < 0.007 
Part 
Within Subjects: involving 165.16 86 1.92 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 41.28 2 20.64 10.75 < 0.001 
Composition x Extensional Status x 71.91 6 11.98 6.24 < 0.001 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 70.19 86 0.82 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Featrue Set 1141.79 2 570.90 699.53 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Featrue Set 51.13 6 8.52 10.44 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 19.82 86 0.23 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 1.04 2 0.52 2.25 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 18.36 6 3.06 13.28 < 0.001 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A3.6 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Signed Difference Scores by Materials. 
Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 101.86 40 2.55 
Extensional Status 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 ns 
Compound Composition 3.81 3 1.27 0.50 ns 
Extensional Status x Compound 4.31 3 1.44 0.56 ns 
Composition 
Within Subiects: involving 95.58 40 2.39 
Difference Part 
Difference Part 58.52 1 58.52 24.49 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part 2.39 1 2.39 1.00 ns 
Composition x Part 10.26 3 3.42 1.43 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 4.59 3 1.53 0.64 ns 
Part 
Within Subjects: involving 230.04 80 2.88 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 72.97 2 36.49 12.69 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 14.87 2 7.44 2.59 ns 
Composition x Feature Set 15.35 6 2.56 0.89 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 34.60 6 5.77 2.01 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects. involving 147.31 80 1.84 
Compound Part x Feature Set 
Compound Part x Feature Set 303.53 2 151.77 82.42 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 1.17 2 0.59 0.32 ns 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 17.63 6 2.94 1.60 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 5.13 6 0.85 0.46 ns 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A3.7 : Mean Absolute Difference Scores, Experiment3 
Real 
absdiffl absdiff2 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 2.774 2.221 2.049 0.762 0.999 1.249 
AN 3.046 2.413 2.913 1.100 2.742 1.975 
NA 3.471 2.779 2.833 1.471 1.461 1.363 
NN 2.875 3.541 2.033 0.804 0.867 0.867 
3.041 2.739 2.457 1.034 1.517 1.363 
8.237 3.914 
Novel 
AA 1.663 1.993 1.754 1.290 1.097 1.167 
AN 3.621 3.683 3.176 1.044 1.045 1.138 
NA 2.138 2.679 1.688 2.121 1.158 1.421 
NN 2.250 2.379 1.771 1.850 1.746 1.250 
2.418 2.684 2.097 1.576 1.262 1.244 
7.199 4.082 
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Table A3.8 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Absolute Difference Scores by 
Subiects, Experiment3 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F l P 
Between Subiects 64.44 43 1.50 
Compound Composition 55.13 3 18.38 12.26 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 30.46 43 0.71 
Extensional Status 
Extensional Status 6.93 1 6.93 9.79 < 0.003 
Composition x Extensional Status 4.38 3 1.46 2.06 ns 
Within Subiects: involving 61.60 43 1.43 
AbsdiffPart 
AbsdiffPart 210.95 1 210.95 147.25 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 10.76 J 3.59 2.50 ns 
Within Subiects: involving 45.45 86 0.53 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 32.39 2 16.20 30.65 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 22.38 6 3.73 7.06 < 0.001 
Within Subjects. involving 49.94 43 1.16 
Extensional Status x Part 
Extensional Status x Part 4.64 1 4.64 3.99 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 50.70 3 16.90 14.55 < 0.001 
Part 
Within Subiects: involving 33.69 86 0.39 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 6.10 2 3.05 7.78 < 0.001 
Composition x Extensional Status x 3.78 6 0.63 1.61 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 108.77 86 1.26 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Featrue Set 9.49 2 4.74 3.75 < 0.027 
Composition x Part x Featrue Set 8.63 6 1.44 1.14 ns 
Within Subiects: involving 109.59 86 1.27 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 4.19 2 2.10 1.65 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 20.07 6 3.35 2.63 < 0.022 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A3.9 : Analysis of Variance of Mean Absolute Difference Scores by 
Materials, Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 32.00 40 0.80 
Extensional Status 1.52 1 1.52 1.90 ns 
Compound Composition 21.08 3 7.03 8.78 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Compound 1.59 3 0.53 0.66 ns 
Composition 
Within Subjects: involving 96.84 40 2.42 
AbsdiffPart 
AbsdiffPart 110.68 1 110.68 45.72 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part 2.91 1 2.91 1.20 ns 
Composition x Part 4.37 3 1.46 0.60 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 24.46 3 8.15 3.37 < 0.028 
Part 
Within Subjects: involving 29.65 80 0.37 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 3.85 2 1.92 5.19 < 0.008 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 0.48 2 0.24 0.64 ns 
Composition x Feature Set 5.24 6 0.87 2.36 < 0.038 
Extensional Status x Composition x 1.46 6 0.25 0.66 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 51.21 80 0.64 
Compound Part x Feature Set 
Compound Part x Feature Set 2.68 2 1.34 2.09 ns 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 5.84 2 2.92 4.56 < 0.013 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 4.94 6 0.82 1.29 ns 
Extensional Status x Composition x 5.89 6 0.98 1.53 ns 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A4.1 : Raw Mean Scores, Experiment4 
Word Order 1 
nl n2 c 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 4.775 2.638 2.713 2.495 5.058 3.553 3.293 4.378 4.133 
AN 5.216 1.058 1.274 0.979 5.195 4.188 1.638 4.742 4.167 
NA 5.388 1.458 3.001 1.196 4.821 2.804 3.425 4.121 3.733 
NN 5.321 2.117 3.633 1.813 5.650 3.354 3.421 4.254 4.113 
5.175 1.818 2.655 1.621 5.181 3.475 2.944 4.374 4.037 
9.648 10.277 11.355 
Word Order 2 
AA 5.151 2.650 3.517 2.845 5.446 3.893 4.785 4.633 4.276 
AN 5.583 1.182 2.549 1.520 5.671 3.638 3.342 4.754 4.133 
NA 5.496 1.054 2.267 1.079 5.279 2.783 3.604 4.158 3.979 
NN 5.725 2.129 3.063 2.499 5.833 3.561 4.113 5.067 4.240 
5.489 1.754 2.849 1.986 5.557 3.469 3.961 4.653 4.157 
10.092 11.012 12.771 
Table A4.2 : Analysis of Variance of Raw Mean Scores by Subjects, Experiment4 
Source Sums of d.f. Mean F l p 
Squares squares 
Between Subjects 117.99 87 7.36 
Compound Composition 60.05 3 20.02 14.76 < 0.001 
Word Order 20.43 1 20.43 15.06 < 0.001 
Composition x Word Order 9.23 3 3.08 2.27 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 96.82 174 0.56 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 77.74 2 38.87 69.85 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 15.63 6 2.61 4.68 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part 3.21 2 1.61 2.89 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 6.46 6 1.08 1.94 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 101.85 174 0.59 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 33.90 2 16.95 28.96 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 9.35 6 1.56 2.66 < 0.017 
Word Order x Feature Set 9.07 2 4.53 7.74 < 0.001 
Composition x Word Ordser x Feature 2.92 6 0.49 0.83 ns 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 168.63 348 0.48 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Feature Set 1262.64 4 315.66 651.41 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 84.12 12 7.01 14.47 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 5.52 4 1.38 2.85 < 0.024 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 18.75 12 1.56 3.22 < 0.001 
Feature Set 
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Table A4.3 : Analysis of Variance of Raw Mean Scores by Materials, Experiment4 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subiects 28.87 40 0.72 
Compound Composition 32.46 3 10.82 14.99 < 0.001 
Word Order 8.98 1 8.98 12.45 < 0.001 
Compound Composition x Word Order 4.09 3 1.36 1.89 ns 
Within Subjects : involving 28.51 80 0.36 
Compound Part 
Compound Part 39.58 2 19.79 55.53 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 8.12 6 1.35 3.80 < 0.002 
Word Order x Part 2.00 2 1.00 2.80 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 2.48 6 0.41 1.16 ns 
Within Subiects: involving 31.81 80 0.40 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 16.30 2 8.15 20.50 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 4.77 6 0.79 2.00 ns 
Word Order x Feature Set 4.30 2 2.15 5.40 < 0.006 
Composition x Word Order x Feature 1.85 6 0.31 0.78 ns 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 83.13 160 0.52 
Compound Part x Feature Set 
Compound Part x Feature Set 639.41 4 159.85 307.69 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 41.52 12 3.46 6.66 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 3.22 4 0.80 1.55 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 9.73 12 0.81 1.56 ns 
Feature Set 
Table A4.4 : Mean Signed Difference Scores. Experiment4 
Word Order 1 
diffl diff2 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA -0.143 1.740 1.420 0.799 -0.681 0.611 
AN -0.913 3.683 2.893 0.658 -0.453 0.363 
NA -0.896 2.663 0.732 2.229 -0.700 0.763 
NN -0.608 2.138 0.479 1.608 -1.396 0.758 
-0.639 2.556 1.381 1.324 -0.807 0.624 
3.298 1.141 
Word Order 2 
AA -0.367 1.983 0.760 1.940 -0.813 0.383 
AN -2.242 3.572 1.585 1.822 -0.917 0.496 
NA -1.892 3.104 1.713 2.525 -1.121 1.196 
NN -1.613 2.938 1.178 1.614 -0.767 0.679 
-1.528 2.899 1.309 1.975 -0.905 0.689 
2.680 1.759 
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Table A4.5 : Analysis of Variance of Signed Difference Scores by Subjects, 
Experiment4 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 205.55 87 2.36 
Compound Composition 9.96 3 3.32 1.41 ns 
Word Order 9.10 1 9.10 3.85 ns 
Composition x Word Order 3.78 3 1.26 0.53 ns 
Within Subjects : involving 28.31 87 0.33 
Difference Part 
Difference Part 8.71 1 8.71 26.76 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 12.31 3 4.10 12.62 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part 0.18 1 0.18 0.55 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 5.20 3 1.73 5.33 < 0.002 
Within Subjects : involving 317.69 174 1.83 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 153.11 2 76.55 41.93 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 56.93 6 9.49 5.20 < 0.001 
Word Order x Feature Set 10.53 2 5.27 2.88 ns 
Composition x Word Ordser x Feature 24.46 6 4.08 2.23 < 0.042 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 62.74 174 0.36 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Feature Set 1211.60 2 605.80 1680.2 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 65.15 6 10.86 30.12 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 2.01 2 1.01 2.79 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 10.60 6 1.77 4.90 < 0.001 
Feature Set 
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Table A4.6 : Analysis of Variance of Signed Difference Scores by Materials, 
Experiment4 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 64.30 40 1.61 
Compound Composition 4.95 3 1.65 1.03 ns 
Word Order 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 ns 
Compound Composition x Word Order 2.66 3 0.89 0.55 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 46.49 40 1.16 
Difference Part 
Difference Part 18.95 1 18.95 16.30 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 10.05 3 3.35 2.88 < 0.048 
Word Order x Part 3.06 1 3.06 2.64 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 4.38 3 1.46 1.26 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 164.40 80 2.05 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 30.26 2 15.13 7.36 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 19.42 6 3.24 1.57 ns 
Word Order x Feature Set 0.70 2 0.35 0.17 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Feature 10.57 6 1.76 0.86 ns 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 81.52 80 1.02 
Difference Part x Feature Set 
Difference Part x Feature Set 479.89 2 239.94 235.48 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 23.82 6 3.97 3.90 < 0.002 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 12.45 2 6.23 6.11 < 0.003 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 2.58 6 0.43 0.42 ns 
Feature Set 
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Table A4.7 : Mean Absolute Difference Scores. Experiment4 
Word Order 1 
absdiffl absdiff2 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 1.663 1.993 1.754 1.290 1.097 1.167 
AN 3.621 3.683 3.176 1.044 1.045 1.138 
NA 2.138 2.679 1.688 2.121 1.158 1.421 
NN 2.250 2.379 1.771 1.850 1.746 1.250 
2.418 2.684 2.097 1.576 1.262 1.244 
7.199 4.082 
Word Order 2 
AA 1.253 2.161 1.571 2.149 1.351 1.195 
AN 2.311 3.686 2.685 2.006 1.272 1.238 
NA 2.083 3.188 2.246 2.558 1.396 1.704 
NN 2.029 3.096 2.186 2.067 1.367 1.565 
1.919 3.033 2.172 2.195 1.347 1.426 
7.124 4.968 
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Table A4.8 : Analysis of Variance of Absolute Difference Scores bv Subjects. 
Experiment4 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 67.53 87 0.78 
Compound Composition 50.74 3 16.91 21.79 < 0.001 
Word Order 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 ns 
Composition x Word Order 5.40 3 1.80 2.32 ns 
Within Subjects : involving 139.11 87 1.60 
AbsdiffPart 
AbsdiffPart 104.59 1 104.59 65.41 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 51.84 3 17.28 10.81 < 0.001 
Word Order x Part 4.89 1 4.89 3.06 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 16.85 j 5.62 3.51 < 0.019 
Within Subjects: involving 60.83 174 0.35 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 71.22 2 35.61 101.85 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 5.28 6 0.88 2.52 < 0.023 
Word Order x Feature Set 2.79 2 1.39 3.98 < 0.020 
Composition x Word Ordser x Feature 5.57 6 0.93 2.65 < 0.017 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 209.22 174 1.20 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Feature Set 51.76 2 25.88 21.53 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 6.96 6 1.16 0.96 ns 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 10.62 2 5.31 4.42 < 0.013 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 2.06 6 0.34 .29 ns 
Feature Set 
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Table A4.9 : Analysis of Variance of Absolute Difference Scores by Materials. 
Experiment4 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 16.38 40 0.41 
Compound Composition 17.94 3 5.98 14.61 < 0.001 
Word Order 1.31 1 1.31 3.21 ns 
Compound Composition x Word Order 1.58 3 0.53 1.29 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 76.19 40 1.90 
AbsdiffPart 
AbsdiffPart 55.63 1 55.63 29.21 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 26.07 3 8.69 4.56 < 0.008 
Word Order x Part 1.84 1 1.84 0.97 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Part 4.44 3 1.48 0.78 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 22.10 80 0.28 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 6.67 2 3.34 12.08 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 1.06 6 0.18 0.64 ns 
Word Order x Feature Set 0.30 2 0.15 0.54 ns 
Composition x Word Order x Feature 0.99 6 0.17 0.60 ns 
Set 
Within Subjects: involving 46.78 80 0.58 
Difference Part x Feature Set 
Difference Part x Feature Set 19.62 2 9.81 16.78 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 2.11 6 0.35 0.60 ns 
Word Order x Part x Feature Set 6.13 2 3.06 5.24 < 0.007 
Composition x Word Order x Part x 1.1 6 0.18 0.32 ns 
Feature Set 
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Table A5.1 : Materials, Experiments and Parti of Experiment6 
real novel (orderl) novel (order2) 
oven glove apron filter filter apron 
car door street church church street 
coat hanger weapon clamp clamp weapon 
pen knife candle bottle bottle candle 
tyre lever pitch gum gum pitch 
brick wall drain floor floor drain 
dairy cow airport corn corn airport 
toilet duck tub moss moss tub 
house fly school rice rice school 
computer mouse carpet slug slug carpet 
clay pigeon bridge beaver beaver bridge 
mug tree ladle bear bear ladle 
dog dish animal jar jar animal 
bird cage tea inn inn tea 
fish kettle fruit mop mop fruit 
butterfly net crow pencil pencil crow 
horse shoe plant arrow arrow plant 
daisy wheel giraffe motor motor giraffe 
stag beetle pig parsnip parsnip pig 
crab apple whale pineapple pineapple whale 
cat fish sheep chicken chicken sheep 
tiger moth algae zebra zebra algae 
sparrow hawk lizard bull bull lizard 
eagle owl otter shrimp shrimp otter 
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Table A6.1 : Similarity ratings for Concept Pairs, by Clash/Nonclash and 
Similarity, Experiment6 
clash 
high similarity 
Similarity ratings 
AA 
street church 5 1 4 4 
glove coat 6 1 5 5 
door lever 5 5 4 3 
knife arrow 5 1 5 3 
tyre clamp 
AN 
4 4 3 4 
gum algae 4 1 5 2 
lever horse 3 1 4 2 
coat horse 
NN 
3 4 2 2 
moss corn 5 2 5 4 
lizard bear 5 2 4 5 
moss daisy 5 2 5 5 
lizard sheep 4 4 4 5 
lizard bird 5 5 5 3 
beetle slug 6 7 5 6 
moss parsnip 5 7 4 5 
plant corn 5 2 7 6 
fish bear 5 7 4 5 
algae moss 6 7 6 6 
plant parsnip 6 3 7 6 
bear sheep 6 5 5 5 
sheep bird 4 7 4 5 
sheep chicken 5 4 5 3 
corn parsnip 6 3 5 5 
daisy parsnip 5 5 4 5 
low similarity 
AA 
glove door 2 1 4 1 
knife floor 2 1 2 2 
pencil church 2 1 3 2 
glove lever 3 1 3 1 
glove weapon 3 1 2 1 
floor pencil 3 1 3 1 
door apron 
AN 
2 
1 
3 1 
weapon horse 2 1 2 2 
floor pineapple 2 1 3 1 
arrow pineapple 2 2 1 
apron horse 3 1 2 1 
door horse 2 1 2 2 
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Table A6.1 continued. 
kettle horse 2 1 3 1 
pencil pineapple 2 1 3 1 
NN 
beetle algae 4 2 3 4 
beetle moss 4 2 3 4 
moss crow 4 7 2 3 
plant crow 4 2 3 1 
algae com 5 2 4 2 
algae crow 3 4 4 2 
algae parsnip 4 3 4 2 
corn crow 4 3 4 3 
crow parsnip 4 2 4 2 
No clash 
High Similarity 
AA 
weapon arrow 6 1 7 2 
dish clay 5 2 4 6 
kettle dish 4 1 4 3 
lever clamp 5 1 4 4 
lever pencil 6 1 4 3 
AN 
arrow fly 4 1 4 2 
lever bull 3 2 4 2 
dish animal 2 2 3 4 
wheel animal 3 2 4 2 
weapon bull 4 1 3 3 
NN 
dog giraffe 5 6 5 4 
dog stag 5 6 5 5 
dog tiger 6 6 5 5 
dog zebra 5 4 5 6 
giraffe tiger 5 5 5 6 
giraffe zebra 6 7 5 5 
stag tiger 5 4 5 5 
stag zebra 6 3 5 5 
Low similarity 
AA 
glove tyre 2 1 3 1 
glove wall 2 1 3 1 
church tyre 3 1 2 1 
church gum 2 1 2 1 
coat pencil 2 1 3 1 
lever church 2 1 2 1 
apron street 2 1 3 1 
apron airport 2 1 2 1 
apron tyre 2 1 3 1 
apron clamp 2 1 3 1 
Table A6,1 continued. 
apron wheel 2 1 3 1 
kettle street 2 1 3 1 
church kettle 
AN 
3 
1 
2 
1 
street duck 2 1 2 1 
airport duck 2 1 2 1 
airport bear 2 1 2 1 
kettle moth 2 1 2 1 
tyre cat 2 1 2 1 
glove bull 
NN 
2 
1 
2 
1 
mouse corn 4 4 3 5 
mouse rice 4 1 3 2 
mouse slug 4 3 4 2 
giraffe stag 5 3 5 4 
Table A6.2 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Property Mapping 
Interpretations by Subjects, Experiment6 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 0.56 15 0.04 
Constant 27.02 1 27.02 726.8 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 0.31 15 0.02 
Clash 
Clash 0.02 1 0.02 1.17 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 0.52 15 0.03 
Similarity 
Similarity 1.2 1 1.20 34.45 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 2.32 45 0.05 
Compound Composition 
Compound Composition 3.31 3 1.10 21.39 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 0.76 15 0.05 
Clash x Similarity 
Clash x Similarity 0.29 1 0.29 5.73 < 0.030 
Within Subjects: involving 1.09 45 0.02 
Clash x Compound Composition 
Clash x Compound Composition 0.49 3 0.16 6.71 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 0.98 45 0.02 
Similarity x Compound Composition 
Similarity x Compound Composition 0.38 3 0.13 5.88 < 0.002 
Within Subjects: involving 1.05 45 0.02 
Clash x Similarity x Compound 
Composition 
Clash x Similarity x Compound 0.10 3 0.03 1.42 ns 
Composition 
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Table A6.3 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Property Mapping 
Interpretations by Materials, Experiment6 
Source Sums of d.f. Mean F2 P 
Squares squares 
Main Effects 788.581 5 157.716 13.557 < 0.001 
Clash 7.771 1 7.771 0.668 ns 
Similarity 104.611 1 104.611 8.992 < 0.003 
Compound Composition 516.068 3 172.023 14.787 < 0.001 
2-Way Interactions 171.540 7 24.506 2.107 < 0.046 
Clash x Similarity 34.569 1 34.569 2.972 ns 
Clash x Compound Composition 63.165 3 21.055 1.810 ns 
Similarity x Compound Composition 52.137 3 17.379 1.494 ns 
3-Way Interactions 8.862 3 2.954 0.254 ns 
Clash x Similarity x Compound 8.862 3 2.954 0.254 ns 
Composition 
Table A7.1 : Mean Number of Features used to Correctly Identify Compounds, 
Experiment7 
Real 
nl n2 comp 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 4.25 0.15 0.76 0.78 3.50 1.23 0.09 2.53 2.44 
AN 5.81 0.22 1.24 0.20 3.72 1.28 1.47 1.42 2.47 
NA 3.25 0.17 0.19 0.12 2.78 1.43 2.47 1.57 5.50 
NN 4.36 0.18 0.39 1.38 5.20 0.59 2.62 3.31 1.77 
4.42 0.18 0.65 0.59 3.74 1.69 1.69 4.09 3.10 
sum 5.25 6.02 8.88 
Novel 
AA 4.17 0.24 0.48 0.24 4.38 1.43 1.79 3.21 4.33 
AN 4.00 0.39 0.37 0.06 3.39 1.16 2.08 2.08 2.17 
NA 5.14 0.00 1.28 0.14 4.48 0.81 3.40 3.40 1.90 
NN 3.53 0.12 0.76 0.26 4.56 1.21 2.96 4.88 2.83 
4.21 0.19 0.72 0.18 4.20 1.15 2.64 3.47 2.79 
sum 5.12 5.53 8.90 
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Table A7.2 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Features used to 
Correctly Identify Compounds by Subjects. Experiment? 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 387.04 110 3.52 
Part 63.32 2 31.66 8.998 < 0.001 
Compound Composition 14.58 3 4.86 1.381 ns 
Extensional Status 1.70 1 1.70 0.484 ns 
Part x Composition 48.19 6 8.03 2.283 < 0.041 
Part x Extensional Status 5.58 2 2.79 0.792 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status 10.89 3 3.63 1.032 ns 
Part x Composition x Extensional 40.43 6 6.74 1.915 ns 
Status 
Within Subjects : involving 201.86 220 0.92 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 47.11 2 23.55 25.67 < 0.001 
Part x Feature Set 781.57 4 195.39 212.95 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 24.42 6 4.07 4.44 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 3.99 2 2.00 2.17 ns 
Part x Composition x Feature Set 25.56 12 2.13 2.32 < 0.008 
'art x Extensional Status x Feature Set 8.40 4 2.10 2.29 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 15.77 6 2.63 2.87 < 0.010 
Feature Set 
Part x Composition x Extensional 28.08 12 2.34 2.55 < 0.004 
Status x Feature Set 
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Table A7.3 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Features used to 
Correctly Identify Compounds by Materials. Experiment? 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 26.16 29 0.90 
Compound Composition 17.65 3 5.88 6.52 < 0.002 
Extensional Status 0.82 1 0.82 0.90 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status 13.29 3 4.43 4.91 < 0.007 
Within Subjects: involving 53.32 58 0.92 
Part 
Part 45.67 2 22.84 24.84 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 16.47 6 2.75 2.99 < 0.013 
Extensional Status x Part 2.86 2 1.43 1.55 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x Part 23.50 6 3.92 4.26 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 71.51 58 1.23 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 40.82 2 20.41 16.55 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 11.21 6 1.87 1.52 ns 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 2,51 2 1.26 1.02 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 5.29 6 0.88 0.71 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 105.43 116 0.91 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Feature Set 576.11 4 144.03 158.47 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 32.91 12 2.74 3.02 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 3.83 4 0.96 1.05 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x Part 13.46 12 1.12 1.23 ns 
x Feature Set 
Table A7.4 : Mean Number of Features used to Identify All Compounds. 
Experiment? 
Real nl n2 comp 
fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 fsl fs2 fs3 
AA 4.00 0.44 0.64 0.61 3.61 1.31 0.83 1.47 1.86 
AN 5.89 0.25 1.31 0.28 3.25 1.72 1,44 1.50 2.42 
NA 3.25 0.17 0.19 0.11 2.69 0.61 2.28 3.31 4.36 
NN 4.22 0.22 0.53 1.31 4.78 1.83 2.06 4.31 1.64 
4.34 0.27 0.67 0.58 3.58 1.37 1.47 2.65 2.57 
sum 5.28 5.53 6.69 
Novel 
AA 4.08 0.28 0.67 0.28 3.72 1.78 1.89 2.81 2.94 
AN 3.97 0.39 0.36 0.56 3.25 1.22 1.89 3.11 2.36 
NA 5.03 0.17 1.39 0.17 4.36 0.86 2.28 3.22 1.81 
NN 3.31 0.11 0.94 0.22 4.56 1.14 2.44 2.72 1.64 
4.10 0.24 0.84 0.18 3.97 1.25 2.13 2.97 2.19 
sum 5.18 5.40 7.29 
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Table A7.5 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Features used to 
Identify All Compounds by Subjects, Experiment? 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 323.82 120 2.70 
Part 28.93 2 14.46 5.36 < 0.006 
Compound Composition 5.48 3 1.83 0.68 ns 
Extensional Status 0.18 1 0.18 0.07 ns 
Part x Composition 34.81 6 5.80 2.15 ns 
Part x Extensional Status 1.35 2 0.68 0.25 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status 13.62 3 4.54 1.68 ns 
Part x Composition x Extensional 40.16 6 6.69 2.48 < 0.027 
Status 
Within Subjects : involving 134.45 240 0.56 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 51.98 2 25.99 46.39 < 0.001 
Part x Feature Set 716.68 4 179.17 319.83 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 15.66 6 2.61 4.66 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 2.06 2 1.03 1.84 ns 
Part x Composition x Feature Set 18.46 12 1.54 2.75 < 0.002 
Part x Extensional Status x Feature Set 9.55 4 2.39 4.26 < 0.002 
Composition x Extensional Status x 12.33 6 2.06 3.67 < 0.002 
Feature Set 
Part x Composition x Extensional 21.64 12 1.80 3.22 < 0.001 
Status x Feature Set 
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Table A7.6 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Features used to 
Identify All Compounds by Materials. Experiment? 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 19.68 40 0.49 
Compound Composition 5.48 3 1.83 3.71 < 0.019 
Extensional Status 0.18 1 0.18 0.37 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status 13.62 3 4.54 9.22 < 0.001 
Within Subjects : involving 31.92 80 0.40 
Part 
Part 28.93 2 14.46 36.26 < 0.001 
Composition x Part 34.81 6 5.80 14.54 < 0.001 
Extensional Status x Part 1.35 2 0.68 1.69 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 40.16 6 6.69 16.78 < 0.001 
Part 
Within Subjects: involving 78.68 80 0.98 
Feature Set 
Feature Set 51.98 2 25.99 26.42 < 0.001 
Composition x Feature Set 15.66 6 2.61 2.65 < 0.021 
Extensional Status x Feature Set 2.06 2 1.03 1.05 ns 
Composition x Extensional Status x 12.33 6 2.06 2.09 ns 
Feature Set 
Within Subjects: involving 137.10 160 0.86 
Part x Feature Set 
Part x Feature Set 716.68 4 179.17 209.09 < 0.001 
Composition x Part x Feature Set 18.46 12 1.54 1.80 ns 
Extensional Status x Part x Feature Set 9.55 4 2.39 2.79 < 0.028 
Composition x Extensional Status x 21.64 12 1.80 2.10 < 0.019 
Part x Feature Set 
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Table A8.1 : Materials used in Experiments 
Original Common Nounl Common Noun2 
AA 
pen anvil pen cabinet chapel anvil 
window television window blanket paint television 
key sign key plough bungalow sign 
guitar tent guitar road pill tent 
plug hotel plug plate piston hotel 
radio violin radio fork zip violin 
bomb trowel bomb statue jacket trowel 
flag bell flag railway pan bell 
jug shop jug rocket cafe shop 
taxi magazine taxi beam hospital magazine 
AN 
bullet cactus bullet virus banjo cactus 
coin canary coin salmon basket canary 
cup dolphin cup daffodil phone dolphin 
shed eel shed toad belt eel 
tractor penguin tractor locust bed penguin 
brake monkey brake ape rug monkey 
drum antelope drum barnacle prison antelope 
bus rhubarb bus star badge rhubarb 
igloo forest igloo scorpion camera forest 
corridor caterpillar corridor lion van caterpillar 
NA 
baboon whisk baboon piano camel whisk 
lobster school lobster bar bush school 
ant fort ant spade ivy fort 
porcupine map porcupine saw kangaroo map 
fossil anorak fossil box armadillo anorak 
rat pocket rat chain otter pocket 
carp uniform carp tunnel python uniform 
cabbage drill cabbage canoe cliff drill 
fern beer fern pillow hippopotamus beer 
worm bag worm razor bee bag 
NN 
fox buffalo fox hare oak buffalo 
deer potato deer mole mosquito potato 
fungus puma fungus bird rhinoceros puma 
badger octopus badger grass hamster octopus 
weed shark weed ostrich crocodile shark 
weasel wolf weasel cloud mushroom wolf 
cow snail cow pike turtle snail 
beach leek beach cat vulture leek 
parrot shrew parrot spider volcano shrew 
peacock ocean peacock vine leopard ocean 
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Table A8.2 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Similar Interpretation 
Types by Subjects. Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl p 
Between Subjects 70.44 23 3.06 
Constant 404.80 1 404.80 132.17 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 55.25 46 1.20 
Common Noun 
Common Noun 24.70 2 12.35 10.28 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 99.28 69 1.44 
Compound Composition 
Compound Composition 61.27 3 20.42 14.19 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 113.44 138 0.82 
Common Noun x Compound 
Composition 
Common Noun x Compound 12.96 6 2.16 2.63 < 0.019 
Composition 
Table A8.3 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Similar Interpretation 
Types by Materials. Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 2588.43 36 71.90 
Compound Composition 1977.89 3 659.3 9.17 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 5772.87 72 80.18 
Common Noun 
Common Noun 524.60 2 262.30 3.27 < 0.044 
Common Noun x Compound 294.53 6 49.09 0.61 ns 
Composition 
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Table A8.4 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Similar Interpretation 
Types by Subjects, Excluding NN Compounds. Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
Fl P 
Between Subjects 35.40 23 1.54 
Constant 186.78 1 186.78 121.35 < 0.001 
Within Subjects: involving 48.03 46 1.04 
Common Noun 
Common Noun 11.33 2 5.66 5.42 < 0.008 
Within Subjects: involving 48.24 46 1.05 
Compound Composition 
Compound Composition 4.80 2 2.40 2.29 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 53.10 92 0.58 
Common Noun x Compound 
Composition 
Common Noun x Compound 1.30 4 0.33 0.56 ns 
Composition 
Table AS. 5 : Analysis of Variance of the Mean Number of Similar Interpretation 
Types by Materials, Excluding NN Compounds, Experiments 
Source Sums of 
Squares 
d.f. Mean 
squares 
F2 P 
Between Subjects 1800.30 27 66.68 
Compound Composition 132.82 2 66.41 1.00 ns 
Within Subjects: involving 2962.40 54 54.86 
Common Noun 
Common Noun 280.16 2 140.08 2.55 0.087 
Common Noun x Compound 48.11 4 12.03 0.22 9.27 
Composition 
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